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Abstract 
Web services, cloud computing and e-commerce require interaction protocols that can meet the 
functional and non-functional requirements of interacting entities. Composing secure interaction 
protocols dynamically continue to pose a number of challenges, such as lack of standard notations for 
expressing security requirements, difficulty in incorporating them into business processes, and the 
difficulty involved in enforcing them. Trust too plays a vital role as any interaction between unknown 
entities may require finding common trusted intermediaries. If such intermediaries are to be selected 
automatically trust relationships must be modelled explicitly reflecting past experiences. Such trust 
relationships must be made category specific as an intermediary trusted for medical transactions may 
not be trusted for finance related ones.  
 
Securing messages sent through one or more intermediaries require devising schemes that provide 
end-to-end security guarantees. In the past, e-commerce protocols such as SET were created to provide 
such guarantees taking into consideration the underlying business processes, trust relationships and 
security requirements. However, such protocols assumed a standard configuration with fixed 
requirements and static trust relationships. Furthermore, complex hand crafted protocols proved 
difficult to model check. This thesis addresses the end-to-end problems in an open dynamic setting 
where trust relationships evolve, and requirements of interacting entities vary. Trust relationships too 
are assumed to vary reflecting past transactions and their categories. Interacting entities are allowed to 
specify trust, security and business related requirements for data elements exchanged. To reduce the 
need for model checking a structured synthesis approach was pursued.  
 
Before interaction protocols can be synthesised at runtime based on underlying business, trust and 
security requirements, a number of research questions must be addressed. Firstly, to meet end-to-end 
security requirements, the security level along the message path must be made to reflect the 
requirements of all interacting parties. Thus, security schemes enforcing them must be created 
dynamically. Secondly, if entities are to interact with unknown entities using different types of 
messages at runtime, a form of institutional trust framework which provides category specific 
endorsements is necessary. Such a framework requires both direct and indirect endorsers as direct 
endorsers known to all parties may not exist. Thirdly, if all such endorsers are to be held liable, a 
technique must be devised to make them accountable. 
 
The thesis proposes a number of solutions to address the research problems. End-to-end security 
requirements were arrived by aggregating security requirements of all interacting parties. These 
requirements were enforced by interleaving and composing basic schemes derived from challenge-
response mechanisms. The trust policies were devised to allow evolution and establishments of trust 
relationships. The institutional trust promoting mechanism devised allowed all vital data to be 
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endorsed by authorised category specific intermediaries. Intermediaries were made accountable for 
their endorsements by being required to discharge or transfer proof obligations placed on them, using 
explicit cryptographic evidence.   
 
The techniques devised for aggregating and enforcing security requirements allow creation of end-to-
end security schemes at runtime. The novel interleaving technique devised allows creation of provably 
secure multiparty schemes for any number of recipients. The structured technique combining 
compositional approach with appropriate invariants and preconditions makes model checking of 
synthesised schemes unnecessary. Simulation results show that trusted paths through large 
endorsement trust networks can be generated at runtime using the hierarchical clustering technique 
devised. The proposed institutional trust mechanism promotes trust in e-commerce by endorsing both 
message originator and recipients. The notion of proof obligation and the techniques for discharging 
them allows derivation of schemes that make intermediaries accountable. The proposed framework 
combining endorsement trust with schemes making intermediaries accountable provides a way to 
alleviate distrust between previously unknown e-commerce entities. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction    
The dramatic growth of e-commerce applications in the last decade can be attributed to the ready 
availability of information about products and services, increased trading options and reduced 
overheads. Ebay, for example, has made it possible for anyone to buy and sell many different 
categories of item without incurring excessive middleman costs. Businesses too have benefited greatly 
through more effective ways of conducting business-to-business transactions. Supply chains can now 
automatically take advantage of globally competitive prices using enabling technologies such as web 
service composition. Though emerging technologies allow services to be combined to meet the 
required functionality, at present end-to-end security and trust requirements are not adequately 
addressed [2]. Failing to address these real concerns can result in loss of revenue, loss of  privacy, 
mistrust and increased cost [3]. Level of privacy is a major concern in e-commerce as any purchase 
related data may be distributed to other entities [4]. 
 
Protocols are simple programs that describe the order in which specific data elements must be 
exchanged between interacting parties to achieve specific goals. Security protocols use additional 
cryptographic elements and operations to meet various security goals such as data integrity and 
authentication. These security goals are met based on computational infeasibility of specific 
cryptographic operations without the necessary keys. Such goals are vital for e-commerce to ensure 
that interacting parties can be made accountable for their actions and to ensure confidential 
information is disclosed only to specific parties. E-commerce also requires protocols that provide end-
to-end security assurances as data are often routed though one or more intermediaries.  
 
A number of protocol suites have been devised to promote security and privacy in e-commerce 
applications in the last two decades [5-8]. For example, the SSL (TLS) suite provides privacy, 
authentication and integrity services between any two points [9], while application layer protocols 
provide end-to-end security for transactions involving electronic payments [6, 10-13]. The  Internet 
Open Trading Protocol (IOTP) is a complex suite of protocols that defines transactions for purchase, 
refund, deposit, withdrawal and value exchange [8]. These protocols have specific strengths and have 
served well the type of configurations for which they were created. However, they are not designed to 
meet the goals and constraints of dynamically composed services where the type of resulting 
configuration is not known in advance [14]. For example, the SET purchase protocol requires 
messages between customer, merchant and payment gateway to be passed with specific encryption in 
a predefined order assuming standard goals for interacting entities. However, a specific merchant may 
require all messages from unknown entities to be routed through trusted intermediaries as a risk 
mitigation strategy, while the customer may want a greater level of privacy depending on the type of 
transaction. Collaboration between such entities is possible only if  custom designed protocols can be 
synthesised based on  functional and non-functional requirements [15-17].   
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Manually designing even simple security protocols is known to be error prone [18]. Hence, 
development and adoption of new security protocols is notoriously slow, often lasting many months, 
or even years [19]. It involves hand-crafting successive versions and verifying them for security 
assurances. Though model checkers can help in verification, they cannot automatically rectify the 
errors detected. Furthermore, existing model checkers suffer from combinatorial explosion as the 
number of paths an adversary can exploit increases exponentially with the number of steps in the 
protocol. These problems are exacerbated in e-commerce, where requirements are becoming more 
complex, often in response to government legislation and customer demand for increased 
accountability and privacy. Existing verification techniques can only be used in very simple protocols 
unless many simplifying assumptions are made to reduce their complexity [6, 11, 12].  Analysis of 
past protocol errors has revealed many protocol attacks could have been thwarted by using some 
common constructs [20, 21]. Using such constructs during design can reduce the number of revisions 
required and, consequently, the time period for adoption of new protocols. Therefore, research interest 
in security protocols has shifted from purely verification techniques to include creation techniques that 
prevent known attacks, and techniques that allow safe composition of existing protocols [22-26].  
 
The full potential of e-commerce for collaboration is not fully exploited mainly due to the lack of trust 
promoting mechanisms [27]. Traditional commerce has used endorsements and guarantees to establish 
trust relationships with unknown parties. Intermediaries are often hierarchically organised where lower 
level endorsements are necessary before obtaining higher level ones. E-commerce too can benefit from 
such intermediaries that can provide the necessary endorsements and guarantees [28, 29]. Such 
intermediary selection is possible only if they are organised according to the types of endorsements 
they provide; a credit agency may endorse an entity for its creditworthiness but not character. 
Furthermore, trust in traditional commerce is a non-binary relation where the level of trust built up 
often determines the type of transaction that can be undertaken. E-commerce too, can profit from 
multilevel trust, if trust policies can be devised to regulate the extent of trust relationships based on 
past conduct. 
 
If intermediaries are to be made accountable for their actions, security protocols should incorporate 
explicit evidences [30]. For example, an intermediary may prove that it endorsed data only after it was 
endorsed by a previous intermediary along the data path, or that it sent data authenticated only after 
receiving it authenticated. An endorsement intermediary directly endorsing data must be able to prove 
that its endorsement follows the predefined rules for such a data category in order to discharge its 
liability. Any intermediary failing to discharge its proof obligation may be penalised by having their 
trust relationships lowered or severed.  
 
The difficulty in creating security protocols often stems from the difficulty of specifying the 
requirements precisely [31]. Even the flawed Needham-Schroeder protocol was a result of 
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misinterpretation of initial assumptions by protocol designers [32]. In defence of their protocol, 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham reasoned that they had assumed that principals do not divulge their own 
keys. Failing to clearly document design phase assumptions has made verification of e-commerce 
protocols difficult [6, 32]. Also, many of the security properties such as authentication and non-
repudiation lack a standard definition [33]. Thus, before any attempt is made to automate the 
generation of security protocols, the precise meaning of security properties must be defined.  
 
Security properties such as receiver non-repudiation, confidentiality, integrity, fair exchange and data 
origin authentication are essential for e-commerce transactions. Attempts to graft security such 
properties at a later stage in the design have been largely unsatisfactory, primarily due to increased 
cryptographic overheads. Cryptographic overheads can be reduced if the cost of security is used as a 
criterion in the service selection stage itself. Moreover, lack of fine-grained security schemes also lead 
to increased security overheads as a higher level of security assurance is provided than strictly 
necessary. If the e-commerce user base is to be extended to mobile and wireless devices, security 
concerns must be balanced with performance issues. Wireless applications, for example, must balance 
the risk posed by open communication channels with modest processing capabilities of resource  
constrained devices [34]. This trade-off between security and cost can be made easier if the protocol 
costs (both line and processing costs) can be estimated as a function of the protocol security strength, 
based on the underlying cryptographic elements and schemes.  
 
An extensive literature review failed to reveal any past protocol synthesis attempt combining trust, and 
security. Such an approach can make it easier to achieve the right trade-offs between security, trust 
and performance, though it requires a number of research challenges to be overcome. The next section 
presents a brief survey of existing e-commerce security protocols and the challenges facing them, 
which provide the main motivation for this research. The following four sections summarise the 
research questions, the outline of the solution, the benefits/rationale for the approach and the 
contributions respectively.  
1.1 E-Commerce Security Protocols  
Standard security protocols such as TLS provide assurances data authentication, data integrity and 
confidentiality [9]. Security protocols for e-commerce and distributed systems must also include other 
important properties such as entity authentication, non-repudiation and recency [9,48].  The entity 
authentication property (EA) allows an entity to authenticate itself to another. The data security 
properties include recency (R), data authentication (A) and data integrity (DI), secrecy (S) and receiver 
non-repudiation (RNR). The receiver non-repudiation property provides data originator non-repudiable 
evidence for data receipt, while all other properties provide assurance to the data recipient. The 
purpose and example for these properties are listed in Table 1.1. 
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Property Purpose Example 
Data 
Authentication (A) 
Provides the recipient of data  the 
assurance that  data originated from 
a specific trusted entity and that it is 
the intended recipient 
An agent entity performing a transaction on 
behalf of a customer may want the assurance 
that data originated from a valid client and 
was directed to it (not to some other entity) 
Entity 
Authentication 
(EA) 
Provides assurance about the 
identity of an entity 
Before a customer can forward a message to 
an authorised agent the customer may want 
the assurance that the agent is what it claims 
to be. 
Data Integrity (DI) Gives data recipient the assurance 
that data has not been tampered 
with during transit 
An agent entity acting on behalf of a customer 
may want the assurance that data was not 
altered during transit 
Recency (R) Gives data recipient the assurance 
that data is not stale, i.e., data was 
sent within a specific timeframe 
A stock-broker may want the assurance that 
the data containing buy/sell instructions is 
recent   
Receiver  
Non-Repudiation 
(RNR) 
Assures data originator that data 
receipt cannot be denied at a later 
time. 
A company submitting a tender may want the 
assurance that the recipient cannot deny 
receiving the data  
Secrecy (S) Limits access to specific parts of  
data 
A customer may send credit information to 
the bank indirectly through a merchant but 
without giving direct access 
   
 
                      
All properties other than secrecy are considered correspondence properties, and are enforced at 
message level. Standard protocols used for e-commerce can be classified into point-to-point and end-
to-end protocols.  Point-to-point protocols are applicable when data are exchanged between two 
parties only, while end-to-end protocols provide security assurances even when data is sent through 
one or more intermediaries.  
 
End-to-End Security 
End-to-end security is vital in e-commerce as messages are often sent through one or more 
intermediaries. In the case of SET protocols designed for e-commerce, end-to-end security properties 
are preserved by using dual signature schemes. Such schemes allow a customer to send data through a 
merchant without disclosing all the data elements. However, such protocols are restricted to specific 
configurations and security properties, making their applicability limited. Protocols synthesised in this 
thesis attempt to meet the security needs of all interacting entities regardless of intermediaries through 
which they are despatched, thus providing end-to-end security guarantees. It guarantees end-to-end 
security by assigning a security level for all data exchanges along the message which is a function of 
security requirements of all interacting entities.  
DEFINITION 1.1 END-TO-END SECURITY  
An entity A provides end-to-end security assurance s  {A,RNR,DI,S,EA,R} to another entity B if the 
security assurance s is provided for each edge along the path from A to B. 
 
Table 1.1 Purpose of e-Commerce Security Properties 
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Fine-Grained Security Properties 
Aggregating security properties requires fine-grained security properties to be defined. For example, a 
message sender may require non-repudiation assurance while one message recipient may require the 
recency assurance while another requires the authentication assurance. Fine-grained security 
properties allow end-to-end security requirements to be met by allowing security requirements along 
the message path to be aggregated. The fine-grained properties proposed in this thesis are made up of a 
combination of basic and composite security properties providing every combination of common 
security properties. A protocol devised dynamically can provide such assurances only if provably 
correct security schemes exist that can enforce such security requirements at runtime. In this thesis 
such schemes are derived using a compositional approach.    
DEFINITION 1.2 FINE-GRAINED SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Fine-grained security properties are made up of all the elements in the powerset of all correspondence 
security properties of interest. 
For example, if {A,RNR,DI,EA} represent the set of all correspondence security properties of interest 
then fine-grained security properties are made up of {}, {A},{RNR}, …. {A,RNR,DI,EA}. 
 
Studying the merits and shortcomings of these standard security protocols which are presented next, 
provides a useful reference point for automatic generation of security protocols.  
1.1.1 Standard E-Commerce Security Protocols 
The most widely used security protocols among those developed over the last two decades include 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC), 
and Internet Open Trading Protocol (IOTP) among others.  Two typical protocols have been chosen to 
illustrate the role of security protocols. SSL, a widely used protocol that provides point-to-point 
security, is presented first, followed by SET, a well-known application layer protocol designed to 
provide end-to-end security. These two protocols are typical of transport layer and application layer 
security protocols, providing point-to-point and end-to-end security. Though these protocols were 
designed independently, many implementations combine these protocols [9].   
1.1.1.1 The SSL Protocol (now known as TLS) 
The SSL/TLS [9] protocol was originally developed by Netscape to enable communication between 
web server and web browser. SSL allows peer processes on network devices to exchange messages 
securely via sockets. With respect to the OSI reference model, SSL lies between the transport and 
application layers as it runs under application layer protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) and above the transport control protocol (TCP), as shown in Figure 1.1. An SSL session is an 
association between two entities that have a common set of cryptographic attributes and parameters. 
An SSL session is started whenever a client connects to a server, and it can remain active for up to 24 
hours. In the first phase of SSL, the identification of parties, negotiation of attributes (such as the 
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hashing algorithm) and exchange of keys take place. In the second phase, data are exchanged using 
negotiated attributes and parameters.  
 
 
 
 
Even though commonly used, SSL has a number of shortcomings. It is vulnerable to session hijacking, 
where the bridge between encrypted and non-encrypted parts in HTTPS is attacked. It lacks receiver 
non-repudiation service, which requires evidence of receipt that can be presented to third parties. It 
also lacks the fair exchange property, which ensures that no party gains unfair advantage when an e-
commerce transaction is aborted half-way.  
1.1.1.2 The SET Protocol  
The SET protocol is an application layer protocol specification jointly designed by Visa and 
MasterCard to secure bankcard transactions over open networks such as the internet. It is a large 
protocol with many optional features and with documentation amounting to over 1000 pages. SET 
introduced two new entities into the architecture: a certifying authority and a payment gateway as 
shown in Figure 1.2. The certifying authority validates the actors and the payment gateway acts as an 
intermediary between the internet and the banking network that links acquirer and issuing institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The SET protocol consists of sub-protocols for the following transactions. 
 Registration of cardholder 
 Delivery of certificates 
 Purchase transactions 
 Payment authorisation 
 Payment capture to initiate clearance on behalf of merchants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Entities in SET Protocol 
 
HTTP FTP SMTP 
SSL/TLS 
Telnet 
TCP 
Figure 1.1 Hierarchy of Protocol Layers 
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     Internet 
Secure Financial Network 
 
Merchant Cardholder 
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End-to-end security requirements are handled in SET by allowing integrity verification of data  
elements without revealing the contents. Semantic constraints are met by linking together specific data 
elements and by passing them in a specific order. For example, SET allows a customer to send 
purchase-order details and payment instructions together to the merchant with the implicit 
understanding that the payment instruction is to be forwarded to the payment gateway only if the 
merchant can meet the purchase-order requirements. Though the merchant can verify the integrity of 
the payment instructions received, it cannot access the details contained therein. This feature is 
enforced in SET using a dual signature, which requires signing hashes of data elements by multiple 
parties. The SET protocol, though effective in meeting end-to-end properties, is limited to bank 
transactions.  If security protocols are to be widely applicable for e-commerce, interacting parties must 
be allowed to specify end-to-end requirements.  
1.1.2 Past Research and the need for a Holistic Approach to Synthesis 
E-commerce and web services must synthesise protocols dynamically if entities are to interact 
flexibly. Traditionally, e-commerce protocols such as SET were represented as a sequence of 
messages without explicitly capturing the underlying semantics of messages and their dependencies. 
Use of such protocols however, does not allow emerging opportunities through changing market 
conditions to be exploited. In a dynamic setting, the extent and types of non-functional properties must 
reflect evolving trust relationships. For example, the level of security assurances needed between 
entities may vary depending on their past relationships. Though some recent work has captured the 
semantics of messages through commitments and AI planning techniques, non-functional aspects have 
not been addressed [1, 94, 95]. Others have focussed exclusively on non-functional aspects such as 
end-to-end trust, security and response time without considering the underlying semantics of messages 
[2, 35, 36]. Others modelling non-functional attributes have taken a piecemeal approach, considering 
only one issue at a time, such as trust [17, 37-42] or security [2, 15-17, 43].  If protocols are to be 
generated dynamically they must be made to work within resource and bandwidth constraints imposed 
by underlying devices and mediums. None of the past synthesis approach surveyed model such trade-
offs. These and other challenges are presented in greater details in Section 3.4. 
 
1.1.3 Difficulties Creating Security Protocols for E-Commerce 
The difficulties with designing and analysing security protocols stem from a number of considerations: 
 Many of the properties that security protocols are designed to provide are extremely subtle. 
Some security properties such as authentication allow multiple interpretations. Basic properties, 
defined in Chapter 3, are combined to create more complex properties with precise meanings. 
 A structured approach to composition is difficult as it must rule out any adverse interactions. 
Two protocols providing different security properties cannot always be safely combined to 
provide multiple properties. These problems are addressed in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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 Security protocols often operate in a hostile environment where adversaries mount attacks using 
their capabilities and the messages they intercept. Some common attacks, and techniques 
devised to counter these attacks, are presented in Chapter 3. 
 If e-commerce entities are to be made accountable, security protocols must incorporate explicit 
evidence for third parties. Techniques to enforce accountability are presented in Chapter 5. 
 Many e-commerce security problems are the result of underlying trust model which only allows 
an entity to completely trust or completely distrust another. Such a binary trust model is 
inadequate to represent the trust relationships in real life where different levels of trust exists 
[44].  A new non-binary trust model is presented in Chapter 4. 
These factors highlight the need for a structured approach using a common framework that models 
security components, underlying trust relationships, workflow restrictions, semantic constraints and 
data dependencies.   
1.2 Challenges Facing Synthesis of E-Commerce Protocols 
Incorporating Security and Trust 
Section 1.1.2 identified some of the shortcomings in past e-commerce protocol synthesis attempts, and 
in particular, the need for a holistic approach taking into consideration both functional and non-
functional requirements. This section summarises some of the challenges that must be overcome 
before such a holistic approach can be devised incorporating business requirements as well as security 
and trust considerations. 
 
Aggregating Security Requirements  
If protocols are to be created dynamically the security properties for each message must be set 
aggregating the security goals specified by the data originator and recipients. Currently basic and 
composite security properties lack a standard definition [33, 47, 48]. Basic security properties usually 
provide assurances to either the data originator or the recipient. Composite properties formed can be 
easily misinterpreted unless the order in which basic properties must be met is explicitly defined.  
Lack of well-defined security properties was a major cause of past security protocol flaws [31].  
 
Composing Cryptographic Schemes  
Unlike other areas of computer science, security schemes are less amenable to a compositional 
approach; two security schemes meeting distinct goals are known to interfere with the goals of one 
another when directly composed [26]. Security schemes for basic properties, however, can be 
composed to arrive at valid schemes for composite properties only when they are non-interfering. To 
allow composite schemes to be created for every security level, schemes should be made non-
interfering, and where this is not possible, the conditions under which they are composed should be 
made explicit.  
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Security and Performance   
Security requirements and performance constraints vary with types of network, device characteristics 
and transaction values. Performance bottlenecks are introduced by additional cryptographic elements 
that increase the bandwidth and the processing cost in terms of time and CPU cycles. Finding the right 
trade-offs requires devising schemes with cryptographic elements with varying security-strength to 
cost ratios. Comparing protocol costs requires a cost model parameterised in terms of underlying 
elements [49, 50].    
 
Strengthening Protocols Against Common Attacks 
Security protocols are vulnerable to a number of subtle attacks. Wireless and mobile devices open up 
many new avenues that can be exploited by adversaries [51, 52]. Preventing or reducing such attacks 
requires strengthening security schemes with additional counter measures, making the cost of attacks 
very high. 
 
Modelling Trust in E-commerce 
While cryptographic schemes can verify an identity or prove the origin of a resource they cannot 
prevent a dishonest-merchant supplying faulty goods. Cryptographic schemes therefore must be 
combined with intermediary mechanisms to promote trust between unknown entities [42, 53, 54].  
Trust is central to traditional commerce. Many trust promoting mechanisms have evolved over the 
years. Trust in the physical world is considered to be directed, non-binary, category specific and 
dynamic. It is directed because A may trust B to pick good stocks, although the reverse may not be 
true. It is dynamic because A may stop trusting B after an adverse incident. It is category specific in 
the same way that one may trust a mechanic to repair a car but not a plumber. Trust is non-binary as a 
company may extend a credit limit up to $100,000 for one customer and only $10,000 to another. In e-
commerce where there are no direct contacts, trust capital which reflects past experiences plays an 
even greater role. However, none of the protocol synthesis techniques have taken a holistic approach 
combining security aspects with dynamic trust relationships. 
 
Need for End-to-End Security Schemes and Accountability 
Before e-commerce can use one or more endorsement intermediaries, end-to-end schemes that make 
all intermediaries accountable for their actions must be devised. Many of the e-commerce security 
protocols lack an accountability mechanism that provides the means to associate an action with a 
specific entity [30]. Enforcing accountability requires incorporating sufficient cryptographic evidence 
to be presented to a third party adjudicator to prove misconduct, similar to audit trails in traditional 
commerce.  Lack of such end-to-end schemes poses major challenges in e-commerce and web 
services.  
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Protocols for E-Commerce 
Design of security protocols for e-commerce has proven difficult due to the interaction between 
security mechanisms and features necessary for e-commerce. For example, fair exchange feature 
requires no e-commerce party gain undue advantage at any stage of the protocol.  
 
Synthesis problems combining security, trust and performance are difficult to solve as they require a 
multi-objective search criteria. However, such problems can be solved using a layered approach if they 
can be reformulated into disjoint sub-problems [55]. Though such techniques cannot guarantee 
optimality, they can help find feasible solutions.  
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1.3 Research Questions   
Protocol synthesis problems have posed many challenges which researchers from different disciplines 
including distributed systems [56-58], artificial intelligence [57, 59], security protocols [23, 25, 60, 
61] and e-commerce and web services [15, 35, 61-63] have attempted to address. This thesis addresses 
research questions related to synthesis of end-to-end security schemes through trusted endorsement 
intermediaries. Section 1.3.1 lists the main research questions pursued in this thesis. 
 
1.3.1 Main Research Questions Pursued in this Thesis 
Fine-grained Security Properties and Provably Correct Schemes (Chapter 3) 
 E-commerce protocols (such as SET Purchase protocol) are designed to provide end-to-end 
security guarantees for all interacting entities even when data is sent through third parties. 
Before such protocols can be synthesised dynamically the following research question must be 
answered: How can end-to-end security requirements be made a function of security 
requirements of all interacting parties? 
 A modular approach to security schemes has proven to be difficult as even valid schemes are 
shown to interfere when directly combined, leading to the research question: How can a 
structured approach be devised to create provably correct schemes for fine-grained security 
properties?  
 E-commerce and web services require proven schemes to despatch messages to multiple 
recipients in a specific order, leading to the research question: How can two-party schemes be 
safely extended to any number of recipients?   
 If protocols are to be synthesised to work within device constraints, security performance 
trade-offs are necessary, leading to the research question: How can the cryptographic elements 
with highest security strength that work within cost constraints be selected? 
 
A New Institutional Framework for Promoting Trust between Unknown Entities (Chapter 4) 
 Traditional commerce flourished only after institutional trust promoting mechanisms such as 
endorsements were introduced. This leads to the research question: How can an institutional 
trust framework for e-commerce be designed which allows vital data to be endorsed by 
authorised category specific intermediaries? 
 If trusted paths are to be generated at runtime, trust relationships must be maintained centrally. 
In traditional commerce, existing trust relationships continue to evolve through direct 
experience while new trust relationships are established through recommendations. This leads 
to the research question: How can a centralized trust network allow establishment and 
evolution of trust relationships?   
12 
 Trusted paths for e-commerce may require data to be passed through large networks involving 
many hierarchical domains. This leads to the research question: How can the algorithms and 
data structures used for generating trusted path be made scalable?  
 
End-to-End Security Schemes (Chapter 5)   
 The validity of a message sent through multiple endorsement intermediaries depends on 
integrity of data and endorsements along the path. This leads to the research question: How 
can end-to-end schemes be devised that provide both data and endorsement security?    
 When messages are sent through multiple endorsement intermediaries, misconduct by any 
entity or intermediary may cause a transaction failure. This leads to the research question: 
How can end-to-end schemes be devised that make all endorsement intermediaries and trading 
entities accountable for their actions? 
 Protocols must be synthesised at run time if protocol paths through intermediaries are to 
reflect existing trust relationships. This raises the research question: How can newly 
synthesised protocols be distributed and enforced by all entities and intermediaries along the 
protocol path?  
1.4 The Approach Proposed in this Thesis 
Many current security challenges cannot be solved unless the underlying model combines the security 
architecture with trust based mechanisms. For example, mobility features make it difficult to verify the 
identity and the origin of a mobile agent unless a trust-enhanced security architecture is devised where 
such agents can only be received through specific other entities [170]. Similarly, end-to-end auditing is 
critical in service oriented architectures where services use a number of other heterogeneous services. 
Securing such services requires combining existing trust relationships with end-to-end accountability 
schemes [169]. E-health collaborations too, depend on combining trust establishment through 
intermediaries with security features, before common resources can be shared [168]. The underlying 
security features can vary from domain to domain but common features include data integrity, 
authentication, privacy and secrecy.  
 
To address such problems this thesis studies the feasibility of creating a structured approach for 
creating end-to-end accountability schemes through trusted intermediaries with the required security 
properties at runtime using: 
 a security framework that employs provably secure two-party schemes that provide the exact 
security requirements specified.  
 a framework that establishes trust by allowing key data to be sent through category specific 
endorsement intermediaries with the required trust relationships. 
 a framework that allows end-to-end security schemes to be derived and enforced that makes 
data originator, recipients and intermediaries accountable.  
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The synthesis problem is decomposed and solved using 3 distinct layers, as shown in Table 1.2.  
 
No. Layer Name Layer Functionality 
1  Fine-grained Security Layer Defines fine-grained security properties and devises two-party 
security schemes that are provably correct.  
2 Trust Establishment Layer Creates trusted paths through category specific endorsement 
intermediaries. 
3 End-to-End Security Layer Derives provably secure end-to-end security schemes that 
make all intermediaries along the trusted path accountable. 
 
 
The Fine-grained Security Layer (Layer 1 in Table 1.2) focuses on developing provably secure 
schemes for enforcing basic and composite security properties. The main steps in the proposed 
solution are outlined below.  
 
 Basic security properties of interest are identified and classified into correspondence 
properties (for which there is a one-to-one mapping between send and receive events) and 
non-correspondence properties such as secrecy. Correspondence properties are enforced at 
message level while secrecy is enforced at data element level.  
 Basic security properties are made to include features necessary for e-commerce such as fair 
exchange.  
 The correspondence properties are combined to form fine-grained security levels. Any 
emergent behaviour required for composite properties is made explicit.   
 The invariants and assumptions necessary for enforcing basic properties are made explicit. 
 All security schemes are strengthened to withstand common attacks such as replay and type-
flaw attacks.  
 Security schemes for multiple properties are formed by combining the schemes for basic 
properties when their assumptions and invariants are not in conflict. Otherwise, non-
interfering schemes are created before combining them. 
 Basic schemes are proved using an approach similar to that used in secure protocol 
composition logic (SPCL) presented in Section 2.3.2.2. The validity of composite schemes 
follows directly from the compositional logic used to combine non-interfering basic schemes.      
 Security schemes for multiple recipients are created by interleaving two-party schemes. 
 Computational overheads for correspondence properties are estimated at message level while  
secrecy is estimated at data element level. 
 
Table 1.2 Layers in the Framework 
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The Trust Establishment Layer (Layer 2 in Table 1.2) establishes trust between unknown 
intermediaries by exchanging key messages through category specific endorsement intermediaries. 
The main steps in the proposed solution are outlined below. 
 Intermediaries are classified according to the data categories they are authorised to endorse. 
Intermediaries may perform direct endorsements based on knowledge of data elements or 
indirect endorsements based on trust placed in other intermediaries.     
 A heuristic algorithm devised with varying weights for trust, performance and cost parameters 
helps create data paths with the required trade-offs.  
 A non-binary trust model allows for growth/decay in trust relationships based on group and 
individual policies. Group policies reflect past positive experience, while individual policies 
reflect the trust disposition of entities for the specific domain and category. 
 Large trust networks are decomposed into smaller domains to allow for efficient trusted path 
retrieval. Retrieval times can be further reduced by creating trusted paths offline.  
 
The End-to-End Security Layer (Layer 3 in Table 1.2) creates the necessary end-to-end security 
schemes that allow intermediaries to be held accountable for their actions.  
 End-to-end schemes are derived by combining the cryptographic evidences needed for 
intermediaries to transfer, delegate or discharge proof obligations. Intermediaries failing to 
produce the necessary evidences are considered to have breached trust assumptions. 
 All messages passed through category specific intermediaries contain a variable part, in 
addition to the fixed part containing the data from originator. The data in the variable part can 
be altered by each subsequent intermediary reflecting its own endorsement.  
 All schemes include a server signed digest made up of valid trusted paths, data category and a 
hash of original data. These server signed elements allow the path through which data are 
received to be validated by intermediaries and recipients. Both source and destination proof 
obligations are discharged only after validating the intermediary responses with server signed 
digests.  
 The minimum security level along any edge in the data path is determined based on the end-
to-end security requirements of data originator and recipients using that path. The server 
annotates this security levels along each edge in the trusted path generated.   
 
1.5 The Benefits/Rationale of the Proposed Framework 
The main benefits of the overall system and each individual layer are outlined briefly in this section. 
The overall benefits result from the holistic approach used in this framework modelling trust and 
security issues together.  Benefits from each individual layer result from techniques devised to specify 
and enforce trust and security requirements.    
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Overall Framework 
 This framework makes end-to-end security solutions possible by modelling the cyclic 
relationship that exists between trust and end-to-end guarantees. End-to-end guarantees 
require selecting intermediaries with good trust relationships (which reflect their past 
conducts), while trust relationships are adjusted based on the type of trust breaches detected 
by the end-to-end accountability schemes.    
 Endorsements and guarantees are an essential part of institutional trust in traditional 
commerce. However, there has been no past attempt to dynamically select direct and indirect 
endorsements intermediaries based on category of e-commerce transactions.  This framework 
allows key messages to be despatched through trusted category specific endorsement 
intermediaries, which provide a form of risk mitigation when interacting with unknown 
entities. The end-to-end schemes devised make all intermediaries accountable for their actions.  
 The exact security level along the message path can be determined dynamically by 
aggregating fine-grained security requirements specified by interacting parties.  The meaning 
of each fine-grained security property (formed by combining commonly used properties) is 
made precise by defining emergent behaviours, thus avoiding past protocol flaws through 
misinterpretation of security properties.  The pre-created, provably secure cryptographic 
schemes for each fine-grained security property allow security protocols meeting requirements 
to be automatically synthesised. 
 By modelling security and trust requirements at the data element level, this framework reduces 
the overall endorsement or security overheads. For example, when an entity sends a quote 
request that has no inherent value and involves no commitment, security assurances and 
intermediary endorsements need not be prescribed.   
 
Benefits of the Fine-grained Security Layer 
 Minimum security levels along the message path can be expressed as a function of the end-to-
end security requirements of data originator and recipients, using the operations defined over 
fine-grained security properties. Enforcing the minimum security level helps to reduce the cost 
of security.  
 The cost model allows computational costs and bandwidth of synthesised protocols to be used 
as the basis of selection when multiple protocols meet security and functional needs. 
Furthermore, by expressing the protocol cost in terms of underlying security strength of 
cryptographic operations, the model allows performance bottlenecks to be met (by lowering 
the security strength when necessary).   
 The process of creating new protocols can be expedited by combining provably secure 
cryptographic schemes for fine-grained security properties with schemes that resist common 
attacks.  
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 The generic process devised for creating fine-grained security schemes may be extended to 
include other less common properties such as anonymity, subject to finding non-conflicting 
schemes.      
 
Benefits of the Trust Establishment Layer 
 The proposed architecture allows e-commerce entities to exchange vital messages through 
authorised category specific intermediaries. Such endorsements promote trust by providing a 
form of risk mitigation. Direct intermediaries endorse messages based on domain knowledge 
of entities, while indirect intermediaries endorse messages based on endorsements by trusted 
intermediaries.  
 Trusted paths can be selected according to differing criteria that reflect the type of 
environment and the perception of entities. For example, in one domain low intermediary cost 
may be set as the prime factor by attaching to it a greater weight than transitive depth and trust 
relationships.  
 A self-regulating trust network is made possible using policies that allow trust evolution and 
trust transfer. Trust evolution reflects past conduct, allowing trustworthy intermediaries to 
build up their trust capital over time. Trust transfer allows new trust relationships to be 
established, thus reducing the number of intermediaries required. 
 Endorsement costs are lowered by sharing common endorsements for data sent to multiple 
recipients. 
 
Benefits of the End-to-End Security Layer 
 Intermediaries are made accountable using explicit cryptographic evidences in end-to-end 
schemes that can be presented to a third party. The ability to prove breach of trust provides the 
basis for revoking endorsement capability and lowering trust relationships, thus serving as a 
deterrent to misconduct.    
 Intermediaries are allowed to verify that messages are despatched along trusted paths before 
endorsing them, using the server signed data path despatched with data.  
 Fine-grained security provided for both data and intermediary endorsements along the data 
path help achieve better trade-offs between security and cost. 
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1.6 Contributions 
Synthesising end-to-end security schemes through endorsement intermediaries required addressing a 
number of research problems. This section outlines the main contributions. 
 
A New Mechanism for Quantifying and Reasoning About Security Requirements  
Fine-grained security properties define hierarchical security levels using a lattice model where each 
security level represents a composite security property. These composite properties are formed by 
combining basic security properties needed by data originators and recipients. The meanings of 
composite properties are made precise by standardising the order in which individual properties must 
be enforced. The operators defined over them allow overall security requirements along the path to be 
expressed as a function of security requirements of interacting parties. By defining all security 
properties in an unambiguous way many of the past security flaws caused by multiple interpretations 
of common security properties can be avoided.  The hierarchical structure makes it possible to specify 
exact security requirements, thus avoiding overheads caused by over-prescription of security 
properties. Fine-grained security properties also make it possible to consider security as a core 
requirement when synthesising protocols for composed services. Past synthesis techniques modelled 
functional requirements or underlying semantics [73,74,94,95] in isolation without considering the 
security needs. The proposed model allows functional requirements and semantic constraints to be 
combined with security needs using the fine-grained security properties and schemes devised. 
 
Provably Secure Schemes Providing Fine-grained Security Properties 
A new technique was devised that allows the dynamic creation of security protocols by combining the 
provably secure schemes providing fine-grained security properties. Provably correct schemes 
enforcing these properties were derived by combining challenge-response mechanism with 
compositional logic. Deriving schemes for composite properties from common base schemes makes it 
possible to sequentially compose them. Though a number of previous attempts have been made to 
synthesise protocols using search based mechanisms [23, 24, 73] or composition of protocols [61, 75], 
which are discussed in detail in Section 2.3. However, no past attempt was made to combine these 
techniques to create fine-grained security schemes that provide the exact security level required. It was 
also shown that these schemes can be combined with techniques that resist common forms of attack 
such as replay and type-flaw attacks. 
 
Extending Two-Party Schemes using Interleaving Technique 
A novel interleaving technique devised allows any two-party scheme to be extended to multiple 
parties. Using this technique all two-party schemes providing fine-grained properties were extended to 
multiple recipients. This interleaving technique was used to create schemes for multiple recipients by 
piggybacking data and cryptographic elements. The validity of extended schemes was proved using 
Strand Spaces. The interleaved schemes provide a number of benefits. First, direct evidence from 
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originator and recipients are included even though data is sent through third parties. Second, the 
number of protocol steps required at data source is significantly reduced when data must be 
despatched to multiple recipients with various security properties.   
 
Security Performance Trade-Offs 
The proposed model for protocol synthesis facilitates security performance trade-offs by allowing 
protocol costs to be expressed in terms of underlying security strength. Security strength gives a 
measure of processing effort required by an adversary to break the underlying mechanism. 
Cryptographic algorithms, elements and key lengths can be grouped together to provide different 
levels of security strength. Such an approach makes it possible to lower security strength to meet the 
underlying performance and cost constraints. Past attempts to synthesise security protocols did not 
consider such trade-offs as security was modelled only in terms of symbolic logic without any 
consideration for underlying cryptographic elements. However, the pervasive use of security protocols 
across different networks and devices makes such trade-offs inevitable.  
 
Framework for Institutional Trust 
A new institutional trust framework proposed can help overcome the perception of risk in e-
commerce. The endorsement intermediary network consists of nodes representing trading entities and 
authorised intermediaries, while edges represent the extent of trust relationships that exist between 
them. All intermediaries are made accountable for their endorsements. The path endorsement trust 
proposed gives a measure of indemnity based on the number of endorsement intermediaries along the 
path and the extent of the trust relationships that exist between them. By combining category specific 
trust and endorsements with security mechanisms for detecting trust breaches, the proposed 
framework provides a much stronger basis for trust propagation than the transitive trust models 
proposed in the past.  
 
Finding Trusted Paths through Large Trust Networks 
Hierarchical domains and domain trust trees devised allow trusted paths through large networks to be 
found at runtime. Search space and time are reduced logarithmically by subdividing large networks 
into domains of limited size. Elapsed times are further reduced by using pre-created domain trust trees 
with different criteria. Simulation results show that for each domain with medium trust coupling the 
average search time grows linearly. Estimates based on these results suggest that trusted paths can be 
retrieved within one second, even for networks of up to 800,000 nodes. If endorsement costs are to be 
reduced depth-limited paths must be found efficiently. A search criteria devised combining path trust 
with transitive-depth reduces the number of intermediaries (and endorsement costs) significantly. 
Simulation results also show such algorithms result in paths to more entities than those algorithms 
using path trust alone.       
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Policies for Self-regulating Centralised Trust Networks  
The centralized trust network is proposed models trust as a derived value based on past conduct, trust 
disposition and trusting beliefs. Trust transfer and trust evolution policies proposed makes the 
centralized trust network self-regulating. Trust evolution policies either raise or lower trust 
relationships based on transaction outcomes. The extent of these changes reflects trusting beliefs in 
underlying domains for specific categories. Trust transfer policies allow new trust relationships to be 
formed reflecting their own trust disposition. Simulation results show that trust transfer threshold 
should be varied over time if entities are to build and preserve their trust capital. These results suggest 
that trust in traditional commerce can be modelled more closely by combining trust evolution policies 
with trust transfer policies. 
 
Deriving End-to-End Accountability Schemes 
The notion of proof obligation devised facilitates reasoning about accountability for various security 
properties. End-to-end accountability schemes for security properties providing assurances to 
recipients (A,DI,TB) can be derived by transferring proof obligations through intermediaries until they 
can be discharged using direct evidence from the data originator. Similarly end-to-end accountability 
schemes for security properties providing assurances to data source such as receiver non-repudiation 
(RNR) can be derived by delegating proof obligations through intermediaries until direct evidence is 
obtained from all final recipients. The past research with accountability discussed in detail in Section 
2.5, was mainly restricted to verifying whether existing schemes makes protocol participants 
accountable.  
 
Enforcing End-to-End Security 
An SSES scheme generates the protocol metadata for enforcing end-to-end security at runtime. The 
server signed metadata consists of data hash, data category, trusted path and the security-levels 
required along the path. Each intermediary and recipient along the trusted path is required to enforce 
the security levels specified using the proven two party schemes in their possession. Path security 
facilitates hierarchical endorsements common in traditional commerce where endorsements must be 
carried out in a predefined order.  
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1.7 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis consists of background, contribution and conclusion chapters as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents background information related to this thesis. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 (Contribution Chapters) 
The main contribution of this thesis titled “Synthesising End-to-End Security Schemes through 
Endorsement Intermediaries” is a framework for promoting e-commerce between unknown entities 
by allowing important messages to be sent through endorsement intermediaries with user specified 
security properties. The first contribution chapter focuses on creating the security schemes 
dynamically based on requirements. The second contribution chapter focuses on selecting trusted 
paths through endorsement intermediaries based on message contents. The third contribution chapter 
focuses on making entities and intermediaries accountable, using explicit cryptographic evidence. 
 A new Framework for Generating Security Protocols using Proven Schemes Devised to 
Enforce Fine-Grained Security Properties is presented in Chapter 3. This contribution 
chapter first defines basic and composite security properties of interest for e-commerce. 
Schemes for these properties are devised using challenge-response mechanisms and 
compositional techniques. Next, schemes for single recipient are extended to multiple recipients 
using interleaving techniques devised. These schemes are also strengthened to withstand 
common attacks based on analysis of past protocol attacks. Finally, standard protocols are 
created automatically using the schemes devised. 
 An Institutional Framework allowing Endorsement of Key Messages by Trusted Category 
Specific Intermediaries is presented in Chapter 4. This contribution chapter proposes a 
framework to reduce the risks involved in trading with unknown e-commerce entities, by 
allowing key messages to be passed through trusted endorsement intermediaries. Trusted paths 
for messages are selected based on a number of different criteria, including the extent of trust 
relationship along the path, trust depth, and cost of intermediaries. Trust relationships are 
allowed to evolve on the basis of past conduct, both positive and negative. New trust 
relationships are established reflecting trust disposition of entities and intermediaries. Clustering 
and retrieval techniques are devised to generate trusted paths efficiently.  
 End-to-End Schemes for Enforcing Accountability are presented in Chapter 5. This 
contribution chapter presents end-to-end schemes devised that make all intermediaries 
accountable. All data despatched are accompanied with server signed trusted paths and required 
security levels to ensure path security. All intermediaries are required to discharge their 
obligations by providing explicit cryptographic evidence that can be presented to a third party. 
Security levels specified along trusted paths are enforced using proven schemes that are 
sequentially composable.   
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by presenting the overall contributions and possible future extensions.   
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Chapter 2: Background and Mathematical Foundations  
This chapter reviews the literature relating to security protocols and lays down the mathematical 
foundation required for the subsequent chapters. Much of the past research into security protocols has 
been devoted to various forms of verification technique. Two common theorem-proving approaches 
are described in detail. BAN logic allows the beliefs of agents to be modelled. Verifying protocols 
using Strand Spaces, a graph-based approach, requires proving a one-to-one correspondence between 
specific receive events and earlier send events initiated by a valid party.  The model checking 
approach automatically tests whether the model of the system meets a given specification. This 
requires both the model of the system and the specification to be formulated in precise mathematical 
language. Past logics used for protocol composition are surveyed briefly before presenting Secure 
Protocol Composition Logic (SPCL), a temporal logic-based approach for modelling protocol 
composition.  Common attacks on security protocols and techniques devised to prevent them are 
presented next, followed by accountability in e-commerce protocols. The last section presents the need 
for security performance trade-offs in protocols.  
2.1 Security Protocols 
The role of a security protocol is to ensure reliability and dependability of information exchanges 
through data authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation and secrecy [69]. The sequence of steps in 
a security protocol is designed to make it very difficult or impossible for an adversary to mount a 
successful attack. Designers must often revise protocols when they are used with different domains or 
devices, considering the level of threats posed and underlying constraints on resources. For example, 
many revised versions of the well-known SSL protocol were derived to suit wireless medium and 
mobile devices [64].  
2.1.1 Main Elements of a Security Protocol 
This section describes the main elements in a security protocol in terms of the roles played by the 
protocol entities and the purpose of common cryptographic components. 
 
 Principals: the valid entities taking part in the protocol, including vendors, customers and 
trusted intermediaries. It is customary to use names such as Alice, Bob and Carol to refer to 
protocol participants playing various roles.  It is possible for an entity to play multiple roles at 
the same time such as, playing the role of merchant in one protocol and customer in another. 
 
 Adversary: any entity acting maliciously to subvert a protocol. A principal may act as an 
adversary if principals in a protocol do not trust one another. It is possible for a valid 
participant in a protocol to be an adversary in another run of a protocol. In such a case, 
information gained from one run may be used to mount an attack in the other.     
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 Message contents (payload): may include both business-related information such as product 
ID, customer ID, and credit card and cryptographic elements such as nonce, time stamp and 
key. The information may be sent as plaintext or in encrypted form.     
 
 Identifiers: are used for principals, trusted intermediaries, the server and the adversary. 
Common labels assigned are principals A, B; the server S; trusted intermediaries T1, T2; and 
the adversary Z.  The notation Z(A) is used when an adversary is impersonating a valid 
participant A.  
 
 Keys: Cryptographic key systems are classified into symmetric and asymmetric key systems. 
In symmetric key systems, keys used for encryption and decryption are either identical or can 
be easily derived from one another. In asymmetric key systems, a pair of keys known as a 
public key and a private key is generated, with one issued for encryption and the other for 
decryption. Deriving one key from the other is possible but is computationally infeasible. 
Private keys should never be disclosed, while public keys can be made available to any other 
entity. A message encrypted with a key in one pair can only be decrypted with the associated 
key in the same pair. Therefore, a message sent encrypted with the private key of a principal 
can only be decrypted with the public key of that principal, proving the identity of message 
originator. Similarly a message sent encrypted by the public key of the intended recipient can 
only be decrypted by that entity (as private keys are never divulged), providing 
confidentiality.    
 
 Nonces: Nonces are random numbers used for uniquely identifying a run or associating 
different protocol elements. The probability of two identical nonces being created 
independently using existing algorithms is so low that it can be assumed to be 0. Hence, they 
are used to provide assurance of recency or freshness.  
 
 Hashes: A hash function h has the characteristic that makes computing hash of message m, 
h(m), easy but finding two distinct messages m1,m2 such that h(m1) = h(m2) is 
computationally infeasible.      
 
 Protocol notation: Each protocol step is represented in the form: A  B : message elements 
Here A represents the sender of the message and B the recipient. 
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2.1.2 Security Protocol Assumptions 
Validity of security protocols depends on the underlying assumptions. Proofs of security protocols are 
derived from these assumptions and other mathematical axioms. Common assumptions include: 
 Perfect cryptography: encrypted items cannot be decoded within available resources and time 
by entities not in possession of the necessary keys. 
 Binary trust relations: entities either fully trust one another or there is no trust relationship at 
all. 
To illustrate the security challenges, the next section presents two standard security protocols. The 
subsequent section discusses the role of security protocols, including common security properties, 
assumptions under which they operate, and their vulnerabilities. 
 
2.1.3 Example of a Security Protocol: Key Exchange Protocol 
The Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol described below is designed to distribute a fresh key 
KPQ between two principals P and Q. It is assumed that P and Q already share the symmetric keys KPS 
and KQS with the key server S. The protocol entities P and Q use the nonces nP (generated in P) and nQ 
(generated in Q) to confirm that the message responses are recent.  In the first step below, P requests 
the server S to generate a symmetric key that can be shared with Q. In the second step, S responds with 
a message encrypted with the key it shares with P with two parts, both of which contain the fresh key 
KPQ. The first part is intended for P, while the second part encrypted with the key shared by S and Q is 
intended to be forwarded to Q in the following step (step 3). In the fourth step Q challenges P with the 
nonce nQ encrypted with the fresh key KPQ it now shares with P, to which P responds in the following 
step using the same key KPQ. 
  
Message 1 P  S :  P,Q,nP 
Message 2 S  P :  {nP,Q,KPQ,{KPQ,P}KQS}KPS 
Message 3 P  Q : {KPQ,P}KQS 
Message 4 Q  P : {nQ}KPQ 
Message 5 P  Q : {nQ-1}KPQ 
 
2.2 Protocol Verification 
Protocol verification using formal approaches became popular after flaws were detected in fairly 
simple protocols. Formal approaches help by delineating system boundaries and by defining protocol 
goals and system behaviour. They also allow reasoning about intruder capabilities and actions. 
However, verification is undecidable unless specific assumptions are made about the number of 
possible interleaving runs, intruder capabilities and possible actions. [65]. An intruder may use some 
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initial knowledge to learn even more secrets as the protocol sessions proceed. The threat model 
proposed by Dolev-Yao in the early 1980s has become the standard model for formal analysis. It 
assumes perfect cryptography and a computationally unbounded adversary that has complete control 
over the network. The adversary is assumed to have abilities to eavesdrop, intercept and fake 
messages.  
 
A formal verification technique has three main parts to it: 
 a way to specify the requirements 
 a framework for modelling the system 
 a way to establish that the model enforces these requirements 
 
Formal methods have been applied at different levels of abstraction using beliefs based logic (BAN), 
process algebra (CSP) and graph-based techniques (Strand Spaces) [66] [67]. Use of formal methods 
ensures that protocol design meets precisely defined protocol goals. Formal methods help to prove that 
adversary with specific capabilities and initial knowledge cannot undermine protocol goals.  
   
2.2.1 Theorem Proving 
The goal of theorem proving is to prove that the given protocol design precludes certain events from 
taking place. Such techniques are traditionally used for proving the correctness of programs. Unlike 
model checking, theorem proving places no bounds on the number of parallel executions (to avoid 
combinatorial explosion). Theorem proving helps deduce whether a formula F holds in all models 
(i.e.,  F ) [165].  Proof inference techniques use a collection of inference rules of the form below to 
arrive at the required conclusion. The conclusion Con is guaranteed when all the premises Pr1, Pr2 
are true or are derivable.  
Con
Pr1, Pr2
  
Axioms, which are inference rules with no premises, are used in proof derivations.  A number of 
automated theorem proving tools have evolved for verification using inductive proofs including ITP, 
Isabelle and PVS  [68,69]. Although these methods are fairly general and applicable to a wide class of 
problems, they require a fair amount of user guidance. 
2.2.1.1 BAN Logic 
BAN logic, a form of modal logic, was developed by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [166]. This logic 
was presented in 1989, in one of the earliest papers that analysed security protocols formally. It 
received much attention as the language presented an elegant and intuitive way to model the beliefs of 
agents. Since then, it has received much criticism as protocols were analysed with the assumption, 
often used in those days that all valid participants are honest. It also has other limitations such as the 
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inability to represent the secrecy requirements of protocols.  The semantics of BAN primitives are 
shown in the Table 2.1. 
 
Primitive Semantics 
P |≡ X P believes X  
P
k Q K is key shared by P and Q only  
#(X) X is fresh (recently generated) 
P    X P sees X (or P receives X) 
P |~ X P has in the past sent a message containing X 
 
 
In this approach, beliefs of each protocol participant are recomputed after each step, based on existing 
beliefs, message receipts and inference rules. For example, if P receives X encrypted with KPQ, and it 
believes that Q is the only other entity in possession of that key KPQ, then P can form the belief that Q 
once said X. This inference rule can be written in BAN logic as in:  
                              KPQ 
P  |≡  P  Q  P believes Q is the only other entity in possession of KPQ 
P    {X} KPQ      P receives X encrypted with KPQ   
_____________ 
P  |≡ (Q  |~ X)   P believes Q once said X      
 
Protocol analysis using BAN (whether a protocol meets its goals) requires the following major steps: 
 conversion of initial beliefs into BAN statements 
 conversion of protocol goals into BAN statements 
 conversion of protocol steps into BAN statements 
 application of inference rules to arrive at new beliefs 
 comparison of final beliefs with protocol goals. 
 
In the recent past a number of attempts have been made to synthesise protocols using BAN logic. 
These approaches are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
2.2.1.2 Strand Spaces 
Another model using the theorem proving approach is Strand Spaces, where protocols are proved by 
showing that specific invariants are never violated [69].  A strand represents the series of visible 
actions by a protocol entity such as sending and receiving messages. Strand Spaces consist of a set of 
strands representing the principals and adversaries involved in the protocol. The underlying graphical 
structures used for modelling events provide an elegant way to reason about the properties of security 
protocols.   
 
Table 2.1 Semantics of BAN Primitives 
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Sending and receiving of messages is represented by positive (+ve) and negative (-ve) nodes 
respectively, as shown in Figure 2.1. If the nodes N1 and N2 have the relationship N1 → N2, then these 
nodes have the form N1 = +a  and  N2 = -a, indicating N1 sends the message a to N2. 
Nodes that represent one event immediately preceding another on the same strand are connected by 
double arrows ( ). If the nodes N1 and N2 have the relationship N1  N2, they belong to the same 
strand with index(N2) = index(N1) +1 (index refers to the order within the strand). 
  
A bundle is a subset of a Strand Spaces representing all the strands in a protocol exchange. The edges 
of a bundle  → and  express the external and internal causal relationship of adjoining nodes 
respectively. 
 
A message term is made up of text terms, keys and their combination. Text terms could include 
principal-name and customer-ID.  
 
As an example, consider a simple protocol between two principals A and B (using the standard 
protocol notation) exchanging nonces using a shared key k.   
A  B: {Na}k     
B  A: {Nb}k 
A  B: Nb 
This protocol can be represented by a bundle consisting of two strands as in: 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal Precedence 
Two nodes N1 and N2 in a bundle C are related by N1  N2, if there is a sequence of zero or more edges 
of type → and ═►. The relation  is a partial order, i.e. it is reflexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. 
Every non-empty subset in C (i.e., which has at least one edge of the form → and ═►) has at least one 
member. 
 
 
A 
+{Na}k 
  
-{Nb}k 
 
+Nb 
 
B 
-{Na}k 
 
+{Nb}k 
 
-Nb 
Figure 2.1  Strand Spaces Representation of Simple Protocol 
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Capabilities of Adversary Strands  
An adversary can generate new messages from intercepted messages and its initial knowledge. These 
actions are modelled by a set of adversary strands, with one or more parameters representing data 
items (g,h,t) or keys (k, k
-1
). Note, the adversary strands below contain both send (+) nodes and receive 
(-) nodes.  The strand T[g] for example, on receipt of term g sends it out to two other strands, while the 
strand C[g,h] receives the terms g and h separately and sends out the appended term g.h.  A protocol 
attack involves combining a number of these actions.   
M[t]    Inset message: <+t> where t belongs to the initial information of intruder 
G[g]   Flushing:  <-g> 
T[g]    Tee: <-g, +g, +g> 
C[g,h]  Concatenation: <-g, -h, +g.h> 
R[g,h]   Separation into components: <-g.h, +g, +h> 
K[k]    Key: <+k> where k  Kp 
E[k,h]   Encryption: <-k, -h, +{h}k> 
D[k,h]   Decryption: <-k
-1
, -{h}k, +h> 
 
Proving the Security Properties  
General theorems about the power of an adversary are developed based on the capabilities of the 
adversary strands (defined above). These theorems, the invariants and nonces together are then used 
together to prove security properties such as authentication and secrecy. Authentication can be defined 
in terms of the agreement property  [33] which states  “A protocol guarantees a participant B (say as 
the responder) agreement for certain binding, if each time a principal B completes a run of the protocol 
as a responder using, supposedly with A, then there is a unique run of the protocol with principal A as 
initiator, supposedly with B”. This requires proving that whenever a bundle C contains a responder 
strand using X made up of specific combination of nonces, the bundle C also contains a unique 
initiator strand containing X. The secrecy property is proved using the invariant that requires all secret 
data elements be encrypted by a key not known to the intruder, before being despatched. 
2.3 Previous Work on Protocol Synthesis 
Past research interest in security protocol synthesis was motivated by the long delays in the traditional 
process of crafting and verifying security protocols [15, 71, 72].  Approaches to protocol synthesis can 
be classified into search-based techniques and compositional approaches.  An early attempt to 
automate protocol generation (APG) involved creating all possible two and three party protocols 
before discarding invalid ones using a fast model checker [73, 74].  Other approaches used meta-
heuristic and backward search techniques to avoid combinatorial explosion [23, 24]. Another attempt 
breaks down protocol goals specified in BAN logic into sub-goals, which in turn determine the 
messages that must be passed between parties [60].  Protocol composition techniques have used 
Secure Protocol Composition Logic (SPCL), Strand Spaces and Pi-Calculus, a form of process 
calculus. 
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 2.3.1 Search-Based Synthesis Techniques 
2.3.1.1 Automatic Protocol Generation and Selection  
Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song [73] devised a technique known as Automatic Protocol Generation 
(APG), which generates all possible protocols using the grammar below.  
 
Message ::= Atomic | Encrypted | Concatenated 
Atomic ::= PrincipalName | Key 
Encrypted ::= (Message, Key) 
Key ::= PublicKey | PrivateKey | SymmetricKey 
Concatenated ::= Message List 
 
Protocols exceeding a specified number of messages are discarded. All protocols are verified using a 
model checker named Athena  [74]. Protocols failing to meet the goals are discarded. The main 
novelty of this approach is the use of an efficient model checker in selecting the protocol. However, its 
applicability is limited to two and three party protocols. The blind search technique cannot scale up to 
more complex protocols involving multiple entities and messages. The model checker Athena used for 
verification could only verify authentication properties. The protocols created by the grammar have no 
semantics attached to them, making it impossible to decide when they are applicable, without human 
involvement.  
2.3.1.2 Backward Search from Protocol Goals 
ASPB (Automatic Synthesis Protocol Builder) uses an automatic backwards search to synthesise 
security protocols from goals [23]. Given a number of distinct protocol goals, it creates separate sub-
protocols before combining them. ASPB expresses the requirements specifications, the initial 
assumptions and the goals in BSW, a variation of BAN logic with channels similar to those used in 
SPI calculus. Heuristic rules for synthesis are also expressed in BSW, which allows goals to be 
expressed in terms of sub-goals, which may include message transfers through specific channels. A 
synthesis process involves using these heuristics recursively until goals can be reduced to assumptions 
or messages through specific channels. These messages are combined to form sub-protocols. The sub-
protocols are then merged to form the overall protocol. In a similar attempt, high-level security goals 
[60] specified in BAN logic (refer to Section 2.2.1.1) are used in synthesis. It incorporates an inference 
engine that breaks down a set of goals into elementary goals, and a realisation function that maps an 
elementary goal into protocol actions.  Its inputs are assumptions about the environment and initial 
beliefs of the entities. Unlike APG, this approach allows security properties’ integrity, authentication, 
non-repudiation and confidentiality to be represented. 
 
The backward search process together with the heuristics used for guidance help reduce the search 
space significantly. As a result, the time required for protocol generation is significantly lower than in 
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APG. Breaking down protocol goals using search techniques provides a top-down approach to 
protocol synthesis (from goals to sub-goals that can be enforced). The main drawback is that the 
method is not guaranteed to produce a protocol even when the requirements are valid, as the inference 
engine may not be able to break down all the goals into elementary goals. Furthermore, its 
applicability for e-commerce is limited as BSW and BAN logics deal with beliefs that cannot be 
produced as evidence. It is also an idealised protocol, since all entities are assumed to be honest. 
Furthermore, creating protocols at an abstract level without using explicit cryptographic elements, 
makes it difficult to model protocol costs.  
2.3.1.3 Security Protocol Generation through Meta-heuristic Search 
A meta-heuristic search allows a guided search of protocol design space (made up of all the 
combinations of protocols that can be created in a specified number of steps) for desired goals, starting 
with initial beliefs [24]. Current beliefs, goals and messages use BAN logic operators such as sees, 
believes, has-jurisdiction and fresh. Communication based on the current beliefs of the sender cause 
new beliefs to be formed in the recipient using inference rules defined in BAN logic. The search 
strategy selects sender, recipient and message elements randomly, from existing participants and 
beliefs respectively. The fitness function for guiding the search is a function of the number of protocol 
goals achieved and the weight attached to goals. Varying the weights with time influences the number 
and type of protocols created. In the early credit scheme the weights are constantly reduced, giving 
greater rewards for earlier messages satisfying the goals, while with uniform credit all weights remain 
unchanged.  
 
This approach often results in creating protocols that meet all the goals. However, the main weakness 
of this approach is that the success rate and the time for synthesis can vary significantly with different 
weighting strategies. The ideal weighting strategy for a given domain can only be determined by 
experimentation. It is also possible that none of the existing weighting strategies may be appropriate 
for a specific setting. These drawbacks make such an approach unsuitable for e-commerce, where 
interaction protocols must be created dynamically.  
 
2.3.2 Compositional Approach to Synthesis 
2.3.2.1 Strand Spaces Based Composition 
In a more recent work, composition of protocols expressed as Strand Spaces has been attempted [75]. 
The mechanisms known as authentication tests [47] use a number of challenge-response schemes 
associated with security goals to design sub-protocols manually. These schemes consist of a series of 
messages, with data in either encrypted or in plaintext form. Public key encryption is used to assert 
data origin and to restrict access, while nonces are used to indicate recency or to show association with 
earlier messages. Hash values are used in acknowledgements to reduce the bandwidth required.  
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The first test, known as an incoming test, allows an inference to be made about the existence of an 
entity with key K, whenever a message sent in the open is later received back encrypted with a key K, 
(where K  S,  S is the set of safe keys). Similarly, an outgoing test allows an inference to be made 
when a message sent encrypted is later received in the open (unencrypted). Using these tests, two-
party protocols were devised to meet authentication and non-repudiation goals. Sub-protocols created 
using authentication tests were combined to create new protocols. Use of distinct cryptographic 
elements in tests ensures protocol goals are not breached when combined [76].   
Evaluation 
The graph based structure used in Strand Spaces allows reasoning about partial ordering of messages 
and origin of messages. Thus, it is well suited for reasoning about capabilities of adversary strands. 
Authentications tests, a form of challenge-response mechanism, uses one-to-one mapping between 
entities based on private and public key pairs. Combining these authentication tests provide a strategy 
for creating new schemes. The Strand Spaces approach however, is not well suited when branching 
behaviour is required, as the principle of unique origin no longer holds. Furthermore, Strand Spaces do 
not explicitly represent data known to a strand. Thus, end-to-end schemes where messages are passed 
through one or more intermediaries are difficult to design using authentication tests alone.  
2.3.2.2 Secure Protocol Composition Logic 
Secure Protocol Composition Logic (SPCL)  [61] uses Cord Spaces, a process calculus based on the 
process algebra PI Calculus [70]. The logic provides the means to reason about protocol traces using 
axioms, assertions and inference rules for each of the main protocol actions.  SPCL uses assertions 
similar to those in Floyd-Hoare logic, which allows proof for protocol correctness to follow from the 
way it is composed [77].  Hoare’s logic uses expressions of the form: {P} C {Q} where P and Q 
are predicates and C is a set of instructions. It asserts that whenever C is run in a state where P 
is true, Q will hold when C terminates. By limiting its actions to those that do not violate specified 
invariants, it allows new security guarantees to be derived. SPCL uses two basic forms of composition 
technique to create more complex protocols out of simple ones.   
The first form, additive combination allows two protocols to be sequentially composed. Given the 
predicates  and , the action P and the entity A,   [P]A means that if  is true before A performs 
actions P, then  is true afterwards. For example, if P is the action “A receiving a signed message 
from B”, and  the precondition that “A is in possession of B’s public key”, then the post condition  
asserts “B sent the signed message to A”. These “before” and “after” assertions allow individual 
protocol actions to be combined to derive assertions for a sequence of steps. For example, [P1;P2]A 
can be derived if [P1]A and [P2]A are both true.  
The second form of combination requires identifying invariants that guarantee before and after 
assertions. If such an invariant  can be found for protocol P1 with pre and post conditions  and , it 
can be expressed as   [P1]A. This says that [P1]A holds in any run satisfying the invariant . 
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For example, an invariant may state that the principals involved in a protocol are honest, meaning all 
entities carry out the protocol steps as specified.  Using such an approach, protocol steps can be 
combined as long as the two protocol steps do not violate the invariants of each other.  Protocol proofs 
take the form [P]x , which means after x executes actions P starting from a state where   is true,  
will be true in the resulting state. SPCL uses a number of predicates.   
TERMINOLOGY 2.1 COMMON TERMS IN SPCL 
The interpretations for the predicates used in SPCL are given below. 
 Has(P,x): Process P possesses information x. If information is sent encrypted with key k as in 
{|x|}k then recipient must be in possession of key K needed for decryption.  
 Send(P,m): Process P sends message m. 
 Fresh(P,t): The term t generated by P is fresh (recently generated). 
 Honest(Z): Entity Z carries out the actions as specified by the protocol.  
 Source(m,X,M): The only way any entity other than X can learn about m is through the set M. 
 Temporal operator  : specify  has to hold in the next state. 
 Temporal operator :  specify  eventually has to hold  
 After(a1,a2): action a2 happens after a1.   
 New(P,t): P creates new term t.  
 Encrypt(P,t): P encrypts t with its key.  
 Decrypt(P,t): P decrypts t with its key.     
 Verify(P,t): P decrypts t with its own private key. 
DEFINITION 2.1 PREDICATE FORMULAS  
Predicate Formula ( ) can be constructed using the BNF grammar below: 
    ::= a | Has(P,t) | Fresh(P,t) | Honest(N) | Contains(t1,t2) |    |  | x.  |  |  
- P and t represent a process and a term, respectively.  
- Process here refers to an entity playing a role such as Bob playing the role of responder.  
- The symbol m represents a generic message each of which has a source, a destination and a 
protocol identifier, in addition to message contents.  
Action Formula a can be constructed using the grammar below. 
a :: = Send(P,m) | Receive(P,m) | New(P,t) | Decrypt(P,t) | Verify(P,t)  
- where Send, Receive, New, Decrypt and Verify are predicates defined in Terminology 2.1.  
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Proof System 
SPCL proof system uses axioms related to protocol actions and predicates. In this section a small 
collection of such axioms is described. A complete collection of axioms and sample proofs were 
presented in some earlier work in protocol composition [26, 61, 78].   
  
Axioms Relating to Protocol Actions  
These axioms state properties that hold immediately after executing a protocol action. In the axioms 
below vn refers to creation of new nonce n. 
AN1 [(vn)]x  Has(X,n)  says an entity generating a new nonce n is in possession of it. 
AN2 [(vn)]x  Has(Y,n)  (Y = X) says if X generates a nonce n, no other entity has n. 
 
Axioms Relating to Predicate Actions  
These specify the relationship between predicates. 
 
DEC Decrypt(X, {|n|}k)  has(X,n) 
 
PROJ has(X,(x,y))  has(X,x)  has(X,y) 
 
 
Generic Inference Rules 
These predicates help derive new assertions from existing ones using Hoare’s logic. 
 
GR1    [P]x      [P]x    GR2  [P]x              
             
             [P]x          [P]x  
 
Preservation Rules 
Preservation rules specify predicates that are not affected by actions. For example, an entity in 
possession of some data element will continue to do so even after one of the actions identified earlier. 
This can be stated using the axiom: Has(X,t) [a]x Has(X,t) 
 
Protocol Composition Axioms  
Proof of correctness using deductive systems can be extended to composed protocols when predefined 
formulas, known as environmental invariants (denoted by ), are not violated [61]. Such 
environmental invariants are necessary to allow reasoning about security properties during 
composition. The three rules described below ensure that protocols are composed only when they do 
not interact adversely by interfering with one another, or with the environment [61]. 
 
DEC states message elements decrypted by 
an entity are added to its  knowledge. 
 
PROJ states a process that possesses a tuple 
also possesses the tuple elements.  
 
33 
 The weakening rule WR states that a formula () provable () from invariant  remains 
provable with additional invariants.  
                                
 WR:         
            
 The composition rule CR1 allows protocol roles to be composed sequentially when the post-
condition of the first protocol matching the precondition of the second one. 
     1[P]A 2       2[P ]A 3    
 CR1:        
      1[P; P ] A 3     
 The composition rule CR2 states that if environmental invariant () is not violated by 
protocols Q and Q  then it will not be violated by the protocol obtained composing them.  
   Q    Q      
 CR2:       
        Q  Q     
Every role  in the composed protocol Q  Q , (obtained combining in parallel or sequential) can be 
written as  = 1 2…. n where 1,  2 are basic sub-sequences of roles in Q or Q .  
Formalising Protocol Composition 
The SPLC methodology [61] allows protocols to be composed in sequence or in parallel by combining 
the sub-sequences, subject to finding suitable environmental constraints and matching post and 
preconditions. The general approach for proving composed protocols can be summarised as follows: 
 Prove the security properties of component protocols Q and Q  separately. 
 Identify the invariants used for these proofs, and name them  and    respectively.  
 Combine protocols Q and Q  using either of the composition rules CR1 or CR2 keeping 
      as the environmental invariant.  
 Apply the sequential composition rule CR1 when the post-condition of the first matches the 
precondition of the second. 
 Finally, prove that the environmental invariant      holds for both protocols Q and Q .  
This protocol composition approach provides a suitable formalism for combining cryptographic 
schemes by making the preconditions and invariants explicit. Protocols formed through sequential 
composition are valid because sub-protocols are combined only when post-condition for one meets the 
precondition for the other. However, it does not have any inherent mechanisms for creating new types 
of security schemes. Although it provides a bottom-up strategy to create a more complex protocols 
from simpler ones, it must be combined with other top-down search strategies to reach the required 
goals, if it is to solve real-life problems [23]. Another drawback of this approach is that it does not 
include a threat model for explicitly specifying adversary capabilities, as in Strand Spaces. Hence, it 
cannot detect attacks when an adversary uses information gathered from one sub-protocol to subvert 
another, even if both sub-protocols themselves are valid. Hence, protocols devised using such an 
approach must be strengthened to withstand attacks such as type-flaw attacks.   
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2.3.3 Semantics Based Protocol Synthesis  
In another approach to protocol synthesis, the Logic of Knowledge, a form of modal logic, models the 
global system state based on past events [156-159]. Logic of Knowledge allows inferences to be made 
based on past actions. However, before such inferences can be made, the roles of entities and the 
semantics of data elements must be standardized across the domain of interaction. In another more 
recent approaches e-commerce and web service protocols were synthesised using social commitments 
of interacting entities as the basis [62,94]. A supplier may commit to ship an item if and when the 
customer commits to pay for that item when delivered. The customer may in turn commit to pay on 
delivery if the merchant commits to replace it if it is found defective later. Viewed thus, a protocol is a 
series of commitments leading from the initial state to one of the final states when all commitments 
are either discharged or cancelled.  Such an approach allows interactions to be determined at run-time 
using a number of primitives such as creating, discharging, cancelling or releasing commitments. This 
approach allows entities to make use of opportunities, thus following a less rigid path than standard 
protocols. For example, a customer may not require a quote from a specific merchant before placing 
an order, if it can be trusted to offer the best price anyway. The approach however, cannot prevent 
adversaries triggering new events to thwart commitments being met. Moreover, it lacks the security 
features necessary to initiate action against e-commerce entities failing to honour commitments. 
2.3.4 Overall Evaluation of Past Synthesis Techniques 
Past synthesis techniques using brute force methods such as as APG can only produce very simple 
two-party protocols. Such techniques cannot create realistic protocols at runtime (even with fast model 
checkers) as the number of possible combinations increases exponentially with the number of 
messages and entities.  Search-based techniques provide a top-down approach that allows goals to be 
met by breaking them up into sub-goals that can be enforced by existing schemes. However, these 
techniques cannot guarantee that all goals can be decomposed into sub-goals. Furthermore, meta-
heuristic search requires the weights to reflect the type of protocol environment. These difficulties 
make such search-based techniques unsuitable for environments where protocols must be created at 
runtime. Moreover, beliefs used as the basis for synthesis in BAN-based techniques cannot be 
presented as expicit evidence in e-commerce. The Strand Spaces approach provide a useful graph-
based challenge-response mechanisms to devise new cryptographic schemes, and to prove existing 
schemes. However, their applicability is limited to sequential schemes as the principle of unique origin 
does not extend to branching behaviour. Protocol composition logic provides a formal basis for 
composing protocols using invariants and preconditions. However, it does not provide a mechanism 
for guiding protocols to meet required goals. Therefore, any practical strategy for composing protocols 
should combine protocol composition techniques with challenge-response mechanisms and search-
based straegies. Similarly commitment based approach allows flexible protcols to be generated based 
on underlying semantics, though such an approach must combine messages with schemes enforcing 
necessary security properties to ensure entities making commitments are held accountable. 
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2.4 Security Protocol Attacks and Prevention Techniques 
Difficulty in verifying complex security protocols (such as SET)  have created a research interest in 
security protocol synthesis techniques [57, 59].  Adherence to certain principles during design can 
reduce the complexity of model checking algorithms [79]. Such techniques are also necessary if 
protocols are to be created dynamically to meet end-to-end security requirements of collaborating 
entities [14]. Moreover, the techniques presented in Section 2.3 cannot entirely prevent attacks by 
adversaries, as characterised by type-flaw and replay attacks. Therefore, this section surveys 
mechanisms devised to counter such attacks [80-84]. In addition, the general design principles derived 
from analysis of past protocol failures are surveyed briefly [79].  
 
In the past most security protocols were restricted to simple key exchange protocols. E-commerce 
protocols, however, present many challenges as they are applied in diverse environments and devices. 
The trade-offs between security and performance become crucial in e-commerce, especially for 
resource constrained mobile and wireless devices. Therefore this section also surveys some recent 
research work carried out to lower the cost of security. Furthermore, many e-commerce and web 
service applications require security schemes to be synthesised dynamically based on specific security 
requirements. Many common security properties, however, have multiple interpretations, making 
precise specification difficult. Hence, some common security properties and their semantics are briefly 
surveyed in this section.    
2.4.1 Requirements for Security Protocols 
The lack of standard definitions for common security properties has resulted in many security protocol 
flaws in the past [31]. The authentication property for example, has many different notions attributed 
to it, each providing a different level of assurance [33]. Authentication based on aliveness requires 
proving that “whenever data is received by entity B from a trusted entity A, that data must have been 
sent by A to B in an earlier event”. This assurance, however, does not guarantee that A initiated the 
data transfer recently or that there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B. A stronger 
assurance amounting to injective agreement defines it as “if whenever A has completed a run 
apparently with B, then B has been running the protocol apparently with A, such that each run of A 
corresponds to a unique run of B” [33]. However, a stronger form of authentication requires additional 
overheads, which may not always be necessary. If composite properties can be decomposed into basic 
properties with exact meanings, past misinterpretations can be avoided. Furthermore, by using 
multiple properties only when necessary, security overheads can be reduced.     
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2.4.2 Common Attacks and Techniques for Prevention 
It is not possible to exhaustively list all possible attacks as they are limited only by the ingenuity and 
resources of the attackers. Protocol design should therefore aim to make the cost of subverting a 
protocol higher than the value of the information contained therein. This section presents replay and 
type-flaw attacks, two of the most common attacks that can be easily mounted by an adversary. These 
attacks undermine protocols by resending or redirecting messages. This section also presents strategies 
devised in the past to make protocols resistant to such attacks. Preventing these attacks also thwarts 
other related attacks such as reflection attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. This section also 
presents the classic man-in-the-middle attack using the attack on Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol. Attacks such as denial-of-service attacks are not surveyed as the scope of this thesis does not 
include security components like firewalls and intrusion detection techniques necessary to prevent 
such attacks.    
2.4.2.1 Type-Flaw Attack  
A type-flaw attack occurs when a message in a protocol run is interpreted incorrectly as another type 
in a different protocol run. Any protocol that does not explicitly state the meaning of a message and 
has a message structure similar to another becomes vulnerable to such an attack. For example, the 
Needham-Schroeder public key protocol allows two entities to exchange nonces without the 
knowledge of any other entity. These nonces allow a shared session key to be created for secret 
communication. A trusted server is used for serving the public keys. This protocol consists of 7 
messages, as shown below, and has two messages with the same structure (messages 3 and 6). The 
protocol is expressed using the standard notation where A and B are agent identities, S is the identity of 
the trusted server, NA and NB are nonces and PK and SK are public and private keys respectively.  
Message 1:  A→S: B        // A send B’s label to server 
Message 2:  S→A: { PK(B), B}SK(S)      // Server responds by sending B’s label and its public key 
Message 3:  A→B: {NA, A}PK(B)       // A sends its nonce and label encrypted by B’s public key 
Message 4:  B→S: A        // B send A’s label to server 
Message 5:  S→B: { PK(A), A}SK(S)      // Server responds by sending A’s label and its public key 
Message 6 : B→A: {NA, NB, B} PK(A)  // Nonce challenge issued to A 
Message 7 : A→B: {NB}PK(B)  // A responds to nonce challenge 
An intruder INTR can attack this protocol by redirecting a message in one protocol run P1 as another 
message in a different run of the same protocol P2, as shown below. It is assumed INTR may fake any 
identity using all data and keys in its possession, to sabotage a protocol. Here INTRX denotes the 
intruder faking the entity X  as in messages P1.3, P1.6, P2.3, P1.7. The messages P2.3 and P2.4 are 
part of a second run of the same protocol initiated by the intruder with the agent A, to decrypt NB. Note 
that the nonce NB is sent in the open in message P2.4, which allows the intruder to respond to the 
nonce challenge issued in P1.6, in the final message P1.7. The possession of nonces NA, NB allows the 
intruder to correspond with B, pretending to be A.   
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Message P1.3:  INTRA→B: {NI, A}PK(B)      
Message P1.4:  B→S: A      
Message P1.5:  S→B: { PK(A), A}SK(S)      
Message P1.6 : B→ INTRA: {NI, NB, B} PK(A)   // Nonce challenge to the intruder faking the identity 
Message P2.3:  INTR(NB,B)→A: {NI, (NB,B)}PK(A)      // INTR fakes its identity as NB,B  (B appended to NB)  
Message P2.4:  A→S: (NB, B)       // NB sent in the open allowing access by intruder  
Message P1.7 : INTRA →B: {NB}PK(B)  // Intruder responds to nonce challenge 
This intrusion cannot be detected unless a mechanism such as a tagging scheme is used which 
explicitly tag the data elements with the type of element used [80].  Each base element is associated 
with a tag that identifies common protocol elements such as agent name, nonce, public key and shared 
key. A tagged value of the form (Tag, Value) specifies the claimed type of value and the actual value. 
Using such a scheme and additional outer level tags (text) to describe the message semantics, Message 
6 would be translated into: 
 ( “{|nonce,nonce,agent|}pubkey“, {(“nonce”,NA),(“nonce”,NB),(“agent”,B)}PK(A))  
The first part (text) consisting of tags nonce, agent and pubkey describes the semantics of the message 
as two nonces and an agent name encrypted with a public key, while the second part consists of tags 
and the actual values in encrypted form. The outer level tag in plain-form allows an honest agent to 
decompose the message correctly. Explicit typing of elements in the second part of the message in the 
inner level prevents any type-flaw attacks. Any changes to the first part of the message in plain-form 
can be easily detected by the recipient as a mismatch.  Though the approach can be implemented with 
negligible additional processing cost, it increases protocol bandwidth significantly, through additional 
tags in encrypted and plain forms.  Tagging schemes can be further simplified by leaving out the tags 
at the outermost level [81].  
2.4.2.2 Replay Attack 
In a replay attack an intruder sends an earlier message as part of another run or protocol. Replay 
attacks are commonly classified into internal, external and interleaving types [83]. Protocols are 
vulnerable to such attacks when no schemes are implemented to track protocol runs or the age of the 
message. A common prevention strategy involves sending additional state information as part of 
protocol messages, thereby making it harder for intruders to replay without being detected. State 
information may include a protocol identifier, a protocol run identifier, a transmission step identifier, a 
message sub-component identifier and primitive types of data items. In practice, however, such 
schemes are seldom used due to the increased bandwidth required and associated processing costs.  
 
Overheads for replay prevention can be reduced by implicit typing [84] and hashing of full 
information. Implicit typing involves creating a unique encryption function for each message by 
making encryption a function of both the key and a constant that varies between messages and 
protocols. In this way a message from another protocol or other part of the same protocol can be 
distinguished easily, even if it has the same format. Implicit typing is more effective than other replay 
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prevention schemes since it requires no additional data or processing cost. However, it makes the 
implementation more complex, requiring protocol and agent-specific parameters for 
encryption/decryption. Also, it is not effective when the same protocol is replayed between the same 
two agents, as the encryption parameters are identical. Attaching a signed hash of full information 
adds little to the size of messages or processing cost [85].  Including hash of full information in an 
acknowledgement makes it difficult for the recipient to claim that the receipt acknowledgement was a 
replay; i.e., it is an acknowledgement for an earlier message received which happened to have the 
same message contents. Similarly, hash chaining can also be used efficiently to guarantee non-
repudiation of data origin in multicast traffic where the multicast groups can be very large. [86].        
2.4.3 Protocol Design Guidelines To Prevent Common Attacks 
Many researchers proposed specific “dos” and “don’ts”  for protocol design, based on features that 
caused past protocol errors [79, 87]. Even if these design techniques cannot guarantee correctness, the 
construction process make formal verification easier, as design techniques and formal proofs are 
generally complementary [79, 88].  This section describes these guidelines.   
2.4.3.1 Principle of Full Information 
Some designers have inadvertently introduced errors while attempting to optimise security protocols.  
As an example, consider the authentication protocol created by Woo and Lam that relies on key 
translations by a trusted server for authentication. Key translations are commonly used with symmetric 
keys where the server shares keys with a number of principals. The stated aim of the protocol is that at 
the end of the run the initiator of the protocol claiming to be P, is actually the same principal (P). The 
protocol below uses the standard notation for nonces (n), symmetric keys (KPA,KQA) and agents (P,Q, 
A). 
1. P→Q:  “I am P” 
2. Q→P: n 
3. P→Q: {n}KPA 
4. Q→A: {P,{n} KPA}KQA 
5. A→Q: {n}KQA 
This simple protocol commences with the initiating agent P identifying itself to another agent Q that 
then responds with a challenge nonce, which P must encrypt with a symmetric key it shares with 
trusted server A. Q then forwards the message response together with the identity of the initiating 
agent (P) to the server after encrypting it with the symmetric key it shares with A. Q’s receipt of the 
original nonce n from the server encrypted with the shared symmetric key is  then  taken as  proof of 
P’ s identity, as the trusted server is involved in a key translation. The protocol was later found to be 
incorrect [21], as it becomes prone to attack when the responder (Q) starts a second interleaving run of 
the same protocol with another principal. The saboteur starts a first protocol with Q pretending to be 
P.  The saboteur cannot, however, get A to perform the necessary key translation required in step 5. 
The saboteur waits until P starts another run of the same protocol to perform the necessary key 
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translation using the nonce from the first protocol. This translated key is then used as the last message 
in the first protocol instance.   
 
In an attempt to learn from their mistakes, Woo and Lam retraced their steps in designing the protocol 
and removed the redundancies. The protocol flaw was the result of removing P, the name of the 
initiator whose identity is being authenticated in the last step replacing {P,n}KQA by {n}KQA. 
Incorporating the name initiator (P) in the encrypted part allows the responder to correctly infer the 
identity of the sender. They concluded that authentication protocols carrying full information gathered 
in every outgoing encrypted message could reduce the chance of replay attacks. A number of 
heuristics for safely reducing redundancies were formulated:  
 Each message should contain the names of both the initiator and the responder, and the nonce 
of at least one participant, the recipient. The nonce allows the authentication run to be 
uniquely identified.   
 An encrypted message intended for a particular principal can omit the name of the recipient 
but should include the name of the sender.  
 Double encryption, where an outer encryption follows an inner one, should only be used when 
the message must be delivered to recipients in a specific order. 
Full information makes protocols more resistant to attacks, because messages contain information 
specific to protocol runs. But it also makes the protocols more expensive in terms of processing and 
bandwidth, especially when a protocol requires multiple hops between two parties. Better trade-offs 
between security and processing can be achieved by only carrying full information of newly gained 
knowledge.   
2.4.3.2 Explicitly Stating the Reasons for Cryptographic Components 
Other  design principles suggest the use of cryptographic elements be made explicit as a way to reduce 
common attacks and protocol misinterpretations  [87]. These are summarised below. 
 Include the identity of a principal if it makes the meaning of the message clearer. Messages that 
contain sender and receiver names encrypted with appropriate signatures are less prone to replay 
attacks.  
 Protocol trust assumptions must be made explicit (such as S is the trusted key server).  
 By making explicit why each encryption is used (i.e., for secrecy, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation or other non-security reasons) unnecessary encryptions can be removed, making the 
protocols more efficient.   
 The recipient of an encrypted message should not assume that the sender knows the content of a 
message, unless the sender has signed it before encrypting it for secrecy.  
 State the reason for use of nonces, i.e., binding (association) or for temporal ordering.  
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 When protocol messages are received, message terms are interpreted on the basis of the protocol 
and the step within the protocol. Thus, the protocol used, the run and the message order must be 
made clear to the receiver. 
 The protocol designer should make the trust assumptions clear. For example, which entities 
(such as a trusted server) are allowed to generate new keys must be made explicit.  
These principles enforce a disciplined approach that requires designers to state underlying assumptions 
clearly and reason out why a specific cryptographic component is used. It also raises awareness of 
some of the common pitfalls in past attempts to make protocols efficient. However, these general 
guidelines are neither sufficient nor strictly necessary for the creation of secure protocols as they 
provide no specific strategy to create a protocol, nor any means to identify when parts of protocol 
elements are redundant. The next section describes one such approach using a challenge-response 
mechanism, noting that most security protocol goals such as authentication and integrity have a one-
to-one relationship between senders and receivers [47].   
2.4.4 Summary of Common Protocol Attacks 
Many of the past protocol flaws surveyed were the result of misinterpretation of security properties 
themselves. The authentication property, for example, has multiple interpretations, providing different 
levels of assurances [33]. If security requirements for protocols are to be set aggregating the 
requirements of all interacting parties, the meanings of basic and composite properties must be 
standardised [31,33]. Furthermore, the security schemes used for enforcing these properties must be 
provably secure. Security protocols are especially vulnerable to many forms of subtle attacks. Though 
it is not possible to list all possible types of attack, they can be classified into common forms of attack 
such as replay, type-flaw and denial-of-service attacks. Such classification allows preventive measures 
to be designed. A number of design guidelines that can prevent common attacks were surveyed [79, 
87]. Many of the principles intended for manual design are equally applicable when synthesising 
protocols, though some may cause high performance degradation. Others are only applicable to key-
exchange protocols, where data size, as well as the number of entities and messages is limited [87].  
Designing e-commerce protocols provides many additional challenges that require combining security 
with other considerations such as fair exchange in transactions.  
 
A survey of past approaches reveals that formal methods have played a vital role in verification and 
synthesis of security protocols [47,65,67,75]. However, underlying costs were often overlooked. 
Although security is considered vital in e-commerce, it cannot be considered in isolation. Increasing 
use of security protocols in bandwidth limited networks and resource constrained devices makes 
security performance trade-offs necessary. Security protocols synthesised on the basis of security 
goals alone may render low-valued transactions unviable. The security strength needed for a protocol 
should therefore be made to reflect the resources available to the potential adversary, the data value 
and the resulting commitments.   
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2.5 Accountability in E-Commerce Protocols 
Many of the past protocol synthesis attempts were based on beliefs about protocol actions. Beliefs 
however are inadequate in e-commerce as beliefs cannot be transferred to a third party without explicit 
evidence. To circumvent this problem,  accountability logic was devised [30] to verify whether an 
action can be associated with a specific party. This logic is similar to beliefs based logic where new 
inferences are made based on assumptions and postulates. Accountability is defined as the property 
whereby association of a unique originator with an object or action can be proved to a third party. In 
this framework proof of a statement x is something which convinces another principal of statement x.  
This framework allows proofs to be made to any third party (strong proof) or to a specific party (weak 
proof). The beliefs can be represented as form of weak proof where a party can prove a statement only 
to itself.  
 
Constructs used in this framework [30] include: 
 
Statement: “A says x” 
This construct makes A accountable for the statement x and anything implied by x.  
 
Weak Proof: “A CanProve x to B” 
This construct says A has the capacity to prove x to B without revealing any secret y known to A (y ≠ 
x).  
 
Strong Proof: “A CanProve x” 
This construct says A can prove the statement x to any principal B.  
 
Trust: “A is TrustedOn x” 
This construct says A has the authority to endorse statement x and is liable for making that statement 
Postulates used in Proving 
Postulates are presented in the form  
R
QP;
 
This constructs means if P and Q hold simultaneously then statement R also holds. Here the symbol 
“;” is used to indicate conjunction of constructs and not temporal ordering. The symbol  is used for 
conjunction of statements such as x and y. 
 
Some common postulates include: 
Conj: 
 y) (x A CanProve
Prove y x;  A CanA CanProve
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This postulate says if A can prove x and A can prove y holds separately, then A can prove they hold 
together.  
 
Inf: 
 yA CanProve
y x;  xA CanProve
 
This postulate says if A can prove x holds, and if x implies y, then A can prove y holds. 
 
Relationship to Belief:  (A Believes x)  (A CanProve x to A) 
This postulate says A believes x if and only if A can prove to itself that x holds.  
 
Trust: 
 xA CanProve
xnIsTrustedOBove ;  A CanPrxsaysB A CanProve )()(
 
This postulate says if A can prove B (which is an authority on x) says x, then A can prove x holds. 
 
The main benefit of this framework is that it allows existing protocols to be analysed for their 
accountability properties. It also allows the right level of evidences to be incorporated depending on 
whether the proofs are required for a specific party or to the public. Furthermore, this framework 
allows beliefs to be represented as a weaker form of accountability. The main limitation of this 
approach is that it is applicable only to those protocols for which accountability is essential. Moreover 
it does not allow other security properties such as secrecy to be analysed. The framework was used 
mainly to analyse existing protocols; it must be combined with other techniques if end-to-end security 
protocols are to be synthesised.  
 
2.6 Performance Trade-offs in Security Protocols 
Widespread use of security mechanisms has attracted research interest on the security/performance 
balance [34]. This is mainly because the viability of security mechanisms in resource constrained 
devices and networks depends on protocols that allow the right trade-offs between security and 
performance [45, 51, 89]. Inherent resource constraints include limited battery power, processing 
capability and memory. Attempts to achieve such trade-offs include selection of cryptographic 
elements with specific performance characteristics and varying the parameters, such as key lengths 
and encryption block-sizes for those cryptographic elements [52]. Such trade-offs are possible if the 
security strength of protocols is measured in terms of the underlying security strength of cryptographic 
elements [46]. Security strength reflects the processing effort required by an adversary to break the 
underlying mechanism. Security overheads can also be reduced by classifying schemes on the basis of 
the exact security properties. Use of  signcryption, for example, avoids the need to use different keys 
for authentication and confidentiality [10, 13]. Others have proposed adaptive [49] protocols whereby 
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security levels in a protocol are varied in response to changes in network and system resources [90, 
91]. Such trade-offs can be made dynamically only if distinct security schemes that are provably 
secure are devised to provide the required security levels.  
 
Most formal techniques for analysing protocols simplify the models by abstracting away items that are 
not essential for security. However, oversimplification of protocols, such as SET used in e-commerce,  
makes it hard to predict performance [12]. The performance of protocols can be predicted more 
accurately if cryptographic elements and algorithms with known security strength/processing cost are 
used. Ideally, security protocols must be designed using cryptographic elements with similar security 
strength, as the weakest link determines overall security strength. Experiments measuring throughput 
of the SSL protocol show that performance can vary by a factor of five depending on the security 
strength of underlying elements [49]. The security strength used should reflect the resources possessed 
by the opponents, with threats from government requiring the highest protection, followed by 
corporations and individuals  [85]. The time required to break the RC-4 stream ciphers used by 
wireless protocols WPA and WEP using a Pentium IV 3 GHz CPU can vary from 30 minutes to 5 x 
10
23
 years, depending on key length. By classifying elements and algorithms that produce similar 
security strength better trade-offs between security and performance can be achieved for different 
platforms.  
 
The literature review of security problems clearly reveals the need to consider the trade-offs between 
security and cost when designing new protocols. Security overheads can be reduced if provably secure 
schemes meet exact security needs. Security protocols can be made to match performance constraints 
if the underlying elements that provide the right security strength (high, medium, low) can be selected 
dynamically. While synthesis of security protocols has attracted much interest recently [23, 24, 60, 61] 
there has been little work done in finding the security performance trade-offs.   
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2.7 Application of Past Logics/Techniques in this Thesis 
Past protocol synthesis and verification logics/techniques provide the mathematical foundations for the 
work done in this thesis. Logics and techniques used in this thesis include Secure Protocol 
Composition Logic (SPCL), Strand Spaces and Accountability Logic.  
 Chapter 3 makes the assumption all intermediaries remain trustworthy for any kind of 
transaction. Schemes enforcing fine-grained security properties (in Chapter 3) are created by 
combining challenge-response mechanisms with secure protocol composition logic (SPCL) 
presented in this chapter. The validity of extended schemes derived for multiple recipients (in 
Chapter 3) are proved using Strand Spaces based techniques presented in this chapter.  
 Chapter 4 assumes a more realistic trust model where trust relationships are allowed to vary 
over time. Such a model requires trusted paths in the form of spanning trees to be formed 
through one or more category specific endorsement intermediaries at run time, based on criteria 
specified.  A spanning tree of a graph is a sub-graph which is a tree (no cycles) that connects all 
the vertices in the graph. 
 End-to-end schemes devised in chapter 5 keep intermediaries along the trusted paths 
accountable for their endorsements. These schemes are derived by transferring and discharging 
proof obligations along the trusted paths (in Chapter 5). The validity of these end-to-end 
schemes are proved using Secure Protocol Composition Logic (SPCL) and Accountability Logic 
presented in this chapter. 
 
The Table 2.2 below summarises how the logics presented are used in subsequent chapters.  
Logic Chapter  Purpose 
Strand Spaces 3 Proving validity of schemes for multiple recipients 
SPCL 3,5 Proving validity of composition schemes 
Accountability Logic 5 Reasoning about proof obligations 
 Table 2.2  Usage of Logics Presented in Subsequent Chapters 
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Chapter 3:  Protocol Generation using Proven Schemes 
(PGPS) 
End-to-end protocols such as SET [6] were hand crafted to provide the needed security assurances for 
e-commerce transactions involving a merchant, a customer and a payment gateway. Their 
applicability, however, is limited, being designed for specific configurations and type of transactions. 
PGPS circumvents this problem by synthesising protocols based on requirements. 
3.1 What is PGPS (Protocol Generation using Proven Schemes)? 
PGPS is a framework which allows protocols to be synthesised dynamically meeting the end-to-end 
security requirements of the interacting parties.  Thus, the set of security properties for any message 
path is set by aggregating the security requirements of constituent data elements at their end points. 
Basic properties in PGPS such as data authentication and receiver nonrepudiation provide security 
assurances to either the data originator or the data recipient. Composite properties formed by 
combining basic properties may provide assurances to both data originator and recipient but in specific 
order. The order in which individual properties must be asserted is standardized in PGPS reflecting 
common security needs in e-commerce. For example, by specifying that the composite property 
enforcing data recency and receiver non-repudiation must assert recency first, the originator gets the 
non-repudiable assurance that data was received and that it was received recently, while recipient gets 
the assurance that data was recent. PGPS thus helps to avoid many of the past protocol flaws resulting 
from lack of standard definition for common security properties [31]. Furthermore, standardized 
properties allow protocol end-to-end security requirements to be expressed as a function of security 
needs of interacting entities. 
 
Security schemes synthesised for e-commerce must meet end-to-end security needs as business rules 
may require data to be routed through third parties.  Such business rules may dictate the order in which 
data elements must be delivered or the way they must be grouped together. Data elements that are 
grouped together provide implicit evidence to recipients that they are part of the same transaction. For 
example, a payment order can be associated with the purchase order if they are received together. 
Delivering data in a specified order prevents certain recipients from gaining undue advantage, and 
allows recipients to receive data indirectly through trusted third parties. Fair exchange schemes 
prevent undue advantage to data recipient (which may fail to acknowledge) by releasing the data in 
stages subject to receipt of partial acknowledgement.  Unlike any previous synthesis attempts, PGPS 
allows such business constraints to be combined with security requirements.  
 
PGPS uses two different techniques for proving end-to-end security: one using only direct evidence 
from originator and recipient while the other combines direct evidence with indirect evidence from 
intermediaries. The first technique uses a PGPS algorithm derived by interleaving proven two-party 
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schemes. The second technique relies on sequential composition of two-party schemes. Use of these 
schemes helps avoid the need for extensive model checking and allow protocols to be synthesised at 
runtime. The basic two-party schemes devised are proved using SPCL. The validity of interleaved 
schemes are proved using Strand Spaces. The validity of sequentially composed schemes follows 
directly from the compositional logic used.  Additional evidence incorporated into the PGPS schemes 
help resist common forms of attacks, such as replay and type-flaw. The sequential compositional 
technique presented in this chapter (forming the Fine-grained Security Layer in Table 1.2) is extended 
in Chapter 5 to synthesise end-to-end protocols through trusted endorsement intermediaries (End-to-
End Security Layer in Table 1.2). The paths through trusted intermediaries are selected based on the 
endorsement trust model presented in Chapter 4 (Trust Establishment Layer in Table 1.2).   
 
If protocols are to be synthesised for different environments dynamically, the underlying framework 
must allow trade-offs between security and performance. Lack of such flexibility in standard SSL 
protocols led to development of many variations that work within performance bottlenecks imposed 
by underlying communication mediums and resource-limited devices [50-52, 92]. PGPS facilitates 
such trade-offs by modelling the cost of protocols as a function of underlying security strength.  Such 
an approach allows optimal security strength to be set as a function of performance bottlenecks. 
3.2 Motivation: End-to-End Security for E-Commerce Protocols 
Point-to-point protocols such as TLS are designed to exchange data securely between two entities 
providing common security guarantees. E-commerce transactions however, require data to be 
despatched to multiple recipients with different security properties and in specific order. TLS, though 
efficient and widely used cannot provide such end-to-end security guarantees [9]. For example, a 
customer may send a message with order and credit card details to both a merchant and a bank with 
access to order details restricted to the merchant and access to credit card details restricted to the bank. 
Enforcing such business specific security guarantees requires specially designed end-to-end protocols 
such as SET. TLS protocols can provide confidentiality, data authentication and data integrity 
assurances. However, it does not provide receiver non-repudiation which is vital for e-commerce. 
Moreover, e-commerce protocols must also incorporate other properties such as fair exchange to 
ensure no party gains an undue advantage, in case a protocol run is terminated midway.  
 
Security requirements in e-commerce reflect the overall perception of interacting entities about the 
type, value and risks associated with transactions. Each transaction may involve exchange of one or 
more data elements either directly or through intermediaries. Business rules in e-commerce may 
require specific data elements to be kept hidden, grouped together, linked or delivered in a specific 
order. End-to-end security provides such guarantees even when data elements are sent through one or 
more intermediaries.  This section uses the SET purchase protocol as an example to analyse how end-
to-end security requirements are met. Section 3.2.1 gives an overview of the SET protocol. Section 
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3.2.2 analyses SET Purchase Protocol. Section 3.2.3 presents limitations of SET purchase protocol and 
outlines the proposed solution PGPS. Section 3.2.4 presents the requirements based on SET purchase 
protocol.  Section 3.2.5 presents PGPS version of the protocol meeting the same requirements. Section 
3.2.6 gives an overview of PGPS. Section 3.2.7 outlines PGPS research contributions.  
3.2.1 SET Protocol Overview 
SET purchase protocols are designed to provide all the common security properties needed for e-
commerce listed in Table 1.1. The SET purchase protocol was designed to provide such end-to-end 
guarantees for customers and merchants by requiring them to register with a centralized certification 
authority. Other SET protocols include customer registration, merchant registration, payment 
authorization and payment capture. The SET protocol family was jointly developed by MasterCard 
and Visa for transactions between three main parties, namely the customer, merchant and payment 
gateway [9].  
The SET purchase protocol involves three components: 
 Merchant component that handles purchase requests. 
 Payment Gateway component, a trusted financial intermediary that verifies payment 
information before forwarding to other financial institutions. 
 Customer holding the credit-card details that initiates a purchase. The customer shares the 
order information with the merchant but this is not revealed to payment gateway. Similarly 
payment information is shared with the payment gateway but not revealed to the customer.  
The main novelty of SET is the dual signature used in the purchase protocol to implement partial 
sharing of information while allowing all parties to verify they are handling the same transaction. Both 
the merchant and the payment gateway receive a hash of hidden information signed by the customer, 
allowing them to verify whether they are dealing with the same order and payment information. This 
mechanism ensures the merchant does not have access to payment information and the payment 
gateway does not have access to the order information, thus meeting the end-to-end requirements. 
 
A simplified six-step purchase protocol used in verifying the SET protocol [6] is presented below. 
This version omits many of the complex interactions permitted in the SET protocol and simplifies 
some of the steps to facilitate analysis. The notation used is kept consistent with earlier work [6] which 
is described briefly in this section.  
 
ID representing entity Y      ID_Y 
Y signing by its private key     SignpriSKY 
Encrypting with public key of entity Y    CryptpubEKY 
Nonce for freshness challenge issued by entity Y   FRESH_Y 
Nonce challenge       XID 
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Step 1. Purchase Initialization Request 
The customer C sends the merchant M a freshness challenge Fresh_C and an identifier ID_M. 
C → M : ID_M, Fresh_C 
 
Step 2. Purchase Initialization Response 
The signed response from merchant M includes a freshness challenge Fresh_M and a nonce XID. 
M → C : SignpriSKM(ID_M, XID, Fresh_C, Fresh_M) 
 
Step 3. Purchase Request 
SET uses a dual signature (PIDualSign) to ensure card details and order information are not revealed 
to the merchant and payment gateway, respectively.  First, the customer signs the concatenation of the 
hashes of payment instructions (PIData) and the order information (OIData). It also includes other 
secrets including customer primary account (PAN) and card details that are encrypted with payment 
gateway’s public key. This information together with order Information (OIData) and the hash of the 
payment instructions (PIData) are then sent to the merchant.  
C → M : PIDualSign, OIData, Hash(PIData) 
Here, C has computed 
HOD = Hash(OrderDesc, PurchAmt) 
PIHead = ID_M, XID,HOD, PurchAmt,M, Hash(XID, CardSecret) 
OIData = XID, Fresh_C,HOD, Fresh_M 
PIData = PIHead,PAN, PANSecret 
PIDualSign = SignpriSKC(Hash(PIData), Hash(OIData)),  
CryptpubEK P (PIHead, Hash(OIData),PAN,PANsecret) 
 
Step 4. Authorization Request 
Before requesting authorization from a payment gateway, the merchant verifies the dual signature 
using the hash of payment instructions and the order information. The payment instructions are then 
combined with transaction identifiers and the hash of the Order Information, before being signed and 
encrypted using the payment gateway’s public key. 
M → P : CryptpubEK P (SignpriSKM(ID_M, XID, Hash(OIData),HOD, PIDualSign)) 
 
Step 5. Authorization Response 
Before responding, the payment gateway verifies the dual signature using the hash from the order 
information. It also checks that the customer and merchant agree on the order description and purchase 
amount (purchAmt) by comparing their hash values. Finally it verifies the validity of the customer’s 
secret account information. If satisfied, a signed authorization response containing the transaction 
identifier, hash of purchase amount and an authorization code (authCode) is sent to the merchant. 
P → M : CryptpubEKM(SignpriSK P (ID_M, XID, Hash(PurchAmt), authCode)) 
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Step 6.  Purchase Response 
The merchant now responds with a signed message to the customer containing the hash of purchase 
amount. 
 M → C : CryptpubEKC(SignpriSKM(ID_M, XID, Hash(PurchAmt), authCode)) 
3.2.2 SET Purchase Protocol Analysis 
SET security protocol was designed to meet both business and security related requirements of a 
merchant, customer and a payment gateway. Business requirements include grouping and sequencing 
constraints. Order and payment information from the customer are despatched together to assure that 
they are part of the same transaction. The public/private keys used ensures customer and payment 
gateway exchange data through the merchant. The presence of hashed data in the customer signed part 
assures the merchant that data was not tampered with during transit. The presence of a merchant ID 
and a merchant generated nonce assures the merchant that data elements were sent authenticated and 
despatched recently (not replayed).  
 
The presence of credit card details only in the part encrypted with the public key of payment gateway 
in the dual signature prevents the merchant accessing them. Similarly, including only the hashed order 
information in step 4 prevents the payment gateway from accessing order details. Also, step 4 allows 
the merchant to authenticate the order details as it incorporates the merchant ID in the part signed by 
the merchant. The presence of the customer signed hash of payment information assures the payment 
gateway that these data have not been tampered with. Data signed by the payment gateway in steps 5 
and 6 (authorization response and purchase response) prove the authenticity and integrity of 
authorization data from payment gateway while the signing by the private key of merchant and 
customer ensure their confidentiality is maintained. Note the protocol ensures the authorisation code 
must be despatched to the merchant before the customer. The security properties met by the SET 
purchase protocol for various data elements is summarised in Table 3.1 while grouping and 
sequencing constraints on data elements are summarised in Table 3.2.  
 
Data Element Secrecy Originator 
Requirements 
Recipient 1 
Requirements 
Recipient  2 
Requirements 
Evidence 
Order 
Information (OI) 
C,M  C: - EA M: A,R,DI  Direct 
Payment 
Information (PI) 
C,PG C: - M: A, R, DI PG: A, DI Direct/Indirect 
Merchant 
Information (MI) 
 M: - PG: A, DI  Direct 
Authorisation  C,M,PG PG:  - M: A, DI C: A, DI Direct  
 
Labels for entities:  Customer - C   Merchant - M   Payment Gateway - PG 
A –  Authentication DI – Data Integrity R – Recency  
EA – Entity Authentication 
Table 3.1 Data Elements and their Security Requirements 
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Data Data Elements Origin Destinations Previous 
Purchase 
Request 
Order Information (OI), 
Payment  Information (PI) 
Customer Merchant  
Authorise 
Request 
Merchant Information (MI), 
Payment Information (PI) 
Merchant Payment 
Gateway 
Purchase 
Request 
Authorise 
Response 
Authorisation  Payment 
Gateway 
Merchant, 
Customer 
Authorise 
Request 
        
 
SET Protocol Limitations 
E-commerce protocols impose many business related constraints which require limiting access to data 
elements sent through intermediaries, such as credit card details or order information. Although SET 
protocol with its end-to-end guarantees is better suited for e-commerce than transport layer protocols 
such as SSL, the lack of verification mechanisms has limited its use [11]. SET allows for many 
different variations including frequent flyer points, split payments and payment by instalment with 
documentation running over several hundreds of pages [13]. Many of the past verification techniques 
were designed to prove the validity of simple key distribution protocols with a limited number of 
entities and data elements.  The high cost of novel constructs in SET such as dual signatures (which 
involve multiple public key operations) also limit its extensibility. 
3.2.3 The Proposed Solution 
Unlike SET which assumes a standard configuration with a single merchant and a customer, the 
proposed solution aims to allow flexible configurations involving any number of e-commerce entities 
and message elements. Furthermore, such transaction may incorporate features such as fair exchange, 
which are not included in standard SET. The infeasibility of crafting and proving protocols for every 
possible configuration and properties makes a compositional approach to protocol synthesis necessary. 
Moreover, standard protocols such as SET are not designed to provide the right level of security 
reflecting the value of data and existing relationships. Right security level of security provides the 
specified level of security, i.e., no less and no more. A specific security guarantee may not be 
necessary when data despatched has no inherent value or when peer entities trust each other. A custom 
designed protocol on the other hand can be made to provide the right level of security, thus allowing 
better trade-offs between security and performance.  
 
Security protocols with the right level of security can be created if entities are allowed to specify the 
security properties and business related constraints applicable. Such an approach requires defining the 
basic and composite security properties necessary for e-commerce. Provably secure schemes must be 
devised for all basic and composite properties. These schemes must be made extensible to multiple 
parties as e-commerce requires data to be sent to multiple recipients in specific order. PGPS provides 
such an approach, where security schemes are synthesised to meet the security and business related 
constraints of interacting entities. 
Table 3.2 Grouping and Sequencing Requirements 
51 
3.2.4 SET Purchase Protocol Specifications in PGPS 
The PGPS protocol specifications in this section are derived directly from the SET protocol 
requirements stated in the previous section. Based on the grouping, sequencing and dependency 
constraints in in Table 3.2, three data exchanges are involved, namely, Purchase_Request, 
Authorise_Request and Authorise_Response with specific security properties as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The secrecy requirements in PGPS are handled at the granularity of data element while all other 
security properties are determined at the granularity of data (combination of  all data elements) by 
summing up security requirements for each data element. For example, the data exchange containing 
order and payment information sent from the customer to the merchant requires the security properties 
authentication, integrity, secrecy, entity authentication and recency.  Table 3.3 shows the data, its 
origin, destinations, data dependency (if any) and their security requirements other than secrecy 
(which is enforced at data element level). These security requirements are described in Table 1.1.  For 
data despatched to multiple recipients, such as Authorise_Response,  the order of delivery can be 
specified explicitly (Merchant before Customer). Table 3.4 shows the secrecy requirements at data 
element level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Data Data Elements Origin Destinations Dependency Security 
Properties 
Purchase 
Request 
Order Information (OI), 
Payment  Information (PI) 
Customer Merchant  A,DI,R,EA 
Authorise 
Request 
Merchant Information (MI), 
Payment Information (PI) 
Merchant Payment Gateway Purchase 
Request 
A,DI 
Authorise 
Response 
Authorisation  Payment 
Gateway 
Merchant, 
Customer 
Authorise 
Request 
A,DI 
        
 
 
Data Element Origin Encryption 
Purchase Information Customer GrpKey(Customer,Merchant) 
Authorise Request Merchant GrpKey(Customer,Payment-Gateway) 
Authorise Response Payment Gateway GrpKey(Merchant, Customer, Payment-Gateway) 
 
Figure 3.1  Purchase  Protocol Specification Made up of Data and Their Security Properties 
Customer Merchant 
2.Authorise Request {A,DI} 
1.Purchase Request {A,DI,R,EA} 
3.Authorise Response {A,DI} 
 
Payment 
Gateway 
Table 3.3 Entity Labels, Data Elements and Security Requirements 
Table 3.4 Data Exchange Details   
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3.2.5 Equivalent SET Purchase Protocol Composed using PGPS Technique 
PGPS generates protocols combining schemes for two-party and multiple recipients, which are 
verified using SPCL and Strand Spaces. The security requirements along the data path are set by 
aggregating requirements at the end points, as described below.  
 All secret data elements are encrypted at the source with a symmetric group key before 
performing any other operations. Secrecy group of any derived element is set to union of all 
base element secrecy groups. This ensures secrecy requirements are not violated.  
 If entity authentication property is prescribed it is enforced in isolation without combining it 
with schemes for other properties. This ensures an entity itself is authenticated before any data 
is despatched to it.  
 Data security levels are computed by aggregating the requirements for all data elements 
specified by the originator and the recipient.  
 When data is sent to multiple recipients, PGPS schemes for multiple recipients are used to 
deliver data in the required order.  
 
Table 3.5 shows the protocol generated using PGPS technique for the SET purchase protocol 
specification. Steps and one and two are used by customer to authenticate merchant. Steps three and 
four are used to get a nonce challenge from merchant to prove recency. Step five is used to send a 
purchase request with properties {A,R,DI}. The purchase request from customer includes payment 
information (PI) and order information (OI).  These data elements are encrypted with group keys _CP 
(shared by Customer and Payment Gateway) and _CM (shared by Customer and Merchant) respectively 
to preserve the secrecy requirements. Steps six sends data elements payment information (PI) and 
merchant information (MI) with security properties authentication and data integrity. The data 
elements PI is encrypted with group keys _CP (shared between customer and payment gateway) and 
MI with _MP (shared between merchant and payment gateway) The composed scheme uses two steps. 
Similarly, the final sub-protocol sends authorisation information (AUT_CAB) encrypted with the group 
key shared between customer, merchant and payment gateway.     
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Protocol Steps Scheme Explanation 
1. Merchant_Authenticate_Request C[EA,nC]M     Customer sends a nonce challenge nC to Merchant 
to authenticate entity. 
2. Merchant_Authenticate- Response M[{nC}pri_M]C     Merchant encrypts  nC by its private key 
3. Recency_Challenge_Request C[Re]M Customer prompts merchant for nonce challenge to 
prove recency. 
4. Recency_Challenge_Response M[nM]C Merchant responds with nonce challenge 
5. Purchase_Request C[PI_CP&OI_CM,{h(PI_CP&OI_CM), 
nM,C,M}pri_C]M  
Customer forwards a signed digest containing the 
hash of data together with the recent nonce, and 
originator and recipient labels to prove {A,R,DI}. 
The data contains payment information shared with 
payment gateway and order information shared 
with merchant. 
6. Authorise_Request M[PI_CP&MI_MP, 
{h(PI_CP&MI_MP),M,P}pri_M]P   
Customer forwards digest signed by merchant 
containing, hash of data and originator and 
recipient labels to prove {A,R,DI}. The The data 
contains payment information shared between 
customer and  payment gateway and merchant 
information shared between merchant and payment 
gateway.  
7. Authorise_Response-1 P[{AUT_PMC,P,(M,C)}pri_P, 
{h(AUT_PMC),C}pri_P]M 
Payment gateway sends authorization details 
shared between customer, merchant and payment 
gateway with properties {A,DI} to merchant first 
and then to customer. 
8. Authorise_Response-2 M[{AUT_PMC,P,(M,C)}pri_P, 
{h(AUT_PMC),C}pri_P]C 
Merchant forwards the authorization details to 
customer with properties {A,DI}. 
 
Comparison with the Standard SET Purchase Protocol 
Figure 3.2 lists the main SET purchase protocol scheme described in Section 3.2.1 and the PGPS 
synthesised scheme. In both cases data and cryptographic elements are exchanged between customer 
(C), merchant (M) and payment gateway (P). PGPS uses two additional steps as merchant 
authentication in steps one and two are performed separately. The rest of the steps have a one-to-one 
mapping and provide a similar level of assurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PGPS and the standard SET approach vary mainly in the way secrecy is enforced. Standard SET uses 
dual encryption technique to enforce secrecy and to associate  data elements [6] while PGPS uses 
C  M: Merchant_Authenticate_Request 
M  C: Merchant_Authenticate- Response 
C  M: Recency_Challenge_Request 
M  C: Recency_Challenge_Response 
C  M: Purchase_Request 
M  P: Authorise_Request 
P  M: Authorise_Response-1 
M  C: Authorise_Response-2 
Figure 3.2  Standard Set and PGPS Generated Protocol Steps 
Table 3.5 PGPS Scheme Generated with SET Purchase Protocol Specifications 
C  M: Purchase_Inititialisation_Request 
M  C: Purchase_Inititialisation_Response 
C  M: Purchase_Request 
M  P: Authorisation_Request 
P  M: Authorisation_Response 
M  C: Purchase_Response 
 
Standard SET 
PGPS 
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group keys to enforce secrecy. The main advantage with the PGPS approach is its flexibility; it can be 
made to provide additional properties such as non-repudiation for the order information. Furthermore, 
PGPS can provide the needed assurances to any number of entities and intermediaries at runtime by 
aggregating their security requirements.   
 
3.2.6 PGPS Overview 
This section briefly outlines how PGPS generates security schemes based on business related 
constraints and end-to-end security requirements. Business related constraints reflect the semantics of 
transactions, the value of data elements and current business policies. Section 3.2.6.1 presents the 
input to PGPS, while 3.2.6.2 the type of business constraints handled in PGPS. Section 3.2.6.3 
presents PGPS end-to-end security requirements while Section 3.2.6.4 outlines the PGPS solution.  
3.2.6.1 Inputs to PGPS 
The inputs to PGPS include both business constraints and security related requirements. Both business 
constraints and security requirements reflect the semantics of knowledge elements, the role of entities 
and the type of transactions. The next two sections describe business constraints and security 
requirements in greater detail. 
3.2.6.2 PGPS Business Constraints 
Business related constraints specify data elements that must be grouped together and the order in 
which they must be exchanged. It is assumed the grouping and sequencing of data elements are carried 
out reflecting the semantics of transactions and data elements. The business constraints specified to 
PGPS include: 
 Data elements that must be despatched together (grouping constraints) 
 The order in which data must be delivered to recipients (sequencing constraints) 
 
A grouping constraint (GC) takes the form GC: ES × ED × DE,  where ES, ED  E the set of valid 
entities and DE  Pow(D), the set of data elements. For example, an e-commerce grouping constraints 
may require data elements order details (OD) and payment details (PD) to be despatched together 
from customer (C)  to merchant (M) as in: C  M: {OD,PD}. 
 
A sequencing constraint (SC) takes the form SC: Pow(D) ×  < ES  ES  E >  where D is the set of data 
elements and E is the set of entities. For example, an e-commerce sequencing constraints may specify 
data elements order details (OD) and payment details (PD) from customer (C) to be despatched to 
payment gateway (PE) via merchant (M)  as in: {OD,PD}: C M PG. 
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3.2.6.3 PGPS End-to-End Security Requirements 
PGPS security requirements allow end-to-end assurances for data and entity identities to be stated. 
Data security requirements including which secrecy (S) and correspondence properties (A,DI,RNR,R) 
are stated at the granularity of data element. The security properties assigned reflect the value of 
transactions, the type of commitments and relationship between entities. The following general 
guidelines are used in PGPS:   
 originator to require receiver non-repudiation if proof of despatch is required  
 receiver to require authentication if originator to be held accountable  
 receiver to require  recency if validity of data element is time dependent 
 sender to  require secrecy if data element despatched is confidential 
 
The following sections summarise the syntax of different types of security requirements. 
 
Entity Authentication Requirement EAR: EA × EB, where EA, EB  E, the set of valid entities. For 
example, when A requires B to authenticate its identity and B requires both C to authenticate its 
identity, the entity requirements can be expressed as in:  A B, B C 
 
Data Security Requirements 
Data security requirements include secrecy (S), data authentication (A), data integrity (DI), receiver 
non-repudiation (RNR) and data recency (R).   
 
 Secrecy Requirement (SR) for a data element is specified by its originator by listing the set of 
entities granted access as in SR: Di × EO ×ED  where Di  D, the set of data elements, and EO  
E is the entity of origin and ED  Pow(E) is the set of destination entities. For example, payment 
information PI originating in customer C and granted access in payment gateway (PG) and 
acquisition bank (B) can be specified using secrecy requirements: (PI:C,{ PG,B}). 
 
 For Non-Secrecy Properties (NSR), both originator and recipients specify their requirements in 
the form NSR: Di × Ej × SREQ  where Di  D, the set of date elements, Ej  E the set of entities  
and SREQ  Pow{A,RNR,R,DI}   is the set of security properties. For example, assume data 
element order information (OI) originating in customer (C) is required in merchant (M) with 
properties {R,DI,A} and in payment gateway (PG) with {DI,A}. Also, the customer requires 
receiver non-repudiation. This is specified in PGPS as in: (OI:C,{RNR}),(OI,M,{R,DI,A}), 
(OI,PG,{DI,A}). Note the requirement in originator is specified first. 
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3.2.6.4 PGPS Solution 
The Table 3.6 summarizes some of the problems faced in e-commerce security and how PGPS 
approach can help overcome them.  
 
 E-Commerce Security Problems PGPS Solution 
1. Security needs for interacting e-
commerce entities may vary over time. 
Existing protocols assume security 
needs remain constant. 
PGPS allows interacting entities to specify exact 
security needs for each data element, which are then 
aggregated to arrive at security needs for data 
exchanged. This required standardizing the order in 
which constituent properties are enforced for 
composite properties.  
2. E-commerce protocols are constrained 
by legal and business rules which may 
require grouping of data elements and 
delivery in specific order. 
PGPS allows protocol path to be determined based 
on such constraints. The security properties along 
the path are set aggregating security requirements 
for all data elements along that path. 
3. Existing e-commerce protocols are 
designed for standard configuration. E-
commerce and web services require 
protocols for different configurations.  
PGPS synthesises schemes at runtime using proven 
schemes. Provably secure two-party schemes are 
first devised for basic properties, which are then 
combined to enforce composite properties.  
4. E-commerce protocols need end-to-end 
assurances as data may be sent through 
one or more intermediaries. 
Indirect end-to-end assurances are provided by 
combining two-party schemes in sequence while 
direct assurances result from schemes piggybacking 
data and cryptographic elements. 
5. E-commerce protocol may face many 
security attacks including replay and 
type-flaw attacks. 
Replay attacks can be prevented by specifying the 
recency property. Inclusion of additional terms can 
prevent attacks such as type-flaw. 
6. Security/performance trade-offs are vital 
in e-commerce as many 
devices/networks are resource/cost 
constrained. 
PGPS cost model allows selection of cost-effective 
protocols. Security protocols can be made to work 
within performance and cost constraints by using 
lower security strength. 
  
 
Table 3.6 E-Commerce Problems and PGPS Solutions 
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3.2.7 PGPS: Research Contribution 
The main contribution of this chapter is a framework to synthesise security protocols based on 
business constraints, security requirements and performance trade-offs. The solution presented 
includes defining fine-grained security properties aggregating them considering other business 
constraints, devising schemes for fine-grained properties, extending them to multiple recipients in 
specified order and finding trade-offs with performance.  
 Fine-grained security levels formed by combing basic properties and the algebraic operations 
defined over them allow security requirements to be aggregated. By standardizing  the order in 
which individual security properties within composite properties are enforced, past protocol 
design flaws [31, 33] caused by multiple interpretations of common security properties are 
avoided. By specifying exact security requirement using fine-grained properties overheads 
caused by over-prescription of security requirements are avoided. 
 Fine-grained security schemes are devised by combining challenge-response mechanisms for 
basic schemes [21, 47] with compositional logic [25, 61] used for safely combining them. 
These schemes are strengthened to resist common attacks by incorporating additional terms. It 
was shown these proven schemes can be combined to create protocols similar to SET purchase 
protocol at runtime. The flexible PGPS approach may be extended to other security properties 
such as privacy. Though a number of previous attempts have been made to synthesise 
protocols using challenge-response mechanisms or composition logic, no past attempt was 
made to combine these techniques to form fine-grained security schemes. Also the long 
elapsed times made previous approaches unsuitable for synthesis at runtime.  
 A novel interleaving technique devised allows any two-party scheme to be extended to 
multiple recipients in specified order. The validity of extended schemes is proved using Strand 
Spaces. The underlying algorithm allows the creation of multiparty security schemes at run-
time as the complexity of the algorithm devised is of order O(n
2
), where n is the number of 
recipients. The interleaved schemes provide a number of benefits. First, direct evidence from 
originator and recipients are included even though data is sent through third parties. Second, 
the number of protocol steps required at data source does not increase with the number of 
recipients (as evidences to and from recipients are combined together).   
 PGPS cost model estimates protocol bandwidth and computational cost as a function of 
underlying cryptographic operations, data size and security levels. None of the past protocol 
synthesis attempts surveyed considered the security performance trade-offs. By expressing 
protocol costs in terms of security strength of underlying cryptographic elements (which can 
be varied), PGPS facilitates trade-offs between security and cost. Such trade-offs are be 
necessary if protocols are to be synthesised at runtime for a specific environment.  
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3.3 Statement of the Problem 
Creating e-commerce security protocols dynamically based on entity requirements poses a number of 
challenges. E-commerce entities require end-to-end assurances as data must be passed through a 
number of third parties. E-commerce security protocols must consider business related constraints in 
addition to security requirements.  Entity requirements can be stated precisely only when meanings of 
basic and composite properties are standardized. Many of the past protocol flaws surveyed in Section 
2.4 were caused either by misinterpretation of security properties or common class of attacks. Past 
prevention techniques presented in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 looked into ways of blocking such 
common attacks, such as replay and type flaw attacks. Traditional protocol design process relies on 
verifying protocols with model checking and rectifying them until no flaws remain. However, high 
computational cost of model checking large protocols makes runtime verification impossible. 
Therefore, compositional techniques must be devised that are provably secure or at the least, reduce 
the possible venues for attacks.  Even if attacks cannot be completely prevented mounting attacks can 
be made costly. However, additional features for improving security must be balanced with 
performance considerations for underlying networks and devices, as absolute security is infeasible. 
Many variations of SSL were created in the past to work within the resource constraints of wireless 
devices. Therefore, security features in synthesised protocols must reflect the extent of threats posed, 
the underlying environment and the value of transactions.  
 Past attempts to synthesise protocols used a combination of challenge response mechanisms 
where a sequence of send and receive events incorporating cryptographic elements were used 
to assert specific properties. However, such properties did not allow for finer shades of 
security properties necessary in e-commerce such as non-repudiation of the receipt of a 
message received in a timely manner by combining non-repudiation and recency properties. 
Individual properties too must incorporate features necessary in e-commerce; for example, 
non-repudiation property must incorporate fair exchange (refer to Glossary). 
 Each data exchange in e-commerce may involve one or more data elements as in the case of 
SET protocol, which combines order and payment information. The security level (such as 
{RNR,A,R}) to be assigned to a data exchange must therefore reflect the security requirements 
specified by originators and recipients of each constituent data element. If security levels for 
data are to be determined at run-time as a function of security requirements a suitable algebra 
must be devised over the set of security properties.  
 If e-commerce protocols are to be synthesised from proven schemes, composite schemes must 
be devised to meet every combination of security properties that may be required by data 
originator and recipients.  However, composite schemes formed directly by combining 
individual ones are known to subvert the goals of one another.   
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 E-commerce business rules may require data to be sent to multiple recipients in a specific 
order, as with the SET purchase protocol. Entities in such cases may require end-to-end 
assurances with either direct or indirect evidence. Indirect evidence relies on each 
intermediary along the path meeting such an assurance. For example, sending d with end-to-
end recency from A to C indirectly via B requires enforcing recency from A to B as well as B 
to C.  Direct method, however, requires both originator and each recipient to provide direct 
evidence to one another. Therefore schemes providing various combinations of security 
properties must be devised dynamically to provide such evidence to any number of recipients. 
 Though it is not possible to prevent every form of attack, past research has shown most 
common attacks (such as type-flaw and replay attacks) can be prevented [80,81,84,85]. E-
commerce protocols synthesised must therefore, incorporate these additional features to resist 
common attacks. 
 Low valued transactions and resource constrained devices require protocols that can provide 
the right trade-offs between security and the underlying costs. A protocol may become viable, 
if the underlying computational and bandwidth are reduced by lowering the security strength 
of cryptographic elements. Such trade-offs can be facilitated if the cost of protocols can be 
expressed in terms of underlying cryptographic elements.  
 Schemes for enforcing properties such as receiver non-repudiation can be very costly as it may 
require active involvement of trusted third parties.  
 
These problems must be resolved to allow the automatic creation of realistic security protocols.  
 
3.3.1 Research Questions 
Synthesising provably correct security protocols at runtime based on user specified requirements 
need to address the following research questions.   
 How can end-to-end security requirements be made a function of security requirements of all 
interacting parties? 
 How can two-party schemes be devised for all combinations of properties in a provably 
correct way?  
 How can two-party schemes be automatically extended to any number of recipients in a 
provably secure way?   
 How can the right trade-offs between-security and cost be achieved for protocols synthesised 
at runtime? 
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3.4 Outline of the Solution 
This section gives an overview of the proposed solution devised in PGPS.  E-commerce security 
requirements were decomposed into basic security properties that can be combined (presented in 
Section 3.4.1). The non-repudiation property is made to incorporate fair exchange features to ensure 
that no party is disadvantaged when a transaction is aborted halfway. To avoid misinterpretation of 
composite properties the emergent behaviours (presented in Section 3.4.2) standardise the order in 
which individual properties are enforced. Composite security properties are made comparable by 
classifying all properties into hierarchical, partially ordered security levels using a lattice model (refer 
to Section 3.4.3). Distinct operators were defined to aggregate both secrecy and non-secrecy properties 
dynamically (presented in Section 3.4.4). Composition techniques were used to derive provably secure 
fine-grained security schemes from basic schemes (presented in Section 3.4.5.) Protocols were 
extended to multiple recipients using interleaving techniques (presented in Section 3.4.6).  
 
3.4.1 Enforcing Basic Properties 
Among the six basic properties (A,RNR,R,EA,S,DI) only the  receiver non-repudiation property (RNR) 
requires the involvement of a trusted intermediary. However, the PGPS non-repudiation scheme limits 
intermediary involvement to exceptional cases, based on some prior work [7]. This scheme 
incorporates fair exchange feature whereby data is not fully released until acknowledgement is 
received for partial release (refer to Section 3.6.2.5 for details). Although this scheme improves 
performance by limiting intermediary involvement [7] it cannot fully guarantee non-repudiation unless 
strong assumptions are made about the recipient and the trusted intermediary. However, this scheme 
gathers sufficient evidence that can be presented to the trusted intermediary for recourse before 
sending the data in full.  A stronger form of non-repudiation scheme with heavy intermediary 
involvement can be used instead if performance is not critical.  
 
Any data exchanged in PGPS may carry one or more data elements. Schemes for all properties other 
than secrecy are enforced at the granularity of data. Secrecy property is enforced at the granularity of 
data element as different data elements are accessible to different entities. All secret data elements are 
encrypted at the source prior to despatch, allowing only entities with the appropriate group key to 
decipher them. No secret data elements are sent in the open. 
TERMINOLOGY  3.1 EMERGENT BEHAVIOUR  
Emergent behaviours are additional behaviours that emerge from the interaction of component 
behaviours within a composite system [93]. In PGPS, emergent behaviours result from the way the 
underlying schemes enforce each component of composite properties. These emergent behaviours are 
standardized by predefining the order in which basic properties must be enforced, to promote common 
understanding between interacting entities.   
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3.4.2 Emergent Behaviours of Composite Properties 
PGPS avoids possible misinterpretations by standardising the emergent features of composite 
properties on the basis of their semantics. For example, when authentication or recency are combined 
with non-repudiation, the standard emergent behaviour requires that the non-repudiation assurance 
follows authentication or recency. This follows the intuition that when a recipient non-repudiates 
receiving data sent with authentication and recency properties, the action is assumed to have verified 
its authenticity/recency.  Standardising emergent behaviours also allows reasoning that involves 
protocols and their security levels.  
TERMINOLOGY 3.2 CORRESPONDENCE PROPERTY 
Correspondence properties are those security properties that rely on a one-to-one mapping between a 
send event and a receive event.  All PGPS properties other than secrecy requires such a one-to-one 
mapping.   
 
Scheme Authentication property is an example of a correspondence property as every receive event 
must be preceded by a send event and every send event must have a matching receive event.   
TERMINOLOGY 3.3 SECURITY LEVEL 
Security level in PGPS is the set of correspondence properties needed to meet the security goals of 
message originator and recipients.  
TERMINOLOGY  3.4 DATA ELEMENTS AND DATA 
Data elements in PGPS are indivisible (atomic) knowledge units with distinct semantics. Data refers 
to a group of data elements (de1,de22, ..) that are transferred together. 
 
In PGPS, the secrecy property is enforced at data element level while data authentication, data 
integrity, data recency and non-repudiation are enforced at message level (aggregating security 
properties required for all data elements forming the message).  
 
3.4.3 PGPS Security Properties and Security Levels 
Basic correspondence properties in PGPS are derived decomposing aggregate security requirements of 
data originator and recipients, which includes authentication, non-repudiation, recency, data integrity 
and entity authentication as shown in Table 3.7. PGPS security levels are defined combining these 
correspondence properties in a predefined order. Standardising security levels allow aggregate security 
requirements of data originator and recipients to be specified precisely. For example, PGPS allows a 
recipient to request a composite property which combines authentication with recency, thus preventing 
replay attacks.  Such an approach also helps to avoid past protocol flaws resulting from different 
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interpretations attached to common properties such as authentication (refer to Section 2.4.1). Also, by 
defining a hierarchy of security levels PGPS makes aggregation of security properties at runtime 
possible. The only non-correspondence property (which has no one to one mapping) is shown in Table 
3.8. Such a modular approach allows other elementary properties such as anonymity to be 
incorporated if necessary. 
 
Property Features 
Data Authentication (A) Guarantees data origin and destination entities  
Data Integrity (DI)  Guarantees that data is not altered in transit 
Recency (R) Guarantees that data was generated/sent after a specific event  
Receiver Non-Repudiation (RNR) Provides evidence that data reached intended destination  
Entity Authentication (EA) Guarantees identity and freshness of peer entity  
 
 
Property Features 
Secrecy Data elements kept private between specific entities  
     
 
PGPS security levels form a lattice model as shown in Figure 3.3. Each node in the lattice represents a 
distinct security level (SL). Note security level in the lattice does not include the correspondence 
property entity authentication (EA) as it is not normally used in conjunction with others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
\\ 
 
PGPS security levels are partially ordered by set inclusion; that is for any security levels SL1 and SL2 
in this model, SL1 < SL2 iff  SL1  SL2. Thus SL1 = {A,RNR, DI}  is considered greater than SL2 = 
{A,RNR}, but SL2 = {A,RNR} and SL3 ={A,DI} are unrelated.   
Figure 3.3 Lattice Model for PGIP Security Levels  
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Table 3.7 Basic Correspondence Properties 
 
Table 3.8 Non-correspondence Properties  
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TERMINOLOGY 3.5 SECRECY GROUP 
The Secrecy group for a (secret) data element in PGPS is the set of entities granted access to it.   
3.4.4 Aggregation of Security Properties 
In PGPS data the security level and data security group (defined below) are determined on the basis of 
their constituent elements.  
The sub-protocol security level is derived by summing up the security requirements of all data 
elements as in : SL(d=de1  de2  … den )  = SR(de1)  SR(de2)  …  SR(den).   For example, if 
SR(de1) ={RNR}  and SR(de2) = {A,R} then SL(de1  de2) = {A,R,RNR}. This follows the intuition that 
the security level for data must meet the requirement for all its base elements. 
Secrecy group (SecGrp) for a derived element is set as the intersection of secrecy groups for its base 
elements as in : SecGrp(de3=f(de1,de2)) =  SecGrp(de1)  SecGrp(de2). This follows the intuition that 
if secret1 is restricted to group1 and secret2 is known to group2 then their combination must be 
restricted to those entities that are in both groups (intersection).  
3.4.5 Methodology for Creating Fine-grained Schemes 
The compositional approach used in PGPS helps to expedite the process of creating fine-grained 
security schemes. The five main steps used in the methodology are: 
1. develop two-party schemes for all basic properties using cryptographic elements and algorithms  
2. identify the assumptions and invariants necessary for these schemes, and develop the necessary 
proofs 
3.  derive schemes for multiple properties by combining basic non-conflicting schemes  
4.  when schemes for basic properties violate the invariants/assumptions of other schemes, devise 
alternative schemes (though less efficient) and repeat steps 2 – 4. 
5. strengthen schemes with countermeasures to resist common attacks.     
3.4.6 Extending Schemes to Multiple Recipients  
Fine-grained two-party schemes are interleaved to allow multiple recipients. Strand Spaces are used to 
prove the validity of these interleaved schemes. The efficiency of interleaving algorithms is evaluated 
using experimental results by varying the number of properties and the number of recipients. These 
experimental results are presented in Section 3.6.6.2.   
 
Security costs for these schemes are computed in terms of protocol bandwidth and computational 
overheads based on underlying digests, nonces, keys, headers and cryptographic operations 
introduced. The cost of enforcing secrecy is estimated at the data element level because the number of 
secret data elements and the entities given access to them may vary. Security overheads for all other 
properties are estimated at the message level as these operations are to all data elements. 
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3.5 The Proposed Model (PGPS) 
PGPS aims to synthesise security protocols at runtime that meets the requirements of interacting 
parties. Such protocols are required in web services and e-commerce where entities collaborate 
together to meet specific goals. Section 3.5.1 explains the rationale for the PGPS model before giving 
an overview. Section 3.5.2 describes the model elements in greater details.  
3.5.1 Rationale and Overview of PGPS Model 
Dynamic collaboration between e-commerce service entities poses many challenges. Two or more 
service entities can collaborate to provide a composite service only if their functional and security 
specifications match. Past attempts to match service specifications have modelled mainly functional 
aspects where the permitted transition for each service is represented using finite state machines, 
commitments machines and AI planning techniques [1, 94, 95]. Though security is considered vital in 
e-commerce, lack of a mechanism to express common e-commerce security requirements made 
security modelling difficult [2, 15]. PGPS uses fine-grained security properties to express and 
aggregate security requirements of both data originator and recipient. If service entities include 
security levels required for permitted transitions (considering the semantics of data being exchanged), 
security requirements for composed services can be computed easily by aggregating them. For 
example, an e-commerce entity can specify time-bound non-repudiation evidence for receipt of a 
purchase-order message by augmenting it with the composite property combining non-repudiation and 
recency. Incorporating security aspects is known to increase the cost of collaboration. However, the 
PGPS cost model makes it possible to select the least costly protocol in terms of bandwidth and 
computational costs.  Furthermore, the use of proven security schemes in PGPS makes it possible to 
meet the security needs of composed services at runtime. For example, a protocol meeting SET 
purchase protocol requirements was regenerated within 17 milliseconds using a 2.5 GHz laptop. 
  
Fine-grained security levels are formed by combining common security properties needed for e-
commerce including data authentication, data integrity, recency, receiver non-repudiation and entity 
authentication. These security properties are classified into those providing security assurances to 
either data originator or recipient. The secrecy property is provided at data element level allowing 
different recipients access to different parts of the message.  Correspondence properties are enforced at 
message level combining security requirements of each data element. Security schemes are first 
devised for basic properties. Security schemes for composite properties are formed combining basic 
schemes when the schemes used for basic properties are not in conflict. Alternate schemes are 
combined when basic schemes are in conflict. These schemes are then extended to multiple recipients 
by interleaving the schemes. The validity of basic schemes is proved using modal logic. The validity 
of composite properties follows directly from SPCL. The validity of schemes for multiple recipients 
was proved using Strand Spaces.       
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3.5.2 Model Elements 
Model elements consist of basic and composite properties, operators for aggregating security 
requirements, provably secure schemes that provide the required security assurances, functions 
expressing protocol costs in terms of underlying elements and scheme generators that extend the 
schemes to multiple recipients. The security properties include both secrecy and correspondence 
properties.  
3.5.2.1 A Motivating Example: Interaction between Semantics and Security 
This section illustrates how fine-grained security levels can be set considering the semantics of data 
exchanged, transaction category and the order in which sub-protocols are invoked, using a simple 
transaction for performing a trade. In Figure 3.4 all sub-protocols exchanged between customer and 
merchant including Request (quote), Quote and Purchase-Order are assigned different security 
levels. The Request sub-protocol involves no commitment on either the customer or the merchant and 
therefore requires no security assurances. The customer however, may want the Quote authenticated 
by the merchant before responding to it. The customer may also want the non-repudiation property 
assigned to the Purchase-Order to prevent the merchant denying its receipt, possibly based on an 
earlier favourable quote. The merchant may want assurances that the Purchase-Order is authentic, 
recent and has not been tampered with during transit, before non-repudiating its receipt. Hence, the 
Purchase-Order combines authentication, data integrity, recency and non-repudiation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
3.5.2.2  Specifying Security Requirements 
Requirements for security protocols can be classified as extensional and intensional [96]. Extensional 
requirements explicitly state the properties required such as authentication or data integrity. 
Intensional requirements specify the property in terms of the protocol itself. For example, an 
intensional property may state that one user responds to a specific message using a shared key. 
Intensional specifications are harder to verify as they require process interactions to be specified using 
a language such as CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [97].  Extensional requirements can be 
classified into correspondence (Terminology 3.2)  and non-correspondence properties [31]. Secrecy, a 
Authentication 
Non-Repudiation, 
Recency 
Message-Integrity 
Quote 
Purchase Order 
Authentication 
Customer Merchant 
Request 
Figure 3.4 Messages using Different Combinations of Security Properties 
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non-correspondence property, specifies restrictions on data access.  Correspondence properties for 
common e-commerce protocols such as SET includes a combination of entity authentication, data 
integrity, data origin authentication, receiver non-repudiation and recency [9]. 
 
3.5.2.3 Expressing Fine-grained Levels of Security 
A fine-grained security level in PGPS is formed by combining any of the basic properties for data 
security.  The security levels (Terminology 3.3) are partially ordered  using a lattice structure similar 
to the one used for information flow, as shown in Figure 3.3  [98]. Two unequal security properties X 
and Y are related (lower or higher) if there are directed edges connecting them in the lattice, either 
directly or indirectly.  The required security level for a sub-protocol in PGPS is computed using the 
Least-Upper-Bound operator (  ) which takes two security properties as operands and returns the 
least security level greater than or equal to both (by finding their union).  For example, when data d 
from S is sent to R1 and R2 through a given path p, the security level SL along that path p is 
determined based on the security requirements (SR) of entities S, R1 and R2 for that data as in:  
SL(p,d) =  SR(S,p,d)    SR(R1,p,d)   SR(R2,p,d). When data d1, d2, sent along the same path p are 
combined, the required security level is also determined using the same   operator as in: SL(p,d1  
d2) = SL(p,d1)  SL(p,d2).  For example, if the first data requires {A,R} and the second data requires 
{A,RNR}, then the composite data requires {A,R,RNR}.    
3.5.2.4 Cost of Security Protocols 
PGPS expresses protocol costs in terms of underlying protocol security strength on the assumption that 
cryptographic elements such as key lengths, hashing algorithms, etc. can be classified according to the 
security strength they provide.  Identifying such cryptographic elements and algorithms, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Security strength based costing allows security strength for 
synthesised protocols to be set reflecting the security/cost trade-offs for the environment.  
3.5.2.5 Schemes Enforcing Secrecy 
PGPS combines information flow control techniques with cryptographic mechanisms to enforce 
secrecy [99, 100]. Every data element in PGPS is assumed to have a single entity of origin. 
Furthermore, all secret elements are sent in encrypted form allowing each data element to be uniquely 
labelled as secret or public. This allows PGPS protocols to be type checked to prove the absence of 
undesirable results, such as leakage of secret elements.   
 
Common cryptographic techniques for enforcing secrecy of data elements, include symmetric keys 
shared by a group of entities, multiple key ciphers [101] or a public key system. For multiple key 
ciphers the number of keys required is the same as the number of entities, though public/private keys 
operations make them computationally expensive.  Public key systems produce multiple data 
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elements, as each secret data element must be encrypted by the public keys of all intended recipients. 
Thus, PGPS uses symmetric group keys for secrecy which allows a group of entities to share one or 
more secrets. It is assumed that all entities sharing secrets (thus known to each other) use a common 
symmetric group key server. Any data originator can request a group key by sending the identities of 
the group entities, signed by its private key. If the specified group key already exists, the server returns 
that key, otherwise it creates and returns a new key.     
3.5.2.6 Schemes Enforcing Correspondence Properties 
Enforcing correspondence properties requires message originator and recipients to possess the 
necessary functions and keys. All entities are assumed to share a common hashing algorithm. All 
entities are assumed to possess the public keys of those entities sending non-repudiable evidence of 
data origin or receipt, using their own private keys. All protocol entities are also assumed to possess 
the means to create nonces used in enforcing recency. Data received is considered recent if the 
message also contains a nonce that the recipient had generated recently.  
 
Messages may also include signed entity labels which allow specific actions to be associated with 
entities, based on predefined conventions. For example, an entity sending a message to a specific 
recipient by attaching a signed label denoting the identity of the recipient in pre-specified format 
(possibly with some tags explicitly stating the semantics) cannot dispute later who the intended 
recipient for that message was. Each basic scheme provides a security guarantee to the sender or the 
recipient and specifies explicitly the necessary assumptions and invariants.  
3.5.2.7  Scheme Generators 
Scheme generators in PGPS are routines that interleave schemes in a specified order to create 
extended schemes that allow data to be sent to multiple recipients.  Parameters passed to these routines 
may include source entity (O), destination entities (DEST), combination of non-secrecy properties 
required (Pr), data (d) and the secrecy requirements (Sec which is optional). The scheme generators 
ensure that different runs of the protocol can be distinguished by incorporating the necessary features, 
such as nonces. The validity of the protocols generated is proved using Strand Spaces (refer to 
background 2.2.1.2).  The input to the protocol generator and the structure of an output protocol is 
listed below. An example for specific entities and properties is given later in this section.  
pro(O, DEST, Pr, d, Sec) = X1[C1] X 2  X2[C2] X 3  X3[C3] X4     
where O is originator, DEST is the set of destination entities, Pr the security properties, d the data, Sec 
the secrecy group for each secret element in d.  The symbols C1, C2, C3 are messages formed by the 
protocol generator routine combining encryption, decryption, hashes, nonces and data elements, based 
on the parameters O, DEST, Pr,d and Sec. For each sub-protocol hop of the form Xi[Ci]Xj, xi represents 
the source and xj represents the destination.  
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DEFINITION 3.1 MESSAGE TERM  
The message terms (MT) are constructed using the grammar below. 
MT = S |  D |  E  |  N  |  F(MT)  | (MT,MT)   
where: 
Symbol Meaning Sample elements 
S 
D 
E 
N 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
DOTX 
Symbols 
data  
entities 
nonces 
encryption and hash functions  
 symmetric keys 
 private key 
 public key 
 one time key 
 hash function 
data encrypted by one time key KOTX 
Re 
d1,d2,… 
O, D1,D2,…X1, X2, X3,… 
nX, nXY, XnY 
 
symXYZ 
priX 
pubY 
KOTX 
h  
DOTA , DOTB 
 
The nonces embedded as part of the messages could take the form nX, nXY. or XnY as described below. 
The first and second forms are used for enforcing recency and the last form for enforcing non-
repudiation. When a nonce is used for recency, the notation nX indicates origin X. When multiple 
recipients are involved, nonces used for recency can be combined. For example, nXY is the result of 
appending the nonce generated by X to that generated by Y to assert recency. Nonces may also be used 
to allow one party to infer certain properties about another entity, such as the possession of certain 
private keys for proving identity. In such cases the notation XnY is used, which indicates the nonce was 
generated at X to be consumed at Y. Other common terms used and some sample values are listed in 
Table 3.9. Functions are classified into encryption functions represented with {}key and hash functions 
represented with h(). Keys can be symmetric group keys such as symXYZ,, public keys such as pubY, 
private keys such as priX or one-time keys such as KOTX. Data encrypted by a one-time key KOTX takes 
the form DOTX. The symbols convey a predefined meaning to the peer entities such as Re for requesting 
nonce challenge to prove recency.  For example, a valid scheme for passing data d between A and 
destinations B and C, using the composite property authentication (A) and recency (R) would be: 
pro(A,{B,C}, {A,R},d) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A   
                                                                                                       A[d, {h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]B B[d,h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriB]C 
In the first hop A initiates the protocol by sending the symbol Re (for recency) to the first recipient B. 
B forwards the symbol together with its own nonce (nB) to second recipient C. C appends its own 
nonce (nC) to that of A’s to form (nBC) and forwards it to A. A creates a signed digest consisting of data 
hash, the combined nonce, and labels for sender (A), and recipients (B,C) and forwards it to B together 
with the data. B subsequently forwards the data and hash to C.  
Table 3.9 Symbols Used and Sample Values 
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3.6  PGPS Details 
This section covers the underlying assumptions, the schemes for preventing common attacks, the 
precise definition of individual properties and cryptographic mechanisms to be used in schemes.   
Security protocols are usually designed with a number of assumptions, including the threat model, the 
level of threat posed, the existing trust between entities and the properties of cryptographic 
components. PGPS uses the threat model attributed to Dolev-Yao [102], which assumes the 
communication medium is under the control of an adversary.  The protocol must be designed to 
withstand attempts by the adversary to redirect, fake or replay messages in the communication 
medium. PGPS also assumes that trusted entities are not involved in mounting an attack or leaking 
information to an adversary.   
 
The basic schemes devised for the common properties are presented in Section 3.6.2. These schemes 
assume the availability of a public key infrastructure (PKI).  PKI uses a trusted party to allow data to 
be exchanged securely over an insecure public network. This requires the trusted party to maintain a 
public key for each entity. Symmetric keys are used only for secrecy here, and it is assumed that the 
infrastructure includes a key server and protocols such as ELK, for distributing the symmetric group 
keys [103]. These schemes also assume a logical time stamping mechanism (refer to Glossary).  
 
The security schemes devised are strengthened to withstand common attacks such as those presented 
in Section 3.6.1. The basic properties and underlying schemes are presented in Section 3.6.2, their 
proofs in Section 3.6.3. The composite properties formed combining basic properties and their 
combined schemes are presented in Section 3.6.4.  The techniques for extending these schemes to 
multiple recipients and their proofs are presented in Section 3.6.5.   Note all schemes devised in this 
chapter make perfect encryption assumptions as defined in Section 2.1.2. 
  
3.6.1 PGPS Techniques for Preventing Common Attacks  
In general it is not possible to prevent every form of attacks for three reasons. First, the number and 
types of attacks is not limited. Second, even if every type of attack is known, techniques used to 
prevent them can severely downgrade performance. Third, the cost of attacks may outweigh the 
potential gains for the adversary. Hence, it is sufficient in most cases to prevent common attacks that 
can be easily mounted by an adversary. This section describes techniques developed for preventing 
two of the most common forms of attack, replay and type-flaw attacks. These techniques can be 
extended to thwart other less common attacks such as oracle attacks. However, preventing attacks such 
as denial-of-service using other security mechanisms is beyond the scope of this thesis. Reasoning 
about protocol actions by honest entities and adversaries involved in sending, replaying or redirecting 
messages, require an explicit threat model.  PGPS uses the Dolev-Yao threat model and the intruder 
capabilities presented in Section 3.6 to reason about replay and type-flaw attacks.    
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3.6.1.1  Preventing Replay Attacks 
All PGPS schemes providing the data authentication property contain the encrypted identities of the 
data originator and data recipients.  To avoid replay attacks  at a later time, a logical time stamp (refer 
to Glossary) is included in the encrypted part. Thus, a sub-protocol sending data d from A to C must 
encrypt all four elements using the private key of A, as shown below. The hash of data is encrypted as 
it is computationally cheaper than encrypting the whole data, while it produces the same assurance. 
   A[d,{h(d),A,C,TS}PriA]C    
The time stamp in the signed part prevents an adversary from mounting a replay attack at a later time, 
thus providing authentication with assurance of a unique run. However, this logical time stamping is 
not strictly necessary, as either a direct (this chapter) or indirect (in Chapter 5) form of time stamping 
is provided as standard properties (recency or time-bound). The latter involves sending the data 
together with a nonce the recipient has generated recently. The presence of the intended recipient C in 
the signed part prevents an adversary intercepting the message, from forwarding it to any entity other 
than C.   
 
Similarly, all schemes providing the data integrity property include the identity of the data originator 
and a hash of the data in the signed part. The sub-protocol below sends data d from A to B providing 
the data-integrity assurance.   
 A[d,{A,h(d)}PriA]B 
3.6.1.2  Preventing Type-Flaw Attacks 
Protocols can be easily undermined by attacks such as man in the middle attacks if every message is 
deciphered solely based on message format and content. Protocols formed combining multiple sub-
protocols also have been shown to open up new avenues for type-flaw attacks because of the similar 
message structures [81]. If, however, the current protocol state and the semantics of data elements are 
taken into consideration, such attacks can be easily prevented.  
 
PGPS tagging schemes are designed to prevent type-flaw attacks (which also prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks). These schemes carry an initiator-signed element that includes its security properties, 
the sub-protocol run and the labels of the data source and recipients, allowing it to be uniquely 
identified. This tagging scheme also prevents an attacker masquerading as some other entity, which 
would be possible if the sender were not explicitly specified.  However, strengthening security by 
using such a scheme comes at a cost, since this scheme requires each entity to perform one additional 
decryption as well as additional memory space for keeping track of schemes. Tagging is made optional 
in PGPS, as tagged data also increases the protocol bandwidth used. 
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3.6.2 Security Mechanisms to Meet Semantics of Properties 
This section presents security mechanisms devised for the basic security properties identified in 
Section 3.5.2.2.  The underlying mechanisms for correspondence properties are presented in Table 
3.10. Each of these schemes uses either a challenge-response mechanism or public key mechanism or 
a combination of these using ½, 1, 1½ or 2 cycles, where the number of cycles is defined as follows.  
TERMINOLOGY 3.6: NUMBER OF CYCLES IN A PROTOCOL SCHEME 
The number of cycles in a protocol scheme is the total number of send-and-receive events in the 
protocol originator. A half a cycle is one where there is a send event with no corresponding receive 
event as in the data integrity scheme presented in Section 3.6.2.3.      
3.6.2.1 Data Authentication 
The PGPS data authentication property provides the data recipient with the assurance that particular 
data, supposedly from a given entity, was actually sent by that entity and that it is the intended data 
destination.  These assurances are enforced by incorporating the labels for the data originator, the 
intended recipient and the hash of data in the signed message digest. The underlying mechanism 
described in Table 3.10 has two main benefits. Firstly, the non-repudiable evidence from the data 
originator provides the recipient the assurance it is authorised to act on the data received.  Secondly, it 
avoids the man-in-the-middle attacks where messages are redirected to unintended recipients. PGPS 
does not deal with man-in-the-middle attacks where messages are captured. The authentication 
property is enforced by using a public key based scheme as shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
 
 
PGPS allows any entity to authenticate data to multiple trusted recipients even if data is sent indirectly 
(to meet specific sequencing or physical requirements). Assume data from A is to be sent authenticated 
to B and C. Encrypting data with the private key of the data originator provides the necessary evidence 
to prove that data originated in that entity. Thus, data from A can be sent authenticated to both B and C 
(multiple recipients) as in:   A[d,{h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA]B  .  B[d,{h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA] C    
3.6.2.2  Entity Authentication 
Entity authentication is the process where one party is assured of the identity of a second party [104].  
This property is implemented with a public key based scheme in PGPS by challenging the responding 
entity to return a nonce sent, encrypted with its private key as shown in Figure 3.6. The underlying 
mechanism is described in Table 3.10. 
 
d,{h(d),A,B}PriA 
A 
 
B 
Figure  3.5 Mechanism for Authentication 
{ nA}PriB 
Figure  3.6 Mechanism for Entity Authentication 
EA, nA A B 
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3.6.2.3  Data Integrity 
Data integrity provides the assurance that the data has not been tampered with during transit. Any 
alteration to the original data can be easily detected by the recipient. A public key based scheme used 
for data integrity is shown in Figure 3.7.  The underlying mechanism is described in Table 3.10. 
 
  
 
The scheme contains only a part of the information used in data authentication, as it contains only the 
identity of the sender in the encrypted part. Therefore, no additional data exchange is involved when 
the data integrity property is combined with data authentication. The above scheme can be extended to 
multiple destinations (such as B and C) as in: A[d,{A,h(d)}PriA]B  .  B[d,{A,h(d)}PriA] C   
3.6.2.4  Data Recency 
In e-commerce the data received may not be considered valid unless it was despatched within a 
specific time frame. The recency property assures the age of the data received. Time stamps and 
nonce-based challenge-response schemes are common mechanisms for implementing recency. Time 
stamps with synchronised clocks can provide assurance about the time interval within which a 
message was generated [85], although accurately synchronising clocks for the sender and receiver can 
be a challenge in practice. Chapter 5 uses such a scheme, as it allows intermediaries through which a 
message is passed to be held accountable. A nonce-based challenge-response mechanism is used in 
this chapter to enforce recency, where the data is accompanied with a nonce from the recipient, as 
shown in Figure 3.8. The symbol Re is used to prompt the recipient B to issue a nonce challenge. By 
sending the data together with the nonce the recipient can be assured that the data was sent recently 
(after the creation of the nonce).  If non-repudiable evidence is required recency can be combined with 
other properties. 
 
  
 
3.6.2.5 Partial Receiver Non-Repudiation 
The receiver non-repudiation property requires cryptographic evidence that can be presented to an 
arbitrator to prove receipt of data. Unlike the other properties considered so far, this property requires 
data recipient to provide evidence to the sender. Fairness is considered an important goal in non-
repudiation schemes as it prevents any party gaining unfair advantage through early termination [105].  
A common technique for ensuring fairness is the use of a trusted third party (TTP) which delivers the 
key only after receipt of the non-repudiable evidence from the data recipient. However, this technique 
increases the traffic at the trusted third party (TTP) and the turn-around time significantly.  
B A Re 
nB 
d, nB 
Figure 3.8  Mechanism for Data Recency 
d,{h(d),A}PriA A 
 
B 
 
Figure  3.7 Mechanism for Data Integrity 
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PGPS uses a two stage scheme based on earlier work done by Zhou and Gollman [7], where gradual 
release of information in first stage is combined with  limited TTP involvement in second stage to gain 
greater efficiency, with the assumption that in most cases honest entities are compliant with protocol 
steps and the communication infrastructure is reliable. In such cases the TTP’s involvement may be 
required in the second stage, and only in the case when the recipient fails to acknowledge the receipt 
of a key [7]. Fair exchange is achieved by sending data encrypted with a one-time key in the initial 
step, as shown in Figure 3.9.  The one-time key kOTA is sent in step three, only after the receipt of B’s 
acknowledgement consisting of the data encrypted with the one-time key, nonce AnB, the labels B and 
A, all encrypted with the private key of B, in step two.  If the protocol is terminated after the first or 
second step, no party can gain an unfair advantage, as the recipient lacks the key for the cipher-text, or 
the sender can only prove the receipt of the cipher-text [7]. In the final step the recipient is expected to 
acknowledge the receipt of the one-time key. If the recipient fails to respond to step 3, the hash of dOTA 
encrypted with the private key of B in step 2, can be presented as evidence to TTP (in stage 2), to 
initiate the necessary action to get the required evidence {kOTA}priB.  In Section 3.6.5, this scheme is 
extended to multiple recipients under the assumption that a common TTP exists that can initiate 
corrective action when necessary.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Limitations 
This scheme based on earlier work which claimed to be efficient because of limited TTP involvement 
[7], can only provide partial receiver non-repudiation in practice; the timely receipt of non-repudiable 
evidence cannot be guaranteed as it depends on the TTP’s communication channel with the data 
originator and the recipient. Furthermore, a noncompliant recipient may not even respond to the 
trusted third party. To circumvent this problem, the framework presented in chapter 4 allows trust 
relationships with noncompliant entities to be severed or lowered.     
3.6.2.6  Secrecy 
Protocols enforcing secrecy hide information from those outside the given group. However, protocols 
can enforce secrecy requirements only during the data transfer phase. Other mechanisms, such as 
authorisation schemes limiting access to (unencrypted) secret data in storage are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. To enforce secrecy, secret data elements are always despatched in encrypted form; thus, 
only entities with the appropriate group key can access a private data element. To prevent indirect 
kOTA  one-time key created in A 
dOTA  {d}KOTA 
 
Figure 3.9 Mechanism for Receiver Non-Repudiation 
{ kOTA}PriB 
dOTA, AnB A B 
kOTA 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
Stage 1 
Stage 2: Only in case 
final acknowledgement 
from B is not received 
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access, the secrecy group of all derived elements in PGPS is made at least as restrictive as the secrecy 
group of all base elements. Any non-secret base element has the universal set as its secrecy group. 
3.6.3 Schemes for Basic Properties and Proofs    
The previous section presented the basic security properties and the mechanisms for enforcing them. 
This section summarizes the schemes and the mechanisms used for various properties in Table 3.10, 
before proving them using SPCL. Proofs based on primitive actions are presented in the next section.  
Property Scheme Mechanism  
Entity 
Authentication 
 
 
 
 
If A receives its recent nonce encrypted by the 
private key of  B then A can be certain about the 
peer’s identity (i.e., it is B). 
 
Data 
Authentication 
 
 
 
 
 
When B receives data together with a digest 
containing a hash of that data and labels A and 
B, encrypted by A’s private key, B can be certain 
that it had originated at A and that it was 
directed to B.  
 
Data Integrity 
 
 
 
If B receives data accompanied with a digest 
containing a hash of that data and label A, 
encrypted by A’s private key, B can be certain 
that the data from A has not been tampered with.  
Receiver Non-
Repudiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If A receives two messages, the first a digest 
made up of an earlier nonce, the hash of data-
encrypted-with-one-time-key (dOTA) and labels B 
and A, and the second with the one-time key, 
both encrypted by B’s private key, then B cannot 
repudiate receiving the message. The nonce 
makes the protocol run unique. Deferring the 
despatch of kOTA until after the receipt of 
acknowledgement makes the exchange fair. The 
last two steps involving a trusted third party is 
carried out only if no acknowledgement is 
received from B. The evidence presented to TTP  
and the key kOTA  allows it to extract receipt of 
acknowledgement from B ( through TTP). 
Recency 
 
 
 
 
 
If B receives data together with the digest 
containing the nonce that it had generated 
recently, then that data must be recent.  
                        
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
TTP 
d,nB 
A B 
nB 
Re 
d,{h(d),A,B}PriA A B 
d,{h(d),A}PriA A B 
{ nA}PriB 
A B EA, nA 
dOTA, AnB 
 
A B 
kOTA 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA}PriB 
Table 3.10 Summary of Schemes/Mechanisms for Basic Properties 
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3.6.3.1 Proof System    
This section uses SPCL to reason about protocol actions. SPCL allows assertions to be made based on 
a series of protocol actions which include primitive actions such as send, receive, new, encrypt, 
decrypt. These assertions provide security guarantees to both data originator and recipient and can be 
verified by using the proof system developed by Hoare based on preconditions and invariants [77] 
(presented in Section 2.3.2.2). The same proof system is also used to verify the composite schemes 
formed for multiple properties in Section 3.6.4. In addition to the action formulas, the formula 
Knows(X,T) and Assert(p) are used in this model. The formula Knows(X,T) states X knows the term 
T, either because it originated in X or was made known through data receipt or decryption. The formula 
Assert(p) states the predicate p can be proved using available evidence.  All the proofs in this section 
make the perfect encryption assumption defined in Section 2.1.2. Moreover, honest entities are 
assumed to adhere to protocol specifications and assumptions. 
 
DEFINITION 3.2: PGPS PRIMITIVE ACTIONS 
PGPS actions are expressed in terms of Send, Rec, Enc, Dec and New as in: 
    A ::= Send(A,B,M)|Rec(A,B,M)|New(A,N)|New(A,OTK)|Enc(A,T,PriA)|Dec(A,T,PubTO)   
 where the primitive actions Send(A,B,M) and Rec(A,B,M) represent message M sent from A and 
received by B, and message M  received by A sent from B, respectively.    
 The primitive actions New(A,N) and New(A,OTK) allows the creation of a new nonce N or one-
time-key OTK in entity A, respectively. 
 The primitive action Enc(A,T,priA) represents encryption of term T by A’s  private key.  
 The primitive action Dec(A,T,pubTO) represents A’s decryption of term T by the public key 
where T originates.   
 
DEFINITION 3.3: PGPS ASSERTIONS 
In PGPS Assert(p) asserts predicate p is true where p can be constructed from predicates Origin, 
Dest, DataValid and Precede as in: 
                         p::=Origin(T,TO)|Dest(T,TR)|DataValid(T,TO)| Precede(M1,M2)   
where:    
 Origin(T,TO) and Dest(T,TR) assert T’s origin (TO) and intended destination (TR) respectively.  
 DataValid(T,TO) asserts integrity of term T received from origin TO.  
 Precede(M1,M2) asserts message M1 causally precedes message M2 in the same entity. 
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DEFINITION 3.4 PGPS INFERENCE RULES 
PGPS inference rules are expressed in the form of axioms involving primitive actions and assertions as 
shown in Table 3.11. The notations used in these axioms are described below. 
PA1 New(X,N1)  New(Y,N2)  N1  N2  Nonces created by two different entities are never identical 
PA2 New(X,N)   Knows(X,N)          New information generated is added to the entity knowledge 
PA3 Rec(X,Y, M  [T1, T2, … Tn])  Knows(X, T1)  Knows(X, T2) … Knows(X, Tn) 
Information received is added to the entity knowledge 
PA4 Knows(X,T1)  Knows(X,T2)   Knows(X,[T1,T2])    Knowledge can be compounded 
PA5 Knows(X,[M1,M2])   Knows(X,M1)  Knows(X,M2)    Knowledge can be decomposed 
PA6 Send(X,Y,M = [T1, T2, … Tn])  Knows(X,T1)  Knows(X,T2) … Knows(X,Tn) 
Only known terms can be sent 
PA7 Rec(R,Y,[EMD,d])  MD Dec(R,EMD,pubY)  Assert(Enc(Z,MD, priY)) 
When R decrypts the EMD from Y using its public key and form MD, R can assert some entity Z has 
encrypted MD with the private key of Y   
PA8 Assert(Enc(Z,MD, priY))  Honest(Y)     Assert( Z = Y) 
Asserting that entity Z encrypted the digest MD with the private key of Y, and Y is honest (Y will not 
divulge its private key) allows  Z = Y to be asserted 
PA9 Assert(Enc(Y,MD, priY))  MD.dest = R     Assert(Dest(M,R)) 
The intended destination of message M can be asserted based on the label in the signed digest 
PA10 Assert(Enc(Y,MD, priY))   MD.source = Y    Assert(Origin(M, Y)) 
The origin of message M can be asserted based on the origin label in the signed digest 
PA11 Assert(Origin(M,X))   Mi  M  Assert(Origin(Mi,X)) 
The origin of message component (part) Mi can be asserted based on origin of message M 
PA12 Assert(Enc(Y,MD,priY))  MD.source=Y  MD.hash=h(d)  Assert(DataValid(M,Y)) 
The validity of data can be asserted based on validity of hash of data received 
PA13 TimeReceived(X,M1) < TimeSent(X,M2)  Assert(Precede(M1,M2)) 
The ordering of two messages can be asserted if the second message is not despatched until after the 
receipt of first message (regardless of the type of network) 
PA14 Rec(R,Y,[N,M])  new(R,N)    Assert(Recent(M)) 
The recency of message can be asserted based on the recency of the nonce 
 
 
M  Message – consists of one or more terms made up of data and digests 
MD  Message Digest  – combines some of the attributes below depending on the scheme used.  
hash – hash of data   
nonce – unique value generated for binding or for proving recency  
origin, dest – labels for data origin and destination   
EMD  Encrypted Message Digest  – formed by signing MD by private key of message originator 
The operators . (dot), =,  and [] are used for attribute, equality, assignment and concatenation 
respectively. For example: 
- y = MD.p1 returns true if y is equal to attribute p1 of MD  
- MD  Dec(X,EMD,key)  means X decrypts EMD with key and assigns it to MD 
- M  [T1,T2] means M is formed concatenating T2 to T1 
Table 3.11 Protocol Axioms 
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Assumptions and Invariants 
The assumptions and invariants used by security schemes are listed in Table 3.12. Invariants restrict 
the data elements that can be learnt by the intruder and valid participants. Invariants for basic schemes 
can vary reflecting the properties they enforce. Basic schemes can be combined safely to provide 
multiple properties only if the individual schemes do not violate the invariants of one another [26].  
Assumptions and  Invariants Description 
A1 All recipients posses the public key of originators 
A2 All senders posses the public key of recipients (needed for receiver 
non-repudiation) 
A3 Explicit labels for message originator and recipient in the part 
encrypted by private key can prevent the man in the middle (MITM) 
attack, where an adversary responds with a message faking its identity.    
Inv1 Private and group keys are not sent in the open 
Inv2 All nonces (random numbers) despatched are freshly generated  
Inv3 Data must not be released completely until acknowledgement received 
for partial release  
Inv4 One-time keys used in non-repudiation are not reused for encryption 
HEA (Honest Entity Assumption) All honest entities adhere to the invariants Inv1, Inv2, Inv3, Inv4 
 
 
This section presents proofs for various two-party schemes which allow the protocol initiator and 
responder to assert specific security properties. For each of the basic security properties, the series of 
primitive actions used in the scheme is presented sequentially.  A combination of public keys, 
symmetric keys, hashes and nonces are used to enforce the security properties. Note that distinct labels 
are used for message digests (MD1, MD2, …) and encrypted message digests (EMD1, EMD2, …) as distinct 
schemes use different elements in the digests. These proofs require showing that if preconditions and 
invariants are true at the beginning after the protocol actions post-conditions and invariants will 
remain true as in: {Preconditions   Invariants} Protocol-Actions {Post-conditions  Invariants}. 
 
1. Entity Authentication (EA) Scheme (A’s actions carried out as part of Authenticating B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Precondition:  Honest(A,B), Invariants:  Inv1, Inv2 
L1. New(A, nA)   // A creates new nonce 
L2. Send(A,B, [“EA”, nA]) // A sends the string “EA” and fresh nonce nA 
L3. Receive(A,B, EMD1) // A receives the encrypted  message digest EMD1 containing nA  
L4. MD1 Dec(A,EMD1,pubB) // A extracts the message digest (nA) by decrypting EMD1 with pubB   
L5. MD1.nonce = nA  // A Verifies that the nonce received (MD1.nonce) is the same as  nA 
Post-condition: Honest(A,B); A Assert(entity authentication by B) 
 Invariants:  Inv1, Inv2 
Table 3.12 Assumptions and Invariants 
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Proof: The Entity Authentication Schemes allow A to Authenticate B 
By precondition Honest(A,B) and honest entity assumption HEA, invariants Inv1 and Inv2 are initially 
true. By axiom PA7, MD1 in L4 derived by decrypting message EMD1 using the public key of B, was 
despatched by an entity in possession of private key of B. Based on the precondition B is honest and by 
assumption HEA (Table 3.12) Inv1 holds (private keys are kept confidential), it follows MD1 
originated in B. Furthermore, by axiom PA1 the newly generated nonce nA is unique. Receipt of nA as 
a part of the term encrypted by the private key of B (in L4 and L5), allows A to assert that the peer has 
successfully responded to the nonce challenge, and has authenticated itself to be B.  The invariant Inv1 
is not violated by A, as the only message sent out in L2 contains only a string constant (“EA”) and a 
nonce. The invariants Inv1 is not violated by B as the only message received from B in L3, is not sent 
in the open. The invariant Inv2 is not violated by A as the nonce sent out by A in L2 is freshly 
generated in L1. The invariant Inv2 is not violated by B as it does not despatch any nonce. □ 
    
2. Data Authentication (A) Scheme (B’s actions when receiving A’s authenticated data) 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Authentication Assertion  
 
Proof: The Authentication Schemes allows B to Authenticate A’s Data 
By precondition Honest(A,B) and honest entity assumption HEA, invariant Inv1 is initially true. By 
axiom PA7, MD2 in L2 derived by decrypting message EMD2 using the public key of A, was despatched 
by an entity in possession of private key of A. Based on the precondition A is honest and by 
assumption HEA (Table 3.12) Inv1 holds, (private keys are kept confidential), it follows MD2 
originated in A. Axioms PA9, PA10 and PA12 allow B to assert the validity of the intended recipient, 
the origin and data, based on the receipt of labels for recipient and origin, and hashed data value in the 
decrypted part (in L3), allowing B to assert data authentication of  message from A. Invariant Inv1 is 
not violated by A as it does not send any message as part of protocol action. Invariant Inv1 is not 
violated by B as it does not send any data in the open. □ 
 
3. Data Integrity (DI) Scheme (B’s actions when receiving data from A with data integrity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B) Invariants:  Inv1 
L1. Receive(B,A,[d,EMD2]) // B receives data d and encrypted message digest EMD2 from A 
L2. MD2 Dec(B,EMD2,pubA)  // B decrypts EMD2 with pubA and stores in MD2 
L3. MD2.hash=h(d) MD2.origin=A  MD2.dest=B  // verifying message hash, origin and destination 
Post-c ndition:  Honest(A,B); B Assert(Data Authentication by A)  
Invariants:  Inv1 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B) Invariants:  Inv1 
L1. Receive(B,A,[d,EMD3])  // receiving the data d and signed message digest EMD3 from A 
L2. MD3 Dec(B, EMD3,pubA)  // B decrypts EMD3 with pubA and stores in MD3 
L3. MD3.hash=h(d) MD3.sender=A  // verifying message hash and origin 
Post-condition:  Honest(A,B); B Assert(Integrity of Message received from A)  
Invariants: Inv1 
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Proof: The Data Integrity Scheme allows B to Verify Integrity of A’s Data 
By precondition Honest(A,B) and honest entity assumption HEA, invariant Inv1 is initially true. By 
axiom PA7, MD2 in L2 derived by decrypting message EMD2 using the public key of A, was despatched 
by an entity in possession of private key of A. Based on the precondition A is honest and by assumption 
HEA (Table 3.12) Inv1 holds (private keys are kept confidential), it follows MD2 originated in A. 
Axioms PA10 and PA12 allow B to assert the origin and integrity of data, based on the receipt of the 
label for origin, and the hashed data value in the decrypted part (in L3), allowing B to assert data 
authentication of  message from A. Invariant Inv1 is not violated by A as it does not send any message 
as part of protocol action. Invariant Inv1 is not violated by B as it does not send any data in the open. □ 
 
4. Receiver Non-Repudiation (RNR) Scheme (A’s actions to non-repudiate B’s receipt of its data) 
 
 
 
Proof of Authentication Assertion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof 
 
Proof: Non-repudiation Scheme allows A to Non-Repudiate B’s receipt of its Data 
By precondition Honest(A,B) and honest entity assumption HEA, invariants Inv1, Inv2, Inv3 and 
Inv4 are initially true. The proof proceeds in two steps as data is partially released with encrypted data 
despatched in the initial stage and the key in the second stage. By axiom PA7, MD4 in L6 derived by 
decrypting message EMD4 using the public key of B, could only be despatched by an entity in 
possession of private key of B. Since the precondition assumes B is honest and that by assumption 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B)     Invariants: Inv1,Inv2,Inv3,Inv4 
L1. New(A,AnB)   // A creates a nonce to ensure unique run with B 
L2. New(A,kOTA)   // A creates a new one-time key for encrypting data  
L3  dOTA Enc(A,d,kOTA)  // A encrypts data with one-time key 
L4. Send(A,B,[dOTA,AnB]) // A sends both encrypted data (by one-time key) and nonce to B 
L5. Receive(A,B, EMD4) // receive encrypted digest containing data hash, nonce and labels 
L6. MD4 Dec(A,EMD4,pubB)  // A decrypts encrypted message digest storing it in MD4  
L7. MD4.hash=h(dOTA)MD4.nonce=AnB MD4.sender=B MD4.receiver=A //verify hash, nonce & labels 
L8. Send(A,B,kOTA)  // sending the one-time-key to recipient (assuming previous step valid) 
L9. Receive(A,B,EMD4B) // receiving the second encrypted message digest 
L10. MD4B Dec(A,EMD4B,pubB)  // A decrypts encrypted message digest storing it in MD4B  
L11. MD4B.key= kOTA    // verifies receipt of key by B. L7 and L11 ensures B cannot repudiate  
---------------------------------------- Alternative to L9 – L11 (using TTP) -------------------------------- 
L12. Send(A,TTP,[kOTA,EMD4]) // sending the one-time-key to recipient (assuming previous step valid) 
L13. Receive(A,TTP,EMD4C) // receiving the second encrypted message digest indirectly through TTP 
L14. MD4C Dec(A,EMD4C,pubB)  // A decrypts encrypted message digest storing it in MD4C  
L15. MD4C.key= kOTA    // Verifies receipt of key by B. L7 and L14 ensures B cannot repudiate 
---------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Post-condition:  Honest(A,B); A Assert(Message Non-Repudiation by B) 
Invariants: Inv1,Inv2,Inv3,Inv4 
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HEA (Table 3.12) honest entities keep their private keys confidential, it follows MD4 originated in B. 
Axioms PA9 and PA10 allow the intended recipient and originator of B’s responses MD4A and MD4B to be 
associated with A and B  respectively. The axiom PA12 allows receipt of encrypted data (L7) to be 
proved based on the hash of the data in the encrypted part of the first response while axiom PA11 
makes the receipt of key by B undeniable based on the second response (L11). The receipt of nonce AnB 
and the axiom PA1 asserting uniqueness of a nonce, allow the response to be associated with a 
specific run. Thus, A can assert non-repudiation by B. If A does receive the second encrypted message 
digest in step 9, the recovery phase in steps L12 to L15 are initiated, where the first encrypted 
message digest forming the evidence and the key kOTA are passed to the TTP. The TTP uses the 
evidence and the key to extract non-repudiable evidence from recipient B [7] before forwarding it back 
to A. By axiom PA11, the key part of response MD4C (in lines L14 and L15) received indirectly through 
TTP could only have originated in B, making it impossible for B to deny receipt of data.  The invariant 
Inv1 is not violated as the only key sent in the open by either A or B is a one-time key. The invariant 
Inv2 is not violated as the only nonce, AnB is freshly generated by A in L1. Similarly Inv3 is not 
violated as the key is not released until after the receipt and verification of acknowledgement in lines 
L5 to L7. Inv4 is not violated as the only one-time key sent (kOTA) is freshly generated in L2. □ 
 
5. Recency (R) Scheme (B’s actions when receiving recent data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof:  B can verify Recency of Data 
By precondition Honest(A,B) and honest entity assumption HEA, invariants Inv1 and Inv2 are 
initially true. By axiom PA1, nonce nB generated in B (in L2) is unique. By axiom PA14, despatch of a 
message by A incorporating a nonce recently generated and sent, must be recent. Invariant Inv1 is not 
violated by A as the messages received from A in L1 and L4 do not contain any keys. Invariant Inv1 is 
not violated by B as the only message sent by B in L3 contains only the nonce nB.  Invariant Inv2 is not 
violated by either A or B as the only nonce, nB is freshly generated by B in L2.  
 
Note the recency scheme, however, does not guarantee the message originated from A. In the 
following section the recency scheme is combined with other basic schemes to prevent such attacks. 
 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B)  Invariants: Inv1, Inv2 
L1. Receive (B, A,”Re”) // B receives request to send data with recency assurance from A 
L2. New (B, nB)  // B creates fresh nonce to enforce recency 
L3. Send(B,A, nB)  // B responds to A’s request by sending the nonce 
L4. Receive(B,A,[d, nB]) // receipt of data together with recently generated nonce sent earlier 
Post-condition:  Honest(A,B); B Assert (Data Recency) (not necessarily from A)  
Invariants: Inv1, Inv2 
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3.6.4 Composite Properties and Schemes Enforcing Them 
The security level for each message in PGPS is set by aggregating the security requirements of the 
data originator and recipients. Hence, a security level may contain two or more security properties. If 
such multiple properties are to be enforced using composite properties, their meaning must be made 
precise to avoid misinterpretations. Different levels of assurances for common properties led to 
protocol flaws in the past through misinterpretation [13]. PGPS uses emergent behaviour 
(Terminology 3.1) to standardize the order in which each basic property must be enforced.  
Furthermore, the cryptographic schemes devised for them are made to enforce emergent behaviours. 
Section 3.6.4.1 presents the emergent behaviours used in PGPS. Section 3.6.4.2 outlines the 
techniques for composing non-interfering schemes either in parallel or in sequence. Section 3.6.4.3 
presents techniques devised for reducing computational costs and bandwidth. Section 3.6.4.4 
illustrates the process used for creating composite schemes. Section 3.6.4.5 lists the schemes created 
using these techniques. 
The main steps in creating composite security schemes are outlined below.    
1.  Identify the invariants and assumptions upon which schemes for individual properties are based. 
Section 3.6.3.1 gave proofs that security goals are met when these invariants and assumptions 
hold for the underlying schemes.  For example, the data integrity scheme was proved assuming 
invariant Inv1 and assumption HEA hold (refer to Table 3.12). 
2. Combine non-conflicting schemes either in parallel or in series to create schemes providing 
multiple security assurances. The scheme for entity authentication is composed with schemes 
for all other properties in sequence, as the identity of the responder must be verified before 
despatching any data (precondition). All other schemes are combined in parallel after ensuring 
that individual schemes do not interfere with the invariants of one another.  
3. If basic schemes are in conflict, then non-interfering schemes must be devised. In 3.6.4.4 
extended schemes are devised for authentication, integrity and recency before combining them 
with the scheme for non-repudiation. 
4. When the same type of cryptographic elements (such as nonces and keys) are used in basic 
schemes, distinct elements (such as two different nonces) must be created to ensure non-
interference in combined schemes [76].    
3.6.4.1 Standardised Emergent Behaviours   
Basic security properties in PGPS are classified into those providing assurances to the data originator 
(receiver non-repudiation, entity authentication) and data recipients (authentication, data integrity, 
recency). Emergent behaviours (Terminology 3.1) for composite properties are standardised based on 
their usefulness for e-commerce. For example, the standardised emergent behaviour for the composite 
property combining authentication and receiver non-repudiation requires that data authentication be 
asserted first, because non-repudiable of evidence of receipt should not be sent until authenticity of the 
data can be verified. Furthermore, by ensuring that all parties have a common, consistent interpretation 
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of composite security properties, PGPS makes reasoning about security needs for messages possible. 
Table 3.13 shows the order in which individual security properties are enforced in PGPS. Entity 
authentication assurance is enforced first, as the identity of peer entity must be verified before any data 
are despatched. Similarly, authentication, integrity and recency properties are enforced before receiver 
non-repudiation, as the receiver may want these assurances before providing non-repudiable evidence 
of data receipt. Hence, any property combined with non-repudiation provides a much stronger 
assurance for the data originator, than non-repudiation alone. For example, when recency is combined 
with non-repudiation, message originator gets the assurance that data was received and that it was 
received in a timely manner.   
 
   
 
3.6.4.2 Techniques for Enforcing Non-Interference 
Schemes for individual security properties can be combined to provide multiple properties only when 
they do not  interfere with each other [25]. Interference with secrecy is avoided in PGPS by using 
independent schemes at data element level, before applying the schemes for other properties. Extended 
schemes are devised for correspondence properties in PGPS if the basic schemes to be combined 
violate the invariants of one another. The basis for validity of such an approach was presented in 
Chapter 2 and is summarised below: 
 Schemes for multiple security properties can be created by combining basic schemes in 
parallel as long as the basic schemes do not violate the invariants of each other.  
 Schemes can be combined in sequence, if in addition the post-condition of the first scheme 
meets the precondition of the second scheme. 
3.6.4.3 Reducing Overheads in Combined Schemes  
When security schemes are combined directly to provide multiple assurances, additional redundant 
elements are usually introduced. However, past attempts to optimise such schemes by removing 
duplicate elements within encrypted parts has resulted in introducing new avenues for attacks [21].  
Therefore, the impact of these changes on security goals must be carefully analysed before removing 
or combining redundant elements. The guidelines used in PGPS when combining schemes are outlined 
below: 
 Repeated labels and cryptographic components in plaintext can be removed as they provide no 
additional information. However, repeated items in distinct encrypted parts are not removed as 
they may provide non-repudiable evidence associating data with entities.         
 First Second Third 
Entity Authentication X   
Authentication  X  
Data Integrity  X  
Recency  X  
Non-Repudiation    X 
Table 3.13 Emergent Behaviours Specifying Order of Enforcement for Security Properties 
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 Encrypted terms that are identical can be removed as they carry no additional guarantees.  
 Data elements contained in distinct terms signed by the private key of the originator can be 
combined when there is only one data recipient. Such elements should not be combined if the 
data is intended to reach multiple recipients in sequence, as the evidence placed in different 
terms may be intended for different recipients.       
3.6.4.4  Forming Composite Schemes 
Most basic schemes presented in Section 3.6.3 avoid interference with each other’s invariants. The 
non-repudiation scheme, however, has specific invariants related to fair exchange requirements which 
are violated by other schemes. Table 3.14 shows all the properties and invariants violated by those 
schemes, and the reason why the invariant is violated. For example, the scheme used for authentication 
conflicts with that of non-repudiation, which prevents full release of data until partial 
acknowledgement is received. In the refined schemes presented in the next section for authentication, 
data integrity and recency, data is released in parts, thus avoiding conflicts with non-repudiation 
invariants.  
Scheme Violated Invariants Reason 
Authentication (basic) Inv3  Authentication scheme does not use partial release 
Data Integrity (basic) Inv3 Data integrity scheme does not use partial release  
Recency (basic) Inv3 Recency scheme does not use partial release 
Non-Repudiation  None  
Secrecy None  
Entity Authentication None  
  
Revised Schemes for Authentication, Data Integrity and Recency 
The revised schemes extended to allow partial release of data for authentication, data integrity and 
recency are shown in Figure 3.10. These extended schemes are used in composition only when the 
basic schemes violate the invariants of others, as the additional steps involved make them costlier. 
Partial release is facilitated by sending data encrypted with a one-time key in the first pass, followed 
by the key after the receipt of acknowledgement. These refined schemes can be combined with any of 
the other schemes, as they do not violate any of the invariants identified earlier. For example, none of 
the three schemes below violate invariant Inv3, which prevents the release of a one time-key until the 
recipient’s acknowledgement of encrypted data.  
  
Table 3.14 Invariants Violated by Various Security Properties  
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Composition Rules 
The vertical axis in Figure 3.11 shows the five message-response cycles (2 steps each) along which 
schemes for entity authentication, recency, authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation are 
merged, to enforce the emergent behaviours specified in Table 3.13.  The black nodes show the points 
at which the property is first asserted. For example, authentication, data integrity and recency 
properties are asserted before non-repudiation. Note the last cycle for non-repudiation involving TTP 
is necessary only when no acknowledgement for the key is received (refer to Figure 3.9). Data 
integrity scheme is shown together with data authentication scheme as they have the same sequence 
(refer to Sections 3.6.2.1 and 3.6.2.3). Extended schemes (shown for recency, data-integrity and 
authentication) are used when the composite property includes non-repudiation, to ensure the 
invariants for individual schemes are not in conflict. Figure 3.11 also shows that the entity-
authentication scheme must be completed before any of the other schemes are implemented as its post-
condition meets the precondition for others (i.e., the validity of the responder is verified before 
sending any data). Therefore the entity authentication scheme is merged sequentially with the others, 
while all other schemes are merged in parallel as their schemes are overlapping.  
Ack = [h(dOTA)] PriB 
A B 
kOTA 
dOTA,[h(dOTA),A,B]PriA 
Figure 3.10 Refined Schemes 
 
Authentication Data Integrity 
Ack = [h(dOTA)] PriB 
dOTA,[h(dOTA),A]PriA A B 
kOTA 
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Re 
Ack = [h(dOTA)]PriB 
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B 
nB 
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3.6.4.5  Composed Schemes  
Tables 3.15 to 3.25 show the schemes for fine-grained security properties derived from composition 
techniques described in Section 3.6.4.4. These schemes also meet the emergent behaviours specified in 
Table 3.13. The schemes for entity authentication property composed with others are not shown, as it 
is the only scheme in the first cycle which must be completed before any other scheme, as shown in 
Figure 3.11. The validity of combined schemes follows directly from the validity of schemes used for 
individual properties as long as their invariants are not violated. 
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication and  Data Integrity 
This composed scheme shown in Table 3.15, assures the recipient of the authenticity and integrity of 
data. It is identical to the scheme used for authentication, as the guidelines for reducing overheads in 
merged schemes presented in 3.6.4.3, permit combination of encrypted parts and removal of repeated 
elements.   
 
 
Figure 3.11 Merging Security Schemes  
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Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A3, Inv1, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the hash part in the digest signed by message 
originator matches the hash of data received, B 
can be assured of its integrity.  In addition, if 
the encrypted part also contains the labels for 
message originator A and recipient B, A cannot 
deny authenticating the data to B. 
 
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication and  Receiver Non-Repudiation 
This composed scheme shown in Table 3.16, assures the recipient authenticity of the data and the 
originator non-denial of data receipt. Note the use of TTP is necessary only when A does not receive 
the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B.  
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2, A3, 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If A receives from B two signed messages one 
consisting of a hash of data encrypted with a 
one-time-key (h(dOTA)) and nonce sent earlier 
(ensures a unique run), and the other, the key 
needed for decryption, then B cannot repudiate 
receiving the data. A cannot deny authenticating 
the (encrypted) data to B, as the digest signed 
by A consists of hash of (encrypted) data and 
labels for A and B. Although step 1 sends the 
nonce AnB in the open, the use of explicit labels 
for responder and initiator in step 2 prevents 
MITM attacks (A3)  
 
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.17, assures the recipient authenticity and recency of data. The term 
Re in the first step requests a nonce challenge for proving recency.  
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A3, Inv1, 
Inv2, HEA 
 
 
 
A digest signed by the private key of A 
containing a hash of the data and B’s recent 
nonce allows B to prove A has authenticated the 
data recently. Although step 2 sends the nonce 
nB in the open, MITM attacks are prevented 
through explicit labels in the encrypted part in 
step 3 (A3) 
 
d,{h(d),A,B}PriA 
d,{h(d), nB,A,B}PriA 
Re A B 
nB 
A B 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,B}PriA,AnB 
{kOTA}PriB 
A B 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
Table 3.15  Composed Scheme for Authentication and Integrity  
 
Table 3.16  Composed Scheme for Authentication and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
 
Table 3.17  Composed Scheme for Authentication and Recency 
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Composed Scheme: Data Integrity and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
This composed scheme in Table 3.18, assures the recipient of the integrity of the data and the 
originator non-denial of data receipt. Note the use of TTP is necessary only when A does not receive 
the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2, A3, 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B cannot repudiate receiving the data as A 
receives two signed messages from B: the first 
made up of a hash of encrypted data (h(dOTA)) 
together with a nonces ensuring unique run and 
recency, and the second with the key needed for 
decryption. If the hash part in the digest signed 
by the message originator A matches the hash of 
data received, B can be assured of its integrity. 
Use of explicit labels in steps 1 to 3 prevents 
MITM attacks (A3).  
 
 
Composed Scheme: Data Integrity and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.19, assures the recipient integrity and recency of data.  
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A3, Inv1, 
Inv2, HEA 
 
 
 
 
A digest signed by the private key of A 
containing a hash of the data and a recent nonce 
from B sent earlier, allows B to prove A has sent 
the data recently. If the hash part in the digest 
signed by the message originator matches the 
hash of data received, B can be assured of its 
integrity.  
 
nB 
A B 
d,{h(d), nB,A }PriA 
Re 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
A B dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,B}PriA,AnB 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
Table 3.18  Composed Scheme for Integrity and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
Table 3.19  Composed Scheme for Integrity and Recency 
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Composed Scheme: Recency and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
This composed scheme in Table 3.20, assures the recipient of the recency of the data and the 
originator non-denial of data receipt. As the recipient verifies data recency before acknowledgement, 
the data originator can use that acknowledgement as evidence of data receipt with recency. Note the 
use of TTP is necessary only when A does not receive the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2, A3, 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B can prove the data received is recent if it is 
accompanied by a signed digest containing 
B’s nonce (sent earlier) with the hash of the 
data. If A receives from B signed messages 
consisting of a hash of encrypted data 
together with nonces for ensuring unique run 
and recency, and the key needed for 
decryption, then B cannot repudiate 
receiving the data. Although steps 2 and 3 
send nonces in the open, MITM attacks are 
prevented through explicit labels in the 
encrypted part in steps 3 and 4 (A3) 
  
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication, Data Integrity and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
This composed scheme in Table 3.21, assures the recipient of the integrity and authenticity of the data 
and the originator non-denial of data receipt. Note the use of TTP is necessary only when A does not 
receive the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2,A3 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B can prove the integrity of the data and its 
authenticity as it is accompanied by a signed 
digest containing the hash of the data together 
with labels for message originator A and 
intended recipient B. B cannot repudiate 
receiving the data as A receives from B two 
signed messages: the first made up of a hash of 
the encrypted data together with a nonce 
ensuring a unique run, and the second with the 
key needed for decryption. Use of explicit 
labels in step 2 prevents MITM attacks (A3). 
 
 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
{kOTA} PriB 
nB 
{ AnB,nB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
dOTA,AnB,{h(dOTA),nB} PriA 
A 
B 
Re 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
dOTA,{h(dOTA),nB,A,B}PriA,AnB 
A B 
{kOTA}PriB 
Table 3.20  Composed Scheme for Recency and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
 
Table 3.21  Composed Scheme for Authentication, Integrity and Receiver Non-Repudiation 
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Composed Scheme: Data Authentication, Receiver Non-Repudiation and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.22, assures the recipient of the recency and authenticity of the data 
and the originator non-denial of data receipt. Note the use of TTP is necessary only when A does not 
receive the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2,A3 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B can prove that the data received is recent and 
authenticated as it is accompanied by a signed 
digest containing the hash of (encrypted) data 
together with B’s nonce (sent earlier) and labels 
for the message originator A and the intended 
recipient B. B cannot repudiate receiving the 
data as A receives from B two signed messages: 
the first made up of hash of encrypted data 
together with nonces ensuring a unique run and 
recency, and the second with the key needed 
for decryption. Use of explicit labels in steps 3 
and 4 prevents MITM attacks (A3). 
 
 
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication, Data Integrity and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.23, assures the recipient integrity, authenticity and recency of data 
received. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A3 
Inv1, Inv2,  
HEA 
 
 
 
 
B can prove integrity, recency and authenticity 
of the data received as it is accompanied by a 
signed digest containing the hash of data 
together with B’s nonce (sent earlier) and labels 
for the message originator A and the intended 
recipient B. Use of explicit labels in step 3 
prevents MITM attacks (A3). 
 
Composed Scheme: Data Integrity, Receiver Non-Repudiation and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.24, assures the recipient of the recency and integrity of the data and 
the originator non-denial of data receipt. The composed scheme is shown in Table 3.24. Note the use 
of TTP is necessary only when A does not receive the acknowledgement for the key kOTA from B. 
  
Re A B 
nB 
d,{h(d), nB,A,B}PriA 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
nB 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
dOTA,{h(dOTA),nB,A,B}PriA,AnB 
A B 
Re 
{kOTA}PriB 
 Table 3.23  Composed Scheme for Authentication, Integrity and Recency 
 
Table 3.22  Composed Scheme for Authentication, Receiver Non-Repudiation and Recency 
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Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2,A3 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B can prove integrity and recency of data as it 
is accompanied by a signed digest containing 
the hash of data together with B’s nonce (sent 
earlier) and label for message originator A. B 
cannot repudiate receiving the data as A 
receives from B two signed messages: first 
made up of hash of encrypted data together 
with a nonces ensuring unique run and recency, 
and the second with key needed for decryption. 
Use of explicit labels in step 3 and 4 prevent 
MITM attacks (A3). 
 
Composed Scheme: Data Authentication, Data Integrity, Receiver Non-Repudiation 
and Recency 
This composed scheme in Table 3.25, assures the recipient of the recency, authenticity and integrity of 
the data, and assures the originator that data receipt cannot be denied. The composed scheme is shown 
in Table 3.25. Note the use of TTP is necessary only when A does not receive the acknowledgement 
for the key kOTA from B. 
Proof basis Composed Scheme Mechanism 
A1, A2,A3 
Inv1, Inv2, 
Inv3, Inv4, 
HEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B can prove integrity, authenticity and recency 
of the data received as it is accompanied by a 
signed digest containing the hash of the data 
together with B’s nonce (sent earlier) and labels 
for the message originator A and the intended 
recipient B. B cannot repudiate receiving the 
data as A receives from B two signed messages: 
first made up of the hash of the encrypted data 
together with nonces ensuring unique run and 
recency, and the second with the key needed 
for decryption. Use of explicit labels in step 3 
prevents MITM attacks (A3). 
 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
nB 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
dOTA,{h(dOTA),nB,A,B}PriA,AnB 
A B 
Re 
{kOTA}PriB 
 kOTA,{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB TTP 
{kOTA}PriB 
{kOTA,A,B}PriA 
nB 
{ AnB,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB 
dOTA,{h(dOTA),nB,A,B}PriA,AnB 
A B 
Re 
{kOTA}PriB 
Table 3.24  Composed Scheme for Integrity, Receiver Non-Repudiation and Recency 
 
Table 3.25  Composed Scheme for Authentication, Receiver Non-Repudiation and Recency 
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3.6.5 Schemes for Multiple Recipients and Their Proofs 
PGPS schemes for multiple recipients are generated automatically by interleaving the single recipient 
schemes generated in Section 3.6.4. The underlying generator algorithm MProt presented in 3.6.5.1 
takes as input the sender, the sequence of recipients and the set of security assurances required. MProt 
also removes redundant elements and combines specific cryptographic elements such as nonces. 
Schemes for two recipients providing all combinations of security properties (except entity 
authentication) are listed in Table 3.26. The scheme for entity authentication property is not combined 
with other properties, as each entity must be authenticated before any data despatch (precondition). 
Section 3.6.5.2 presents the proofs for the validity of this approach.  
3.6.5.1 Multiple Recipients Security Scheme Generation Algorithm 
MProt(sps, s, rs) takes as argument source s, set of security properties sps and a sequence of recipients 
rs and generates a multiple recipients security scheme. It does this by interleaving the single recipient 
scheme for the same properties nr times where nr is the number of recipients. It is assumed that the 
routine SProt(n)  returns the single recipient scheme steps (for the same properties) from source s to 
recipient rs[n]. The number of cycles (Terminology 3.6) in the generated MProt scheme is the same as 
the number of cycles in the SProt scheme. Each complete cycle in MProt will have nr+1 steps formed 
interleaving the messages sent to the recipients and the messages received by the source.  If the SProt 
for given security properties ends with an incomplete cycle the MProt scheme too will end with an 
incomplete cycle with nr steps, formed by interleaving all the messages sent to the recipients.  The 
main step of MProt is outline first, followed by the algorithm details and a running example.  
The main steps of MProt are as follows: 
1.  create single recipient schemes from source to each recipient  
2 form the cycles and steps of MProt by interleaving the Sprot(i) as i varies from 1 to nr 
3 remove the repeated elements and combine other elements which can be safely composed. 
 
Algorithm Details: 
1. Create the single recipient schemes SProt(n) for given properties sps, source s and rs[n] where 
n is the index into the sequence of recipients rs 
 
2. The message contents in MProt is formed by interleaving corresponding cycles of SProt as 
follows: 
For each complete cycle j in MProt: the i
th
 step is computed as follows: 
nr
ik
SProt(k)j  of cycle th in source fromsent  message         
+   
1
1
 of cycle th from source  toresponses message
i
k
SProt(k)j  
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For an incomplete cycle j in MProt: the i
th
 step is computed as follows: 
nr
ik
SProt(k)j  of cycle th in source fromsent  message  
3. Repeated elements are removed, and specific elements are combined to reduce the number of 
terms. Each recipient combines its own nonce with the earlier one to form a composite nonce as in 
nB + nC = nBC. 
Running Example using MProt({A,R}, A, [B,C]) 
1. For the running example: s = A, rs = [B,C] and sps = {A,R} and the security schemes for A to B 
and A to C are as shown below: 
  
 
 
   
 
2. For the running example, with one complete and one incomplete cycles, the message contents 
would be as shown in the scheme below. Note some of the terms (Re, d) are repeated. 
 
 
 
 
3. For the running example, repeated terms are (Re, d) are removed and the nonces nB, nC are 
combined to form nBC, which help reduce the number of distinct encryptions required. The 
resulting simplified scheme is shown below.    
 
 
 
 
Schemes for All Basic/Composite Security Properties Generated for Two Recipients 
Table 3.26  lists the schemes generated automatically for data sent from A to recipients B and C for all 
combinations of security properties (entity authentication is not combined with others as it is used on 
its own). The table uses the following symbols/functions.  
 
d  data h(d)  hash of d (data) 
kOTA  one-time key used by A dOTA  d encrypted A’s one-time key kOTA 
AnBC  A’s nonce to B and C  nBC   The nonce formed combining nB with nC 
Re  Symbol for recency EA  Symbol for entity authentication 
d,{h(d), nBC,A,B}PriA  
nB 
A B 
d,{h(d), nB,A,B}PriA 
Re C 
nC 
A 
d,{h(d), nC,A,C}PriA 
Re 
d,{h(d), nBC,A,B}PriA  
nBC 
Re,nB A 
B Re C 
nB, nC 
C 
d,{h(d), nC,A,C}PriA 
Re, Re 
B 
d,{h(d), nB,A,B}PriA,d,{h(d), nC,A,C}PriA 
Re,nB 
A 
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EA subS(A,{B,C}, {EA}, null) =  A[EA, nA]B  B[EA,nA,{nA} PriB]C  C[{nA} PriB,{nA} PriC]A 
A subS(A,{B,C}, {A},d) =  A[d, {h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA]B  B[d,{h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA]C   
DI subS(A,{B,C}, {DI},d) =  A[d,{h(d),A}PriA]B  B[d,{h(d),A}PriA]C 
RNR subS(A,{B,C},{RNR}, d) =  A[dOTA,AnBC,]B   B[dOTA, AnBC,{AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C   
       C[{AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB, {AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC ]A A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B 
       B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
R Subs(A,{B,C}, {R}, d) =  A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A .A[d,nBC]B  B[d,nBC]C 
A,DI subS(A,{B,C}, {A,DI},d) =  A[d, {h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA]B  B[d,{h(d),A,(B,C)}PriA]C 
A,RNR subS(A,{B,C}, {A,RNR},d) =  A[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,(B,C) }PriA,AnBC] B  
      B[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,(B,C) }PriA,  AnBC,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C   
      C[{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC] A  
      A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
A,R subS(A,{B,C}, {A,R},d) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[d,{h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]B   
B[d,{h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]C 
DI,RNR subS(A,{B,C}, {DI,RNR}, d) =  A[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A }PriA, AnBC] B  
        B[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A}PriA,  AnBC,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C   
      C[{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC] A  
     A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
DI,R subS(A,{B,C}, {DI,R},d) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[d,{h(d),nBC,A}PriA]B   B[d,{h(d),nBC,A}PriA]C 
RNR,R subS(A,{B,C}, {R,RNR}, m) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A . A[dOTA,AnBC, {nBC,h(dOTA)}PriA]B 
      B[dOTA, AnBC, {nBC,h(dOTA)}PriA,{AnBC, nBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C 
     C[{AnBC, nBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB, {AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC ]A 
    A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
A,DI,RNR subS(A,{B,C}, {A,RNR},d) =  A[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,(B,C) }PriA,AnBC] B  B[dOTA,{h(dOTA),A,(B,C) }PriA,   
AnBC,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C    
     C[{ AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB,{ AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC] A  
     A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
A,DI,R subS(A,{B,C}, {A,DI,R},d) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[d,{h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]B  
       B[d,{h(d),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]C 
A,RNR,R subS(A,{B,C}, {A,RNR,R},m) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]B  
     B[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA, {AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C  
     C[{AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB,   {AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC ]A   
      A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
DI,RNR,R subS(A,{B,C}, {DI,RNR,R},m) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A}PriA]B  
     B[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A}PriA, {AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C 
    C[{AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB, {AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC ]A   
    A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B  B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
A,DI,RNR,R subS(A,{B,C}, {A,DI,RNR,R},m) = A[Re]B  B[Re,nB]C  C[nBC]A A[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA]B 
     B[dOTA,AnBC,{h(dOTA),nBC,A,(B,C)}PriA, {AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB]C 
    C[{AnBC,h(dOTA),B,A}PriB, {AnBC,h(dOTA),C,A}PriC ]A   A[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA ] B 
     B[{kOTA,A,(B,C)}PriA, {kOTA}PriB] C  C[{kOTA}PriB, {kOTA}PriC ]A 
 Table 3.26  Schemes Generated from A to [B,C] using Different Combination of Properties 
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3.6.5.2 Multiple Recipients Security Schemes: Proofs 
Strand Spaces [106] are used in this section to prove that multiple recipient schemes (protocols) 
created by interleaving single recipient schemes are secure. The Dolev-Yao threat model [102] used 
assumes that the communication medium is under the control of the adversary who is free to block, 
readdress, fake or duplicate messages.  The adversary starts with a set of initial keys and acquires new 
knowledge by intercepting the messages exchanged. The adversary can send fake messages of its own 
using keys in its possession. Intruder capabilities presented in Table 3.27 models the power of the 
adversary explicitly, which are proved to be inadequate to subvert the protocol goals for various 
properties. All the proofs in this section make the perfect encryption assumption defined in Section 
2.1.2. The proofs in this section follow the Strand Spaces methodology presented in Section 2.2.1.2. In 
addition, this section uses the honest entity assumption which states honest entities do not disclose 
private keys and the assumption that all nonces (random numbers) are freshly generated (Inv1 and 
Inv2  in Table 3.12). 
Assumed Intruder Capabilities Modelled as Adversary Strand 
The set of initial knowledge of the adversary strand is represented by KA. This contains the public keys 
of all parties and the symmetric keys the adversary shares with other parties. The capabilities of the 
adversary strand to deduct new facts are assumed to be those listed in Table 3.27.    
Strand Capability Operation Description 
M[t] <+t> Inserts t where t  KA 
G[g] <-g> Flushing (blocking) 
T[g] <-g, +g, +g> Tee (forwarding term along two other strands) 
C[g,h] <-g, -h, +g.h> Concatenation of two terms 
R[g,h] <-g.h, +g, +h> Separation of term 
K[k] <+k> where k  KA Sending a key in possession 
E[k,h] <-k,-h, +{h}K> Sending an Encrypted term 
D[k,h] <-k
-1
, -{h}K, +h> Sending  a term after decrypting it 
 
Authentication Property 
The authentication property in PGPS is based on the aliveness property, which requires proving that 
“whenever data is received by entity B from a trusted entity A, that data must have been sent by A to B 
in an earlier event”. Stronger assurances amounting to “injective agreement” requires combining the 
authentication property with recency [33]. 
Strand Space for Multiple Recipient Authentication Scheme 
In the multiple recipient scheme all authenticated data are signed, i.e. accompanied by a digest 
encrypted with the private key of the sender, which contains a hash of the data, data origin and all data 
Table 3.27 Capabilities of Adversary 
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destinations. This scheme therefore requires proving that data signed by a valid sender can only 
originate in one specific entity, the entity of data origin. The diagram below shows a Strand Space 
bundle with a number of intermediaries preceding Rn, which can be either adversaries or other 
protocol recipients. A Strand Space bundle for this scheme is shown in Figure 3.12. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Assumption: Dolev-Yao Threat Model and Intruder Capabilities as shown in Table 3.27. 
Proof of Authentication Scheme for Multiple Recipients: Requires proving each data recipient Ri .. 
Rn can be assured that data originated in source S and was directed to it.  
 
The data d received together with the digest containing source and recipients above must have 
originated in S, as tampered data will not produce the same hashed value as that received in the term 
signed by originator S. The presence of recipient label R1 ..Rn (the intended destinations) within the 
term signed by S can be used to prove the data was directed to the recipients R1 ..Rn. In order for an 
adversary to introduce the encrypted term {h(d),S,(R1..Rn)}PriS  into the strand using its capability 
E[k,h] in Table 3.27, the strand must receive the key priS in the open. However, the invariant Inv1 
(Table 3.12) precludes honest entity S from sending its private key in the open. An adversary can 
replay such a message at a later time using its capability T[g] or from known terms using the 
capability M[t].However, authentication property is not required to prevent replay attacks; 
authentication must be combined with the recency in PGPS to prevent  such attacks.  
Data Integrity Property 
Strand Space for Multiple Recipient Data Integrity Scheme 
The scheme used is identical to authentication shown in Figure 3.12 except that it has no label for the 
recipient (refer to Section 3.6.3).  
Assumption: Dolev-Yao Threat Model and Intruder Capabilities as shown in Table 3.27. 
Proof of Data Integrity Scheme for Multiple Recipients: Requires proving data received by 
each recipient Ri .. Rn can be assured that data from source S has not been tampered.  
 
The data d received together with the digest must have originated in S, as private keys are never 
divulged by honest parties (Inv1) (table 3.12) and different data will not produce the same hashed 
value. 
d,{h(d),S,(R1..Rn)}PriS 
Rn 
S 
Figure 3.12  Strand Spaces Bundle for Authentication Scheme 
 
d,{h(d),S,(R1..Rn)}PriS 
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Receiver Non-Repudiation Property 
Receiver non-repudiation schemes work by including additional evidence in an acknowledgement 
sent, allowing a third party to verify data receipt. This assurance incorporates an “injective 
agreement”, which requires a one-to-one correspondence between recipient and sender. The PGPS 
non-repudiation scheme for multiple recipients adheres to this definition by getting every recipient to 
submit evidence of data receipt signed by its own private key. This signed evidence incorporates a 
nonce from the sender (that can be generated by a third party if necessary) to prove a unique run.  
Strand Space for Multiple Recipient Receiver Non-Repudiation Scheme 
The scheme used by this property facilitates fair exchange by providing access to data in its final form 
only after receiving acknowledgement for a partial release. In the first pass, the encrypted data dOTS is 
sent together with a nonce SnRs.  The nonce sent from S to all the recipients in the group Rs can be 
generated by the trusted third party if necessary (before sending data that requires non-repudiable 
evidence of message receipt) to provide stronger evidence of a unique run. The one-time key needed 
for decryption is released only after receiving a signed digest containing a hash of the previously sent 
partial data, nonce and labels of the recipient and sender. The scheme ensures that the one- time key is 
released only after receiving all the acknowledgements. This scheme, therefore, requires proving that 
the acknowledgement came from a specific recipient and is associated with a unique send event 
identified by the nonce. Figure 3.13 shows a Strand Space bundle with a number of intermediaries 
between sender S and a particular recipient Rn, which can include both adversaries and other valid 
protocol recipients. 
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Figure 3.13 Strand Spaces Bundle for the Non-Repudiation Scheme 
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Assumption: Dolev-Yao Threat Model and Intruder Capabilities as shown in Table 3.27. 
Proof of Non-Repudiation Scheme for Multiple Recipients: Requires proving none of the recipients 
R1 .. Rn can deny receiving the data from source S. 
 
The digest received by S containing the nonce, recipient label and the hash of encrypted data from 
each of the recipients must be the acknowledgement from R1 .. Rn, as private keys are never divulged 
by trusted intermediaries (Inv1 in Table 3.12). Also, R1 .. Rn must be in possession of d as only 
identical data can produce an identical hash value. The presence of recipient label (one of R1 .. Rn and 
S) prevents type-flaw attacks;  no adversary strand can create such a digest using it capability E[k,h] 
(in Table 3.27) without the private keys of R1 .. Rn. The signed acknowledgement for KOTS  by R1 .. Rn  
can be used to prove it had received the one-time key necessary to retrieve the data. The scheme is 
fair, as the one-time key for decrypting the data will be released only after verifying the 
acknowledgements for all recipients R1,…Rn.     
Recency Property 
The recency property allows data recipients to place an implicit lower bound on the time of data 
despatch by comparing it to an earlier event. It cannot, however, guarantee data origin as it cannot 
prevent attacks by adversaries. Recency property must be combined with authentication property to 
prove data origin. Recency property must be combined with non-repudiation property if guaranteed 
timely data delivery is required.  
 
Strand Space for Multiple Recipient Recency Scheme 
The scheme requires the concatenation of nonces generated by recipients allowing the last valid 
recipient to send the composite nonce to the sender. The sender attaches the data to the composite 
nonce. The recipients can extract their own nonce to verify that the data received has been recently 
generated by the sender. This scheme requires each recipient to show that the data was sent after an 
earlier event. This property however, does not assure that the data was generated by a specific source 
entity. If such an assurance is required recency must be combined with authentication. Figure 3.14 
shows a Strand Space bundle with a number of intermediaries between sender S and a particular 
recipient Rn, which can include both adversaries and valid protocol recipients.  
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Assumption: Dolev-Yao Threat Model and Intruder Capabilities as shown in Table 3.27. 
Proof of Recency Scheme for Multiple Recipients: Requires proving all of the recipients can be 
assured that the data received is recent. 
The message received by Rn containing its own recent nonce with data must have been sent recently 
as nonces are assumed to be unique and freshly generated (Inv2).      
3.6.6 PGPS Performance 
E-commerce protocols cannot be selected on the basis of security alone, because high security-strength 
components can impact on the performance, including response time, line costs  and throughput [45]. 
For example, maximum throughput of SSL can vary by a factor of five, depending on the 
cryptographic algorithms and the key lengths used [49]. The performance impact is even greater for 
resource limited devices [52]. Finding the right trade-offs between security and performance requires 
modelling the cost in terms of underlying cryptographic elements [45, 107, 108]. Performance 
measures including response-time, throughput and communication costs are modelled indirectly in 
PGPS based on underlying factors, protocol-bandwidth and computational cost. The computational-
cost is expressed in terms of the number of CPU cycles required to perform the cryptographic 
operations. It is based on the amount of cryptographic operations carried out at the data originator and 
recipients. The PGPS cost model assumes a flexible architecture where security requirements are set 
using fine-grained security levels with varying security strengths.  
3.6.6.1 Analysis of PGPS Protocol Generation Algorithm 
If protocols (schemes) for multiple recipients are to be generated dynamically the underlying 
algorithm should scale well. Hence, this section computes how the total-number-of-terms vary with 
increasing number of recipients. The total number of terms including piggybacked elements is used 
because the underlying algorithm needs to process those terms (removing redundancies, merging 
terms). The total number of terms in turn reflects the number of new terms added for each additional 
recipient, which varies based on the schemes used by different properties.  Hence, the number of steps 
and size of data are modelled as a function of the number of recipients (nR) and the underlying 
schemes used.  
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Figure 3.14 Strand Spaces Bundle for Recency Scheme 
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Total Number of Steps 
The number of cycles (nC) in MProt is determined by the number of cycles in the SProt. An upper 
bound on the number of cycles in SProt: nC =  nS mod 2  + 1 where nS is the number of send and 
receive events as two such events form a complete cycle (Terminology 3.6).  As outlined in the 
algorithm, when nR is the number of recipients there can be at most nR+1 steps. Therefore, an upper 
bound on the total number of steps is: totSteps = (nS mod 2 + 1) *(nR + 1). Thus, for any scheme with 
nS send-and-receive events (fixed), the total number of steps (totSteps) grows linearly with nR.  
Total Number of Terms 
The total number of terms is estimated based on the number of new terms introduced by each 
additional recipient. In Table 3.28 the first row shows the number of new terms introduced when 
(n+1)
th
 recipient is added, while the second row shows the total terms after n recipients.  For example, 
the data integrity scheme for an additional recipient introduces only one additional step with two terms 
(the data and the signed digest) and requires no changes to any of the other steps (the previous 
recipient simply forwards the data and the digest from the source entity). Schemes for all other 
properties require some changes to either steps used in forwarding the message from the source, or the 
steps used in carrying the responses back to the source, or both. 
 DI A EA R RNR {A,DI,R,RNR} 
New terms for (n+1)
th
 
recipient.  
2 n+1 n+2 2n+2 2n+3 5n+6 
Total number of terms 
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2n 
2
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This analysis shows that the performance for DI property in linear, as the number of terms for n 
recipients is only 2n. The schemes for all other properties is order O(n
2
). In the next section, the result 
of this algorithm analysis is corroborated by the measured performance.  
3.6.6.2 Performance of the Protocol Generation Algorithm  
This section presents the results of running the protocol generation algorithm varying the number of 
destinations and the security properties. The response time was measured running the algorithm with a 
2.5 GHz laptop with 4 GB RAM and Windows XP operating systems. The algorithm was 
implemented as a Java program with 750 lines of code. The elapsed time was obtained based on the 
average of 10,000 runs (to reduce the impact of background processes running). Figure 3.15 shows 
how the elapsed time varies with the number of recipients while Figure 3.16 shows how the number of 
protocol terms increases with the number of recipients.  
   Table 3.28 The Number of New Terms introduced for N
th
 Recipient and the Total Number of Terms  
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Analysis 
The analysis attempts to evaluate algorithm complexity in terms of processing time. Processing time is 
modelled using total number of terms, as each additional term involves processing. Total number of 
terms for n recipients is derived by summing the new terms introduced by each additional recipient 
(refer to Table 3.28).  Scheme for {DI} involves 2n terms, thus resulting in linear complexity. The 
scheme for {A,DI,RNR,R} involves 
2
)75( nn
 terms, thus resulting in quadratic complexity. Schemes 
for {RNR}, { A } and { R } also shows quadratic complexity as the numbers of terms involved are
)4(nn , 
2
)3(nn
 and )3(nn  respectively. It is evident from Figure 3.15 and 3.16 the analytical 
results corroborate well with experimental results, with the graphs for all the properties showing very 
similar rates of increase.   
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The experimental results show that elapsed time is less than 20 ms even for the scheme generated for 
up to 25 recipients with the combination of all security properties {A,DI,RNR,R}. This shows the 
viability of the method presented as the number of recipients is unlikely to exceed 25, in most practical 
applications. 
3.6.6.3 Security Overheads of PGPS Generated Schemes 
One past approach uses the state of commitment resulting from message exchanges as the basis for 
protocol synthesis [94]. Such commitments can be made enforceable if such messages are exchanged 
with the right PGPS security levels.  Different combinations of messages may be used to arrive at the 
desired state of commitment; however each message may require a different security level that reflects 
the underlying semantics. For example, in Figure 3.17-A customer C sends a quote request message 
(QReq) to merchant M which responds with a quote response message (QRes) with security property 
{A} which includes the product, price, quantity and timeframe. Finally the customer C sends a 
purchase order (PO) which includes the product, price, quantity and timeframe with security 
properties {A,RNR}. At the end of these message exchanges the customer is committed to pay when 
goods are delivered and the merchant is committed to supply at the stated price and timeframe.  If 
however, customer C has an established relationship with M which requires it to supply goods at pre-
set price and timeframe, both B and C may reach the same level of commitment by sending a different 
purchase order (PrePO) message which includes only the product and quantity as shown in Figure 
3.17-B.  In such settings the candidate protocol with the least overall protocol cost can be the basis for 
selection. The next section expresses the overall protocol bandwidth and computational cost as a 
function of underlying security strength. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.6.6.4 Computational Cost 
The computational cost incurred by protocols can be used as a means to select the optimal protocol 
when multiple protocols meet the security requirements. The overall protocol computational cost (PC) 
in PGPS can be expressed as the sum of sub-protocol costs (SPCi), based on the schemes devised in 
3.6.5 for sending an individual message for multiple recipients as in   
    
l
iSPCPC
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Figure 3.17 Two Different Message Exchanges Producing the Same Outcomes 
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where SPC(Mi) is the sub-protocol cost for the i
th
  message, and l is the number of messages. The cost 
of each sub-protocol scheme is expressed as a function of protocol security strength ss (refer to 
Section 2.6) and message security-level sl (Terminology 3.3). Sub-protocol cost is based on the sum of 
costs for non-correspondence (NCP) properties (such as secrecy) enforced at the data element level 
and costs for correspondence (CPC) properties (such as authentication, integrity) enforced at the data 
level.  
SPCi =  SPC_NCPi (ss) + SPC_CPi(ss,sl)   
The cost of enforcing secrecy for each data element is based on the cost of encryption at the source 
before other sub-protocol operations, and the cost of decryptions at destination entities afterwards. In 
PGPS secrecy cost is expressed in terms of the number of secret data elements in i
th
 sub-protocol (
iNSE ), the average size of secrecy group in i
th
 sub-protocol ( iizeSecretGrpS ) and security strength 
(ss).   
 ),  , ),(_ (  ssssMNCPSPC iii izeSecretGrpSNSECostSK   
The cost of enforcing a security level sl using security strength ss is the sum of costs for enforcing the 
individual properties sp constituting sl as shown below.   
),(_  
1
),(_ jspssiCP
n
j
SPCslssCPSPC i where j
num
j
spsl U
1
and num is the number of 
basic properties in sl.  The cost of enforcing individual correspondence properties is based on the cost 
incurred at each step of the protocol, which is security level and security strength dependent. These 
costs are stated using the functions described in the Table 3.29. 
Function and Variables Meaning Arguments to functions 
SN(ss) 
CN(ss) 
CPrE(ss,size) 
SPrE(ss,size  
CPuD(ss,size) 
SPuD(ss,size) 
COTKE(ss,size) 
COTKD(ss,size) 
SOTKE(ss,size) 
SOTK 
SH(ss,size) 
CH(ss,size) 
n = NRi 
NSEi 
SDi 
NMH 
HS 
Size of nonce 
Cost of nonce 
Cost of private key encryption 
Size of private key encryption 
Cost of public key decryption 
Size of public key decryption 
Cost of one-time-key encryption 
Cost of one-time-key decryption 
Size of  one-time key encryption 
Size of one-time key  
Size of hash 
Cost of hash 
Number  of recipients in ith  sub-protocol 
Number  of secret elements in ith sub-protocol 
Size of data in ith sub-protocol 
Number of message headers 
Header size 
security strength 
security strength 
security strength, size of data  
security strength, size of data 
security strength,size of data 
security strength,size of data 
security strength,size of data 
security strength,size of data 
security strength,size of data 
 
security strength, size of data 
security strength, size of data 
 
 
Table 3.30 shows estimated computational costs for i
th
 sub-protocol sent to n recipients with 
elementary properties entity authentication (EA), data integrity (DI), authentication (A), recency (R) 
and receiver non-repudiation (RNR).  
   Table 3.29 Functions used for Describing Protocol Costs 
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3.6.6.5 Protocol Bandwidth
 
Protocol bandwidth in PGPS measures the amount of data carried from one point to another and is 
expressed as a function of message sizes, the number of recipients, the protocol security strength, the 
size of message headers and the number of hops. The number of message headers (NMH) for a given 
security level can be derived directly from the cryptographic schemes associated with that security 
level. The Table 3.31 shows the NMH values for n recipients in PGPS. Note the number of hops 
required for the security levels {A} and {DI} is the same as that required for {A,DI}.  
A DI RNR R EA A,DI A,RNR A,R A,R,DI A,R,RNR A,DI,RNR R,DI,RNR A,R, 
RNR,DI 
n n 2n+1 2n+1 n+1 n 2n+1 2n+1 2n+1 3n+2 2n+1 3n+2 3n+2 
 
 
Protocol bandwidth in PGPS is computed by summing up the bandwidths of all sub-protocols. The 
number of hops used for security levels with multiple properties is usually less than the sum for 
individual properties, as some hops are combined. The bandwidth for headers is therefore expressed as 
a function of the sub-protocol security level while the bandwidth for cryptographic components is 
expressed as the sum of the parts of individual properties. 
l
i
SPBiin
l
i
iSDisln
l
i
NMHHSMPB
1
.
1
),
1
(.)(     where  l is the number of sub-protocols. 
Sub-protocol bandwidth (SPB) is expressed as the sum of bandwidth resulting from non-
correspondence  (SPB_NCP) properties (such as secrecy) and correspondence properties (SPB_PC) at 
message level.  
 SPBi =  SPB_NCPi + SPB_CPi(ss,sl) 
The additional bandwidth for enforcing secrecy can be expressed as a function of tag size (TAGSIZE), 
number of secret elements (NSE) and number of destinations (ND).  
SPB_NCPi = TAGSIZE . n . NSEi  
Each correspondence property making up the security level causes an increase in bandwidth through 
additional cryptographic elements as shown below. 
Table 3.30 Computational Cost for Multiple Recipient Protocols 
Table 3.31 Number of Headers Used for Security Levels 
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spssiCPSPBslssiCPSPB
1
),(_  ),(_   where j
num
j
spUsl
1
  
Table 3.32 shows protocol bandwidth for i
th
 sub-protocol sent to n recipients, for each of the 
correspondence properties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expressing computational cost and bandwidth as a function of security strength makes trade-offs 
between security and performance possible, by selecting the right security strength. Furthermore when 
two or protocols meet the requirements the optimal one can be selected on the basis of cost.  
3.7 Applicability: Dynamic Generation of Security Protocols  
One main benefit of the PGPS approach is the ability to generate security protocols at runtime which 
is vital in e-commerce and web services. However, any protocol generated must meet both functional 
and security requirements of all interacting entities.  These requirements in turn vary with the 
underlying domain, the role of interacting entities and the semantics of data elements. This section 
presents a technique that allows such constraints to be specified in terms of data elements and 
underlying classes or roles with predefined meanings. Section 3.7.1 explains how a knowledge based 
approach can be used to automate the synthesis process. Section 3.7.2 compares the performance of 
PGPS with other approaches.  
3.7.1 Automated Synthesis (SYN) 
This section describes the technique devised to automate protocol synthesis (SYN) based on 
requirements stated in terms of knowledge elements in the initial and final worlds. These requirements 
together with knowledge dependencies and semantic constraints specified form the basis for 
computing the necessary message transitions with the associated security levels. The messages made 
up of one or more knowledge elements are formed to transform the entity knowledge level from 
specified initial state to the required final state without violating the security requirements. End-to-end 
security requirements are met based on security properties specified explicitly for knowledge elements 
in the initial and final worlds and implicitly for knowledge element dependencies. Together, they help 
meet the end-to-end security requirements, vital in e-commerce. For example, if a customer requests a 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Table 3.32 Bandwidth for Multiple Recipient Protocols 
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service from a broker with a time-bound property in a specific domain the broker may be required to 
interact with other service providers and respond using the same time-bound to meet the end-to-end 
security requirements. The message security levels necessary to meet such end-to-end security 
requirements can be enforced using the schemes presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7.1.1 describes the 
model elements formally while section 3.7.1.2 describes the synthesis process using an example. 
 
3.7.1.1 Model Elements and the Basis for Synthesis 
TERMINOLOGY 3.7: MODEL ELEMENTS 
 E represents the set of all trading entities and intermediaries in the domain 
 ER represents the set of all entity roles such as Bank, Merchant or Customer. 
 KE represents a knowledge element such as the customer-credit-information.  
 KL (knowledge level) for an entity represents the set of all knowledge elements currently in its 
possession 
 The security requirements (SReq) for a knowledge element in initial or final state is = SC x SP  
where SC  ER be the roles given access to a specific knowledge-element and SP  {A,NR,TB,DI} be 
the set of all correspondence security properties specified.   
 
For example, if a knowledge-element originating in A can only be accessed by entities B and C using 
security properties authentication, SReq would be set to ({B, C} × { A}). 
  
SYN models current system state assuming perfect knowledge recall, whereby all knowledge initially 
possessed or acquired in the past, can be recalled by entities [27]. Such a model allows a layered 
approach to synthesis, where knowledge of entities increase steadily until the desired goal state is 
reached. A layered approach allows planning graphs to be devised in a polynomial-time by limiting 
the number of possible transitions [46]. In this approach all intermediate system states are defined in 
terms of possession of knowledge elements. Entity knowledge level increases through knowledge 
elements received or derived. Multiple final states permit different sequences of valid actions, 
reflecting non-deterministic choices available to interacting entities.  For example, consider a 
merchant entity which allows its customer entities to either rent, purchase or discontinue the trade after 
making initial inquiries. Possible goals can then be expressed as customer-purchasing and merchant 
retailing, customer-renting and merchant-hiring, or both entities suspending the trade. The entities may 
transition through a number of intermediate states with different knowledge levels, until one of the 
desired final goals is reached. 
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DEFINITION 3.5 KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM 
Let  E be the set of entities, 
 S be the finite set of states,  
 I  S be the set of initial states,  
 F  S be the set of final states,  
 SKE be the set of all knowledge-elements and  
 SPS the set of security properties and T   E × P(E) × SKE × SPS be the relation specifying 
the set of valid transitions.  
Then the knowledge based  system (KBS) incorporating security can be expressed as a tuple as in:   
KBS  = ( E,S, I, F, T, SKE, SPS)   
In a KBS the set of valid transitions is determined based on the current state of knowledge, 
dependencies and constraints specified. The current knowledge at any instance is represented by:  CK 
 E × SKE, where E is the set of entities and SKE the set of knowledge-elements.   
Specifying Dependency Constraints 
Dependency constraints specify new knowledge-elements that can be derived from base elements 
based on entity role and the underlying domain. Such a constraint may specify that a merchant cannot 
generate supply-details until purchase-details, customer-details and stock-level-details are available. 
 
 
Security constraints necessary to meet end-to-end security can also be specified explicitly in terms of 
security properties of base and derived elements. The security properties with which a base element 
should be received (RSP constraints described in Section 6.5.3.5) can be stated in terms of security 
properties with which a derived element must be received. Similarly, security properties with which a 
derived element should be sent (SSP constraints also described in Section 6.5.3.5) could be made a 
function of security properties with which base elements were sent. Such constraints help capture the 
relationships that exist between the security properties and the underlying semantics in a particular 
domain. For example, a bank receiving an authenticated message for credit card payment from a 
merchant may proceed to alter the customer-balance on the premise that the merchant could only 
authenticate such a payment message if it had already received an authenticated message confirming 
goods delivery.  
KEI1 KEI2  KEI3 
{TB} 
KEO1 KEO2  KEO3 
Base Knowledge Elements 
Derived Knowledge Elements 
Figure 3.18 Specifying Dependenies between Knowledge-Elements 
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TERMINOLOGY 3.8: DEPENDENCY CONSTRAINTS (DC) 
Let  Role be the entity role where new knowledge-elements are derived 
 Base  SKE be the sets of base elements 
  Derived   SKE be the set of derived elements 
  Bfs be the set of functions that expresses security/trust receipt requirements of each base element as a 
function of receipt requirements of derived elements. These functions help propagate security/trust from 
message recipient to originator.    
 Dfs be  the set of functions that expresses security/trust despatch requirements of each derived element as 
a function of despatch requirements of base elements. These functions help propagate security/trust from 
message recipient to originator.   
Then the Dependency constraint DC= <Role, Base, Derived, Bfs, Dfs> specifies the dependencies for Role in 
terms of Base, Derived, Bfs and Dfs. 
 
Sequencing Constraints at Entity Level 
In the proposed approach a knowledge element is despatched to all other entities requiring those at the 
earliest time. However, the sequencing constraints (VMD and VMR below) can be used to restrict the 
order in which knowledge elements are despatched or received.  
TERMINOLOGY 3.9:VALID MESSAGE RECEIPT (VMR) 
The predicate VMR(e,ke,pke,s_role) specifies e must receive all the knowledge-elements pke from an entity of 
with role s_role before receiving ke, where e   E, is the set of entities, ke  SKE and pke  SKE where SKE is 
the set of all knowledge elements.  The sender role or message elements can be set to null if necessary.  
For example, the predicate VMR(Mer1, Purchase_Req, {Quote_Req}, null)  specifies merchant Mer1 
will accept the message Purchase_Req if it had earlier received a Quote-Req message from the same 
entity. The predicate VMR(Mer1, Purchase_Req, {Quote_Req}, Customer)  specifies merchant Mer1 
will accept the message Purchase_Req from a Customer entity that had earlier received a Quote-Req 
message.   
TERMINOLOGY 3.10: VALID MESSAGE DESPATCH (VMD) 
The predicate VMD(e,ke,pke,r_role) specifies all the knowledge-elements pke that an entity e must 
despatch to an entity of role r_role before sending the knowledge-element ke,  where e   E, message 
element received ke  SKE , and pke  SKE. 
Grouping Constraints at Entity Level 
In the proposed approach all knowledge elements are despatched at the earliest time unless grouping 
constraints are specified reflecting the underlying semantics. Grouping knowledge elements 
exchanged into a single message help assure recipients that they relate to the same transaction [50]. A 
bank may insist on receiving a message containing encrypted information from both merchant and 
customer before initiating a credit-transfer between them. A merchant entity must, therefore, group 
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together payment and purchase details in a message before despatching it to the bank.  A merchant 
forwarding the message elements credit-card together with purchase details cannot later refute that 
they were part of the same transaction. Assertions such as “elements received together are related” are 
made from common conventions used in standard protocol design [15].  Knowledge-elements should 
be grouped only when necessary as it adversely impacts performance through higher security level (set 
to the element with the highest security level) and delays in message despatch (until all base elements 
are received). SYN allow message recipients to specify grouping constraints for message receipt using 
VMRG. Such constraints however, can only be met if message originators permit such grouping for 
messages sent, using VMSG.  
TERMINOLOGY 3.11: VALID MESSAGE RECEIVER GROUP (VMRG) 
VMRG(recv, megroup) is the predicate for specifying valid message receiver group where recv   E 
and megroup  SKE.  
 
The predicate VMRG(Mer1, {Purchase_Req, Customer_Info})  specifies that merchant Mer1 will 
receive the message that contains both Purchase_request and Customer_Info, and either of these 
messages cannot be sent alone. Similarly valid message sender group VMSG(sender, megroup), where 
sender   E, and megroup  SKE specifies message elements that must be sent together.  
 
End-to-End Security/Trust Properties Derived Through Propagation 
End-to-end requirements in SYN are propagated recursively using dependency constraints expressing 
security requirements as a function of base and derived elements. Receiver security properties (RSP) 
are propagated form derived elements to base ones while the sender security properties (SSP) are 
propagated in opposite direction.  Such an approach allows entities of data origin and destinations to 
influence the security level for intermediate transactions. For example in Figure 3.18, the Sender 
Security Property (SSP) for knowledge-element KEO2 in Entity En is a function of the Sender Security 
properties (SSP) for its base elements as in:  
 SSP(En,KEO2) = fb( SSP(Ei,KEI1), SSP(Ej,KEI2), SSP(Ek,KEI3)) 
where Ei, Ej, Ek  are entities from which base entities (KEI1, KEI1, KEI1) are despatched, and fs is a 
function over the domain of security properties (using set operators).  An example of a valid function 
fs is union(SSP(Ei,KEI1), ,SSP(Ej,KEI3),{A}) which forms the resulting sender security property by 
combining the security properties of two of its base elements, and the security property {A}.  Such a 
function (fs) ensures the security property is no less than {A} regardless of the security properties for 
base elements. Similarly the Receiver security property (RSP) for KEI2 in En from which KE02 and 
KEO3 are derived acan be stated as:  RSP(En,KEI2) = fd(RSP(Em,KEO2), RSP(En,KEO3)). 
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A Message Synthesis Example Based on Knowledge Element Requirements 
A simple example in this section demonstrates how constraints and requirements at the knowledge 
element level can be used in arriving the set messages and their security levels. Figure 3.19 shows the 
five knowledge elements, their dependencies, secrecy requirements and their entity of origin. For 
example, the knowledge element Quote generated based on QReq (quote request) and CDet (customer 
details) is kept a secret only shared by the merchant and the customer. Figure 3.20 specifies the initial 
and final knowledge elements for customer and merchant and their required security properties if any.  
For example, supply order is required in merchant with authentication property. The dependencies 
show the relationships between base and derived elements and the relationships between security 
properties. These relationships between security properties as well as the initial and final security 
requirements are used to arrive at the security levels for messages exchanged as shown in Figure 3.21. 
Note in this example all messages are despatched at the earliest possible time as no sequencing or 
grouping constraints are specified. Note the details of security schemes are omitted as the proven 
security schemes presented on Section 3.6 can be used meet the required security levels directly. 
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Figure 3.19 Dependencies between Knowledge Elements 
 
Figure 3.20 Initial and Final Requirements and Dependency Constraints  
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3.7.2 Performance of PGPS 
The regeneration of the SET purchase protocol was used as the benchmark to measure the PGPS 
performance because it provides end-to-end security necessary for e-commerce and there have been 
past search based synthesis attempts to regenerate it. Unlike the earlier search based techniques, PGPS 
approach makes synthesis at runtime possible. A protocol similar to the SET purchase protocol was 
generated within 17 milliseconds using a 2.5 GHz laptop running a Windows XP operating systems. 
With faster protocol servers synthesis duration can be reduced significantly.  Other search based 
synthesis techniques have relied mainly on abstract specifications of protocol goals using BAN logic 
(refer to Section 2.2.1.1). The performance of these techniques [23, 73] (with much longer reported 
duration for synthesis) cannot be compared directly with PGPS where proven schemes are combined 
to create the protocols. 
[{Quote}GKCM]:{NR,A} 
 
[SO] {A,R} 
 
[QReq, CDet] 
 
Customer Merchant 
[DO]{R} 
 
Figure 3.21 Protocol Specifications at Message Level 
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3.8 Discussion 
Past attempts to synthesise collaboration protocols between autonomous entities were mainly based on 
transitions and commitments permitted by their business rules. However, such attempts did not model 
the security assurances necessary to hold interacting entities accountable for their actions. Standard 
security protocols designed for e-commerce, such as SET, were limited to specific configurations. If 
protocols are to be synthesised with necessary security assurances, individual entities must be allowed 
to express the exact security requirements for all possible data exchanges. The lack of standard 
definitions for common security properties, such as authentication, led to many of the past protocol 
flaws. The PGPS framework makes it possible to specify different levels of assurances unambiguously 
by combining a few of the basic security properties. The fine-grained security properties formed by 
combining the basic properties make it possible to aggregate security requirements of interacting 
entities. To provide distinct schemes for all fine-grained security properties, PGPS uses a structured 
approach that combines challenge response mechanisms with compositional techniques. Furthermore 
PGPS schemes allow grouping and sequencing constraints necessary for e-commerce to be considered. 
PGPS also facilitate security performance trade-offs by expressing the bandwidth and computational 
cost of synthesised protocols in terms of the security strength of the underlying elements.  
 
3.8.1 Security Requirements using Fine-Grained Security Levels   
Hierarchical levels of common security properties were defined in the past to provide different levels 
of assurance [33]. Authentication based on injective agreement provides a stronger assurance than that 
based purely on aliveness as it includes evidence of a unique run. However, such a strong 
authentication property (with additional overheads) may not be necessary if the message was received 
in response to a recent message. Furthermore, if security needs of dynamically interacting entities are 
to be met, subtle security properties necessary must be unambiguously defined. For example, the 
PGPS composite security property combining recency with receiver non-repudiation provides the 
sender the evidence to prove the receipt of data despatched recently, in addition to assuring recipient 
of data recency. PGPS fine-grained security levels are defined combining basic security properties in a 
predefined order to standardize the meaning of such assurances. By using fine-grained security levels, 
security requirement along any message path can be expressed as a function of requirements by 
message originator and recipients, thus allowing end-to-end security requirements to be met. Though 
the fine-grained security properties defined are adequate to express different levels of security 
assurances defined in the past, they must be extended if newer properties such as anonymity are to be 
included.  
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3.8.2 Synthesising Protocols Using Proven Schemes 
Recent attempts to synthesise protocols can be classified into three main categories. In the first 
category are challenge-response techniques, which were devised to provide basic security properties 
[21, 47]. In the second category are compositional techniques, which form more complex protocols 
from simpler ones [25, 26, 75, 78, 109]. In the third category, protocol goals stated in the form of 
beliefs were used to derive new protocols [23, 24, 60, 73]. Though these approaches were successful 
in discovering and deriving new protocols, the required processing made them unviable for synthesis 
at runtime. PGPS combines challenge-response schemes with composition techniques to arrive at 
provably secure schemes enforcing fine-grained properties. These schemes were combined to create 
realistic security protocols at runtime; a protocol designed to meet the SET purchase protocol 
requirements was created in 17 ms, which compares favourably with other search-based techniques. 
The correctness of all basic schemes was proved using SPCL, while the validity of composite schemes 
follows directly from the compositional approach used. The main limitation of the model is that it 
cannot resist every form of attack, though the additional terms incorporated make common attacks 
difficult to mount. Non-repudiation schemes used can only provide partial guarantees unless strong 
assumptions are made about communication channels with trust server and compliance of recipient. 
However, by modelling trust relationships (in Chapters 4 and 5) together with security schemes using 
a holistic approach the proposed framework allows trust relationships with noncompliant entities to be 
lowered or severed. 
3.8.3 Extending Security Schemes for E-Commerce 
A compositional approach to e-commerce security protocols requires devising schemes that can work 
in conjunction with business related constraints. Grouping constraints where two or more data 
elements must be despatched together are handled by aggregating their security requirements. Non-
repudiation schemes were extended to include fair exchange features. A novel interleaving algorithm 
using piggy backing allows data elements to be despatched to multiple recipients in any specified 
order. The payload for piggy backed evidence is reduced by removing redundancies and combining 
elements such as nonces. Though the processing cost increases with the number of recipients, the 
elapsed time for protocol generation was found to be less than 20 ms even with 25 recipients and 5 
different properties.  
 
The validity of schemes devised for multiple recipients was proved using Strand Spaces. The low 
elapsed time makes it ideal for services that must be composed securely at runtime. The interleaving 
schemes, however, assume that all entities are honest and all protocol obligations will be discharged 
correctly. However, as this assumption may not always hold, the schemes devised in Chapter 5 makes 
all intermediaries accountable for their actions. Another limitation of the interleaved scheme is that it 
requires entities to lie along a straight path (in sequence), which increases the amount of piggybacking 
needed, especially for large numbers of recipients. Furthermore, the validity of interleaving schemes 
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depends on the trustworthiness of all the entities involved. The schemes devised in Chapter 4 select 
intermediaries based on category specific trust relationships and do not constrain them to lie along a 
straight path.  
3.8.4 Cost Estimation Based on underlying Cryptographic elements  
Security performance trade-offs have attracted much research interest in recent times. Many have 
argued that security protocols should be designed to achieve “good enough security” as security is 
about trade-offs rather than absolutes [45]. Security strength should be made to reflect the level of 
threat posed, with stronger keys used for protection against large organisations and governments, 
which have more resources at their disposal [85]. Private key operations are generally much slower 
than public key operations and their ratio grows linearly with key size. Performance issues become 
even more critical in wireless applications, where resource-limited devices are used. The 
computational constraints of such devices have led to severe performance degradation in the past due 
to high security overheads [52]. Energy usage is one of the main constraints for wireless devices as 
they are mostly battery operated. The energy requirement, too, is found to be highly sensitive to the 
size of asymmetric keys [110]. With widespread use of mobile applications needing security there is 
now a strong research interest in finding the right security/performance trade-offs [50-52, 92].  
 
Past synthesis attempts modelling security at an abstract level did not consider the underlying protocol 
costs. PGPS makes security performance trade-offs possible by modelling security aspects together 
with computational costs and protocol bandwidth. The formal methods used in deriving individual and 
composite schemes ensure security goals are met. The cost model allows protocol bandwidth and 
computational cost to be expressed as a function of underlying security-strength, data security levels, 
number of entities and data-size. Such a model allows compatible services with least cost to be 
selected when using resource limited devices and networks. Furthermore, the security strength of 
protocols can be lowered if necessary, to meet performance/cost bottlenecks.  
 
3.8.5 Future Work 
The current PGPS model can be extended in a number of different directions. The security properties 
can be extended to include other recent properties in e-commerce such as anonymity and privacy. 
PGPS schemes can be further strengthened to resist other forms of attacks including reflection, oracle 
and algebraic attacks. Different schemes may be devised for security properties such as non-
repudiation that provides the required level of trade-offs with performance. PGPS uses a 
compositional approach to generate security protocols. Specialized model checkers can be devised to 
verify whether the composed schemes continue to meet the original requirements. Currently composed 
properties use distinct encryption techniques combining signing and encryption. Such overheads for 
composite schemes can be reduced by devising techniques based on signcryption which combines 
signing and encryption into a single operation.  
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3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a model that allows security protocols to be synthesised combining proven 
schemes. The issues of fine-grained security properties, basic and composite schemes, and trade-offs 
between security and cost have been addressed. In particular, this chapter presented the following 
solutions.   
 
 Fine-grained security levels were formed combining six basic security properties that 
incorporated some features necessary for e-commerce (such as fair exchange).  The meaning 
of each composite property was made precise by standardising the order in which individual 
properties should be enforced. Operators defined over fine-grained security properties allowed 
security levels along protocol paths to be set, aggregating end-to-end security requirements. 
 
 The correctness of the challenge-response and public key-based schemes devised were proven 
using SPCL. Composite schemes were formed combining non-interfering basic schemes. The 
correctness of the composite schemes followed directly from the compositional logic used. 
Two-party schemes were strengthened to withstand common attacks by incorporating 
additional cryptographic elements. 
  
 The two-party schemes were extended to multiple recipients using interleaving techniques. 
Such schemes meet the needs for specific applications such as contract signing, where data 
and evidence must be delivered in specified order. The correctness of these extended schemes 
was proved using Strand Spaces.  
 
 The computational cost and bandwidth of synthesised protocols were estimated as a function 
of security strength and security levels used along the protocol path. Such an approach 
allowed the right security level to be chosen on the basis of performance constraints. 
Furthermore, when two or more protocols meet the security and functional requirements, 
computational costs and protocol bandwidth can be used as the basis for selecting the 
interaction with better security performance trade-offs. 
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Chapter 4:  Promoting Trust via Endorsement  
   Intermediaries 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 used cryptography for authenticating known entities and data originating from them.  
However, cryptography alone cannot secure e-commerce transactions between previously unknown 
entities [111]. Public key systems can only vouch for the association between an identity and a public 
key, and not for the trustworthiness of an entity [112]. Cryptography cannot prevent a dishonest 
merchant supplying faulty goods, even if the merchant’s identity is known. Overcoming the perception 
of risk and insecurity in e-commerce therefore requires new trust promoting mechanisms [113].  
Intermediary mechanisms help promote trust between unknown entities by combining trust and 
security [42, 53, 54]. Such mechanisms rely on economic incentives and disincentives  to “weed out” 
malicious trading entities and intermediaries [38, 53]. Privacy considerations too may influence the 
trust placed on e-commerce intermediaries [114]. As trust plays a central role in e-commerce, trust 
between interacting entities must be considered a core requirement  [115].  
 
In traditional commerce, initial trust relationships established through reputation continue to evolve 
through direct experience. Reliable entities benefit through increased clientele and higher valued 
transactions. Similarly, reliable e-commerce entities can be made to benefit, if policies model trust 
relationships as a function of past conduct. Such policies must also reflect risk averseness of individual 
entities and domains, expressed through trust disposition and trusting beliefs. If the criteria for trust 
establishment and trust evolution are too stringent, business opportunities may be missed; if it is too 
relaxed, untrustworthy alliances may be formed. In general, false positives are less risky than false 
negatives as a missed trade through too stringent trust requirements is less harmful than trading with a 
dishonest entity through too relaxed trust requirements. Finding the right balance often requires 
statistical or simulation models as the risks and benefits vary significantly across categories and 
domains [119].  
 
In the past, traditional commerce flourished only after institutional-trust promoting mechanisms were 
put in place in the form of guarantees, indemnities and endorsements. Endorsements by authorised 
intermediaries helped to promote trust between previously unknown entities. In a similar way, 
authorised e-commerce intermediaries can promote trust between unknown entities by endorsing the 
messages exchanged. For example, an e-commerce payment order from an unknown customer is more 
likely to be trusted by the merchant if it is endorsed by an authorised payment gateway. A news feed 
provider may want to ensure that all data published originated from reliable sources and is free from 
malicious contents by getting them endorsed. A games developer may want to send a new game to all 
subscribers endorsed for their trustworthiness. Indirect endorsements may be necessary if the message 
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originator and recipient do not share a common trusted intermediary. Intermediary frameworks must 
therefore allow both direct and indirect endorsements.  
 
Promoting trust based on traditional commerce intermediaries poses a number of challenges. 
Intermediaries for traditional commerce are generally category specific. A JP (Justice of the Peace) 
may act as an intermediary endorsing a legal document but may not have any jurisdiction over 
financial matters. E-commerce intermediaries too should be classified according to the categories they 
are authorised to endorse.  Traditional commerce provides legal recourse when intermediaries fail to 
discharge their obligations. Making e-commerce intermediaries accountable requires devising 
protocols that incorporate explicit evidence that can be presented to a third party. Furthermore, trust 
relationships between intermediaries in traditional systems are fine-grained (not binary), directly 
reflecting the extent of past transaction history. For example, B may be trusted as an intermediary 
between A and C, only if both A and B, as well as B and C, have very strong trust relationships. E-
commerce intermediaries too can be selected in a similar way, if the extent of trust relationship is 
modelled using some quantifiable measure, such as the value of past transactions.  
  
Whilst endorsement-intermediaries can help mitigate the risks inherent in e-commerce collaboration, 
they come at a price. Each additional intermediary increases endorsement costs, protocol bandwidth 
and response-time, and creates another avenue for security compromise. A large number of 
intermediaries may be inevitable in environments where only a few trust relationships exist or a long 
chain of hierarchical endorsements is necessary. In other environments, the cost of intermediaries may 
be considered too high in relation to the value of transactions. Hence, it is vital that a trust building 
framework for e-commerce provide the means for balancing risk mitigation with performance, cost 
and security, taking into consideration the type of environment and the value of transactions.  
 
4.1.1 Literature Review 
Trust forms the basis for e-commerce, web services and many evolving technologies such as cloud 
computing. Both direct experiences based on past interaction and recommendations by trusted parties 
impact how trust relationships evolve in such environments. Traditional commerce too has also relied 
on a number of instruments for building indirect trust, including services provided by authorised 
intermediaries such as bank guarantees, endorsements and credit checks [121-123]. Use of such 
authorised intermediaries has helped to mitigate the risks involved by making intermediaries liable for 
their specific endorsements or guarantees. If such a category specific intermediary architecture can be 
devised for e-commerce, the perception of risk and insecurity between trading entities can be reduced. 
To the best of our knowledge there has been no past attempt to model a category specific endorsement 
intermediary architecture. The following sections review related research involving trusted paths, the 
role of trust providers, trust propagation and transitive trust.  
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4.1.1.1 Trust Characteristics 
Although there is no standard definition for trust in computer science [112], a number of trust 
characteristics have been generally agreed, including “trust is directed”, “trust is subjective” and “trust 
is category specific” [120]. The concept of trust in past research involves some level of uncertainty or 
risk for the trusting party [116]. This perception of risk is based on trusting beliefs about the ability, 
integrity and benevolence of the trustee [117]. Ability refers to the skills and competencies of the 
trustee in a specific domain; integrity concerns the moral and ethical standards of the trustee; 
benevolence describes the degree of goodwill the trustee has towards the trusting party [116, 118]. 
Other factors that influence trust are trust disposition and institutional trust. Trust disposition 
quantifies the extent to which an entity is willing to be influenced by other entities, while institutional 
trust is the confidence in the presence of well-defined structures that allow legal recourse [118]. If 
trust between unknown entities is to be promoted, the underlying beliefs and factors that facilitate trust 
should be measured and regulated. In recent work involving trustworthiness of service providers in 
cloud computing environment the need for fuzzy inference system that mimics the human mind has 
been proposed as a way to handle the uncertainty present in recommendations [161]. 
4.1.1.2 Trust Evolution 
Trust evolution depends on direct experience and indirect referrals or recommendations. Though trust 
cannot be modelled precisely, past attempts define trust and trust growth as a function of transaction 
history and loyalty [139], which are similar to credit history which grows with positive experience 
over time. Similarly any negative experience causing poor transaction history such as a series of 
defaults in payments can adversely impact trust relationships. In e-commerce environments where 
trust relationships are dynamic the time frame and the price range for which trust values are applicable 
should be modelled explicitly using appropriate vectors [160]. Such a technique can prevent malicious 
agents building the trust through low valued transactions and attempting to cheat on a costly one. 
Others of recentness of past transaction when modelling trust; production rules lower trustworthiness 
more severely for recent poor conduct than those from distant past [162]. Others have devised self-
organizing trust network using distributed algorithms to help safeguard against poor recommendations 
by malicious agents [163].  
4.1.1.3 The Role of Trust Service Providers 
Commercial entities are unlikely to take part in a transaction unless their own interests are 
safeguarded. For example, a person buying a product over the internet may not be willing to pay 
unless it is in good order and the seller may not be willing to send the product until payment has been 
received. Such stand-offs can be resolved by trust service providers (TSPs) which ensure 
commitments are made only after all parties have met their obligations [123-125]. However, 
specifying the exact role of a TSP for a specific interaction is not trivial. One past solution involves 
describing the acceptable and desirable states for all entities, before finding their intersection [37]. 
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This scheme protects the interests of all entities by setting up an indemnity account, which can be 
forfeited when one of the entities fails to meet the condition. Explicit semantic constraints used in this 
method make verification of synthesised protocols possible. However, restricting interaction to two 
parties without any mechanisms for providing explicit evidence limits its applicability to a small class 
of exchange problems.  
4.1.1.4 Economic Incentives for Trust Service Providers 
Trust service providers play a specific role between two or more entities for a price. In one approach 
the economic incentive needed to keep TSPs reliable is modelled using a probabilistic trust model 
[38]. It is assumed that all TSPs are motivated by selfish behaviour for economic gain. The reliability 
of a TSP is equated to the probability that it can play the required role. Appropriate payment rules 
were devised to provide trusted agents with sufficient incentive to comply with trust assumptions. 
Payments necessary for each agent are such that their gains by complying with the trust requirements 
outweigh the gains of violating them. The novelty of this approach is that it models the economic 
benefit from the service provider’s perspective and uses incentives to prevent breach of trust. The use 
of a fine-grained trust model allows a more realistic representation of trust. However, modelling trust 
based purely on short-term economic gain without considering the long-term benefits derived from 
strong trust relationships, limits its applicability. Furthermore, computing the payment necessary from 
individual entities requires collecting private information from agents (which may not be possible).     
4.1.1.5 Need for Endorsements 
Traditional commerce has relied on confidence building instruments, such as endorsements, to 
promote trade. Many government agencies provide endorsements for various services offered by 
private practitioners. E-commerce entities too can use such endorsement services to increase the level 
of confidence in services being offered [121]. Past proposals for e-commerce endorsements include 
the use of separate agencies for getting service credentials [121], and the use of endorsement proxies 
to select good services [126]. The level of credentials provided by endorsement agencies may vary 
depending on domain-knowledge. Confidence in such endorsements is inevitably dependent on the 
confidence in the endorser. An endorser licensed by a local, authorised organisation may have limited 
jurisdiction, confined only to that domain. If licensing agencies are to endorse services from other 
domains, the endorsements themselves must be endorsed by intermediaries at a higher level of 
jurisdiction. This is similar to insurance agencies being insured by other insurers. Although 
hierarchical transitive assurances are inevitable, long transitive chains of endorsements may lead to 
reduced confidence. Furthermore, endorsements based on static information are often not reliable.  E-
commerce and web services, however, require up-to-date information reflecting the trading entities’ 
confidence in endorsement intermediaries and endorsement intermediaries’ confidence in trading 
entities.  
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4.1.1.6 Trusted Paths 
Dynamically determining e-commerce trusted paths relies on underlying mechanisms that model the 
evolution of trust relationships [127]. Many past algorithms combined multiple trust service providers 
(TSP) to build up the trust between interacting entities [42, 128, 129]. The metrics for TSPs can be 
based on positive past trust experience or private relationships. In one approach using a distributed 
algorithm, trusted paths are extended iteratively by exchanging information between entities until a 
path is found between message sender and recipient [128]. The TSPs themselves can be running in 
nodes in different environments, and executing a distributed search algorithm for building the trusted 
path. A forward message is sent to the adjacent node when searching for the target, and a backward 
message when a path is discovered. This approach, by using a parallel search procedure allows the 
search time to be reduced significantly. However, the number of messages grows exponentially with 
increasing node numbers due to each node forwarding the message to its neighbours, which results in 
congestion in highly trusted nodes. Furthermore, incorrect trust information by compromised entities 
may create invalid trusted paths.  
4.1.1.7 Direct and Indirect Trust Propagation 
Many web sites facilitate a form of trust propagation by displaying aggregate user scores. However, 
dishonest entities can distort the aggregate scores by placing biased views. Unscrupulous marketing 
agencies are known to pay others to write favourable feedback. Averting such malpractice requires 
restricting trust propagation to globally trusted information sources and other trusted entities. 
Empirical results have been used to compare the effectiveness of different means of direct and indirect 
propagation [130]. In direct propagation, if X trusts Y and Y trusts Z, then X ends up trusting Z. With 
propagation using co-citation, if P trusts R and S while Q trusts R, then Q also ends up trusting S. 
Propagation using transpose trust is applicable if X trusting Y causes Y to trust X to some extent. The 
propagation by co-citation was found to be the most effective predictor based on work done 
comparing different propagation methods [130]. Empirical study highlights the need to combine 
multiple strategies for trust propagation. However, the binary trust model where one entity either 
completely trusts or distrusts another, does not allow the extent of trust required to be modelled as a 
function of transaction value or risk. 
4.1.1.8 Transitive Trust 
Transitive trust refers to trust placed in an entity based on experience of others (not direct). Although 
transitive trust is an integral part of human communications, it is not easy to define precisely. 
Moreover, trust is not always transitive in real life [131]. For example, Alice’s willingness to trust Bob 
to repay a loan for a specific amount and Bob’s willing to do the same with Charlie, does not 
necessarily lead to Alice’s willingness to do the same with Charlie.   However, if Charlie trusts Dave 
to be a good plumber and Bob trusts Charlie to be able to recommend a good plumber, Bob may also 
trust Dave to be a good plumber. Similarly if Alice trusts Bob to recommend a plumber known to him 
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through referrals, Alice may be willing to trust Dave. Many trust management systems model trust by 
combining direct trust with transitive trust [120]. Traditional trading entities, too, have combined 
direct trust based on past experience with indirect trust relationships to increase their trading 
opportunities. Though indirect trust increases trading opportunities they also open up more venues for 
attacks [122].   
 
Public key infrastructure (PKI), which uses a form of transitive trust aggregates functional and referral 
trust [54, 132]. An entity trusting a certification authority (CA) must have the functional trust that the 
public key of CA is authentic and correctly certifies public keys, and a referral trust that the CA 
validates other subordinate CAs able to certify public keys. This process is iteratively repeated until 
the public key of a source is obtained. Thus, the last edge in a trusted path represents functional trust 
while all other edges represent referral trust [54]. Use of distinct edges for functional and referral 
trusts in transitive trust graphs allows multiple referrals through parallel trust combinations to be 
represented [54]. However, the parallel combination of trusted paths used results in complex cyclic 
networks that can only be analysed using heuristic techniques.  Moreover, the trusted paths are created 
without considering the value and category.    
 
Transitive trust plays a major role in service oriented social networks which are becoming widespread. 
Trustworthiness of service provider must be expressed in terms of transitive trust along different social 
trust paths. Computing trustworthiness however, requires heuristic algorithms as the optimal path 
algorithms are NP-Complete  [133]. Social network communities are also less amenable to a 
hierarchical organization based on the type of communities as some nodes may belong to multiple 
communities [134]. Therefore recent work has treated communities as nodes instead of links [135]. 
Trustworthiness however, cannot be expressed in terms of existing trust relationships alone as trust 
degrades with the number of intermediaries. In social networks where most pairs can be connected 
using at most six trusted intermediaries [133, 136], attenuation in transitive trust is modelled implicitly 
by setting it to the product of all trust relationships (that lie in the range 0 to 1).  
 
Trust also plays a dominant role in service oriented computing (SOC), a software architecture that 
allows independent services to be composed in real-time. In SOC, services that are both autonomous 
and persistent collaborate together to perform the required actions.  Trust plays a major role, as the 
service user has no direct access to secondary service providers operating under different sets of 
administrative structures.  Prior dealings and referrals from other trusted entities can be used in 
selecting services. To ensure services do not work against the interests of service users, services must 
be selected based on compatible security and privacy policies [4, 16]. The underlying framework 
therefore must allow trust and security issues to be modelled together.    
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Referral networks help identify service partners by maintaining and sharing the trustworthiness of 
other services [125]. Such a mechanism fosters good behaviour in trusted entities, as a single breach of 
trust may damage trust built up over a long period. An agent needing a specific service contacts its 
neighbours, which may offer the service or give referrals to other agents. The agent requesting the 
service may accept the service or follow up with the referrals. Services are matched based on the 
quality of service provided and the level of service requested. When a service is selected and used, its 
ratings and referrals that led to that service are updated on the basis of the quality of service. These 
updates lead to constant evolution of these trust networks, whereby agents move closer to the ones that 
they trust. The main benefit of this approach is that principals help each other discover trustworthy 
services. This approach is also less risky than the traditional approach, where there is sole reliance on 
the integrity of some central authority.  However, these networks may not be effective when the 
number of referrals is too high, or too low; higher cost is incurred through increased service options 
for high number of referrals while no matches may be found for a low number of referrals.           
4.1.1.9 Summary of Literature Review and Evaluation 
Although no standard definition exists, trust is assumed to involve some level of uncertainty or risk. 
Trust is considered to be directed, category specific and subjective. Factors that influence trust include 
trust disposition, institutional trust and trusting beliefs. Initial trust is often established through some 
form of trust propagation mechanism. Trust relationships continue to grow over time on the basis of 
past experience. Trust promoting mechanisms include trusted intermediaries (trust service providers), 
with varying roles depending on the type of interaction. Sufficient economic incentives disincentives 
must be provided to prevent intermediaries breaching trust assumptions. Endorsing transactions by 
authorised endorsement intermediaries may help increase the confidence between unknown entities.  
 
An extensive literature survey revealed the need for a framework that combines trust evolution and 
trust transfer with institutional trust using some form of endorsements [113, 126]. Such endorsements 
must be both hierarchical and category specific as endorsements in e-commerce are category specific 
and may be subject to endorsement at another level.  Unlike traditional e-commerce intermediaries, 
category specific endorsement requires both direct and indirect endorsements. For example, a liquor 
purchase message from a retailer entity to a wholesale merchant entity can be routed through a liquor 
purchase endorser, one or more liquor endorsement intermediaries and a liquor sales endorser. Thus, 
direct and indirect endorsers play a role similar to that of functional and referral trust in transitive trust 
systems. If trusted intermediaries are to be made reliable, mechanisms must be devised to detect trust 
breaches. Proven conduct should be used as the basis for growth or decay in trust relationships and 
extension or termination of endorsement capabilities.  Another gap identified is the transition between 
transitive and direct trust. In traditional commerce transitive trust often evolves into direct trust which 
carries with it a higher level of reward and risk. Although much work has been done with direct and 
transitive trust, little or no work has been done modelling the transition from transitive to direct trust.   
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To address these gaps this chapter presents a model named Promoting Trust in Endorsement 
Intermediaries (PTEI), based on a hierarchical institutional framework, trust disposition and trusting 
beliefs. An institutional framework is provided through category specific endorsement intermediaries. 
The trust disposition and trusting beliefs of individual entities and domains form the basis of trust 
transfer and trust evolution policies. PTEI policies are designed to promote trust relationships with 
reliable trading entities and intermediaries through rewards for compliance and penalties for trust 
breach. Increased trust coupling and strong trust relationships create more trading opportunities for 
entities and greater endorsement incomes for intermediaries. Trust transfer allows transitive depths to 
be reduced eventually leading to direct trust relationships. Although direct trust carries greater rewards 
the trust transfer threshold should be set experimentally to reduce risks resulting from poor alliances.  
4.1.2 Main Contribution  
The overall contribution of this chapter is an institutional framework named PTEI for promoting trust 
in e-commerce [167]. It presented a number of solutions which are outlined below.  
 The first contribution is an architecture that helps to promote trust in e-commerce by 
endorsing all key data exchanged between unknown entities using authorised category specific 
intermediaries. The resulting trust based on both past experience and the authority granted to 
endorsers at different levels, provides a much stronger basis for trust propagation than 
traditional transitive trust models. Hence, the endorsement based trust proposed degrades at a 
much lower rate (by varying the associated parameters) than traditional transitive trust. 
Furthermore, by combining endorsements and category specific trust this model makes e-
commerce transactions without human involvement possible for more critical transactions 
such as those involving medical drugs.  
 The second contribution is a self-regulating centralized trust network which allows evolution 
of existing trust relationships and formation of new trust relationships based on past conduct, 
trust disposition and trusting beliefs. Simulation results for the model show that the number 
and extent of trust relationships is proportional to the reliability of entities. Such a model 
corroborates well with traditional commerce where the number of alliances with traders and 
agents grows at a rate proportional to their trustworthiness. 
 The third contribution is the approach used to allow trusted path generation at runtime. 
Centralized network used for modelling trust relationships makes such path generation 
possible. For large networks, PTEI groups entities into hierarchical domains on the basis of 
trust coupling. The simulation results and the complexity analysis done for the hierarchical 
network, suggests that trusted paths through a network of 800,000 nodes can be created within 
one second. The retrieval times can be further reduced by using the domain trust trees formed 
offline, which maintain separate trusted paths from each entity.   
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4.2 Statement of the Problem 
Endorsements by category specific intermediaries form the key to promoting institutional trust in 
traditional commerce. Using such endorsements in e-commerce poses a number of problems: 
modelling category specific hierarchical endorsements, techniques for evolving trust relationships and 
algorithms for finding trusted paths in at runtime. These are highlighted in this section.  
 
 Traditional commerce and law enforcement relies on the presence of category specific 
endorsement authorities. For example, a person may not teach in a primary school until that 
person’s character is endorsed by police authorities who have access to criminal records.  
 In traditional commerce, trust relationships evolve dynamically based on past direct 
experience while new trust relationships are formed based on cumulative experience of trusted 
parties. If such dynamic trust relationships are to be modelled for e-commerce, new trust 
transfer and trust evolution mechanisms must be devised.   
 Trusted endorsement paths may be created based on a number of factors, including minimum 
trust relationships along the path, transitive depth, cost of endorsements, or a combination of 
these. For example, longer endorsement paths may be acceptable in sensor networks used in 
weather data but not in wired networks transmitting financial transactions.   
 Dynamic collaboration between unknown e-commerce entities depends on finding 
endorsement paths through intermediaries at runtime. However, generating such paths for 
large networks can become intractable even if algorithms are of polynomial complexity. 
4.2.1 Research Questions 
Before an institutional trust framework similar to that found in traditional commerce can be created, 
the following research questions must be answered: 
 Endorsements formed the basis for institutional trust in traditional commerce. This leads to the 
research question: How can an institutional trust framework for e-commerce be designed 
which allows vital data to be endorsed by authorised category specific intermediaries? 
 If trusted paths are to be generated dynamically, trust relationships must be maintained 
centrally. In traditional commerce, existing trust relationships continue to evolve through 
direct experience while new trust relationships are established through recommendations. This 
leads to the research question: How can a centralized trust network allow establishment and 
evolution of trust relationships?  
 Trusted paths for e-commerce may require data to be passed through large networks involving 
many hierarchical domains. This leads to the research question: How can the algorithms and 
data structures used for generating trusted path be made scalable?  
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4.3 Outline of the Solution 
Endorsement trust has played a vital role in traditional commerce. Consider a company that only hires 
an electrician endorsed by a maintenance service agency it trusts when some electrical work needs to 
be done. Such endorsements are category specific; a maintenance agency, for example, cannot provide 
product endorsement. Endorsement trust improves gradually based on positive experiences, while it 
may decline sharply if there is one single negative experience. A bank, for example, is more likely to 
guarantee a large line of credit to a customer with a long and positive transaction history than to a 
customer with a short one. However, one bad experience may seriously damage the trust capital built 
up, and affect all future guarantees. Endorsement trust in traditional businesses reflects the beliefs of 
both the endorser and the endorsee. For example, the endorsement trust between an agency and a 
particular electrician reflects both the agency’s beliefs based on past electrical work done and the 
electrician’s beliefs based on the type of companies hiring through the agent. 
 
Trust relationships in general are treated as one-way functions, as B may trust C’s recommendation of 
good stock picks but not vice-versa. If an e-commerce framework is to model trading opportunities 
based on traditional commerce, the underlying trust relationships must be allowed to evolve over time. 
Lack of frameworks that allow reasoning about trust based on users’ trust policies has prevented e-
commerce from exploiting many new opportunities [137, 138].  Thus, the proposed endorsement trust 
based architecture incorporates the following:  
 non-binary trust relationships that reflect the level of confidence  
 category specific intermediaries able to provide the necessary endorsements 
 a hierarchical structure for endorsement intermediaries  
 a trust network maintaining the trust relationships between intermediaries and trading entities  
 trust evolution based on past experience 
 formation of new trust relationships reflecting reputation and trust disposition. 
TERMINOLOGY 4.1 COMMON TERMS 
The terminology used for common terms in this chapter is described below:  
 Entity (EN) represents either a trading entity or intermediary. 
 Category (C) of data (d) is the aggregation of categories of data elements as in: 
 C(d=d1  d2…  dn) = C(d1)  C(d2)… C(dn) where d1, d2..dn are atomic data elements. 
 Endorsement Capability of an intermediary is the set of knowledge element categories it is 
authorised to endorse. 
 Trust Disposition is the extent to which an entity has a tendency to be willing to depend on 
others [113]. In this thesis trust disposition is considered to be category specific.  
 Direct Endorsements are performed based on direct knowledge of entities in the domain while 
Indirect Endorsements are performed based on trust placed on other endorsers. 
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 Domains are groupings of trading entities and intermediaries. These grouping may be based 
on geography or other factors such as existing trust relationships.  
 Transitive Depth is the number of intermediaries between the data originator and recipient. 
 Maximum Transitive Depth is the maximum number of intermediaries allowed in a given 
domain. This value is set as a function of the number of entities and the number trust 
relationships in that domain as described in Section 4.4.9. 
 Entity and Intermediary Reliability denotes the average number of transactions before a 
transaction failure occurs in a given domain and category. Invalid endorsements and actions 
by intermediaries can be detected  using the accountability schemes presented in Chapter 5.   
 Trust transfer establishes new direct  trust relationships based on transitive trust.    
 Trust evolution is the change in endorsement trust relationship based on past experience. The 
extent of change varies across domains and categories.  
 
The proposed framework helps to mitigate risks involved in trading with unknown entities by routing 
key data through hierarchical category specific endorsement intermediaries. Intermediaries may 
perform direct endorsements based on direct knowledge of trading entities or indirect endorsements 
where endorsements themselves are endorsed. Both direct and indirect endorsers are selected on the 
basis of existing trust relationships which are maintained by a centralised trust server. Trust 
relationships improve with positive experiences but decline when invalid endorsements or trading 
entity failures are detected. Selection criteria for trusted paths can be expressed in terms of transitive 
depth, cost of endorsements or trust relationships along the path. Path selection for large trust 
networks is made efficient by subdividing them into hierarchical trust domains.  
 Intermediaries in PTEI are classified into direct intermediaries which base their endorsements 
on direct domain knowledge of entities, and indirect intermediaries, which endorse 
endorsements by other trusted intermediaries (such as companies insuring other insurers). 
Indirect intermediaries are organised into multiple levels to facilitate a hierarchical structure 
that reflects the extent of their jurisdiction.  
 Entity level policies reflecting trust disposition determine the trust transfer threshold and the 
duration of distrust with entities breaching trust. Group level policies specify trust evolution 
rate and maximum transitive depth for all entities in the domain. 
 Objective functions with varying weights for different factors allow flexible path selection. 
Inverse values are used for factors to be minimised, such as cost and depth.  
 PTEI trust networks are decomposed into domains on the basis of physical or logical 
boundaries. Separate domain trust sub-trees are created for different objective criteria. The 
root node of each such sub-tree is labelled with all entities that can be reached as well as their 
trust and performance measurements. By clustering entities into hierarchical domains trusted 
path retrieval for large networks can be distributed to individual domains that can work 
independently.  
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4.4 Endorsement-Trust Model and Building Blocks 
The proposed architecture, PTEI, can help promote confidence between unknown e-commerce entities 
by allowing key messages to be sent through category specific endorsement intermediaries. An 
endorsement intermediary may perform direct endorsements based on its knowledge of trading entities 
in its domain or indirect endorsements based on trust placed on other endorsement intermediaries. 
Direct endorsers use information from other services in that domain such as licensing for specific 
category, creditworthiness, legal status etc. Indirect endorsers may be organized into hierarchical 
levels such as provincial, national etc. Therefore the service provided by the endorser may vary based 
on the category, the domain, the hierarchical level and the type of endorsement (direct/indirect). 
Together endorsements provide a form of indemnity for trading entities.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the main components and functionality of the proposed architecture PTEI. The PTEI 
components allow maintenance of trust relationships, policies for various categories and domains, and 
tracking of endorsement processes. Trusted paths through intermediaries are formed on the basis of 
data category, source, recipients and trust parameters. Endorsement costs are reduced by sending data 
to multiple recipients through common intermediaries. Trust criteria specified are maximised subject 
to maximum transitive depth and minimum trust relationship along the path not being violated. These 
criteria are set reflecting the value of data, the category and the endorsement costs. Trust values are 
lowered (or severed) when noncompliance is detected during a transaction based on invalid evidence 
presented or afterwards based on archived evidence. Any intermediary endorsement found to be 
invalid may cause its endorsement capability to be revoked. Trust relationships improve over time 
when transactions are completed successfully. These economic incentive schemes are designed to 
cause growth in trust relationships between reliable trading entities and intermediaries, which in turn 
increases future trading opportunities and incomes. Intermediaries and entities are made accountable 
for their actions using end-to-end cryptographic schemes, presented in Chapter 5. These schemes 
require endorsers to maintain any evidence of information used as the basis for their own 
endorsements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trustUpdate(source, recipient) 
update(domain, category, policy) 
Figure 4.1. PTEI Model Overview 
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PTEI maintains trust capital in a hierarchical category specific trust network. The main functions of 
PTEI can be can be classified based on when they are carried out: 
 
Immediately Before Transaction: 
1. Trusted path through endorsement intermediaries is selected based on trust parameters 
2. Selected path is certified by Trust Server 
For Trust breaches detected during Transactions: 
3. Devalue or sever trust relationships along the trusted path based on domain policies; seek 
alternate paths if necessary. 
For Transactions Successfully Completed: 
4. Update trust values based on domain policies 
Detect Problems (manually) within a Specific Period after Transaction: 
5. If a problem detected after the completion of transaction is attributed to an intermediary 
endorsement failure, trust relationships along the path are devalued or severed. In addition 
endorsement capability may be revoked for a period based on domain policies.  (Refer to Section 
4.4.10.3) 
 
The rest of this section presents the building blocks used in PTEI.  Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 define 
category specific endorsement intermediaries and endorsement-trust relationships. Section 4.4.3 
presents category specific endorsement trust network.  Section 4.4.4 outlines endorsement processes. 
Section 4.4.5 presents entity and domain policies that make the trust network self-regulating. Section 
4.4.6 defines path trust and path endorsement trust. Sections 4.4.7 and 4.4.8 describe trusted path 
representation and selection criteria used in PTEI. Section 4.4.9 expresses maximum transitive depth 
required as a function of trust coupling. Section 4.4.10 describes trust and trust evolution policies.    
4.4.1 Hierarchical Category Specific Endorsement Intermediaries 
Traditional commerce has relied on some form of category specific endorsements for exchanging key 
information. A school admission procedure usually requires a child’s details to be supported by a birth 
certificate (a document endorsed by a birth registrar). When multiple endorsements are required, a 
higher level of endorsement may not be granted until a lower level one is obtained. Police clearance at 
national level may be subject to state level police clearance.  PTEI uses a similar structure by 
supporting category specific intermediaries. Intermediaries are classified according to the category of 
knowledge elements they can endorse. A message may contain knowledge elements belonging to one 
or more categories, labelled C0, C1 … Cn. Those in category C0 need no endorsements, and can either 
be sent directly between trading entities or sent together with knowledge elements of any other 
category.   
 
PTEI intermediaries can act as direct endorsers, indirect endorsers or both; direct ones endorse trading 
entities despatching and receiving messages, while indirect ones endorse other intermediaries. Direct 
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endorsers must have the necessary domain knowledge to perform the required endorsements. For 
example, any credit agency directly endorsing a loan request from a customer must have the authority 
and the means to access the credit histories of all customers in the domain. If the same credit agency 
were to endorse the loan request to the recipient bank as well, it also would have to possess the 
authority and the means to access the credentials of all banks. When no common intermediary exists, a 
path through indirect endorsement intermediaries must be found.  
 
E-commerce trading between unknown entities from different domains poses many challenges. For 
example, regulations affecting any form of trading in restricted items such as arms and endangered 
animals may be imposed at many levels, including provincial, national and global. Sanctions at global 
level may override trade treaties at national or state level. In the proposed framework, authorised 
endorsement intermediaries are organized into hierarchical levels to enforce such regulations. At the 
lowest level, direct endorsers verify that such trading can be carried out by the trading entities based 
on access to various records in those domains. Indirect endorsements are performed, subject to 
meeting endorsements at other levels and meeting any regulations specific to that level in that 
category. PTEI selects such intermediaries on the basis of the level at which they are authorized to 
endorse and their existing trust relationships with other intermediaries. Such a hierarchical 
organization however depends on developing schemes that make them accountable for their actions.    
4.4.2 Endorsement-Trust Relationships 
Traditional commerce relied on agents and brokers to promote trust between unknown entities. Web 
based commerce has now replaced such human intermediaries and their associated costs by using 
specialised intermediaries such as Ebay, which maintain trust relationships based on past trading 
experience. In PTEI, an endorsement-trust relationship reflects an endorser’s confidence based on past 
positive experience, thus serving as a predictor of future success. Endorsement trust relationships have 
three categories, depending on the types of end nodes as shown in Figure 4.2. The endorsement trust 
relationship directed from a trading entity to an endorsement intermediary reflects the endorser’s 
confidence that the trading entity is valid for the specific data category. For example, if a “supply 
drugs” message from entity A is to be endorsed by a medical agent, the agent must believe that entity 
A is a valid originator for that category based on past experience. An endorsement trust relationship 
directed from an intermediary to a trading entity reflects the intermediary’s confidence in the trading 
entity being valid for the specific data category. The relationship directed between two endorsers 
reflects the mutual confidence of one endorser on the other.  
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Endorsement-trust relationships are directed, category specific and are assumed to grow gradually 
using non-binary values. When a trust relationship is first established it starts with the initial value of 
TRMIN, and grows through trust evolution and trust transfer (Section 4.4.10) up to a maximum value 
of TRMAX. Trust relationships are allowed to grow at different rates for different categories and 
domains.  If two entities are not known to each other, or any prior relationship has been terminated 
because of trust breach, the value for the trust relationship is set to 0.  The trust relationship with any 
trading entity (originator or recipient) may be terminated by direct endorsers performing a category 
specific search in the domain (such as a bankruptcy register). The trust relationship with an 
endorsement intermediary may be terminated at a later time, if direct endorsements are found to be 
invalid or when an indirect endorsement has been performed without any valid basis (without evidence 
of prior valid endorsement).  The accountability schemes presented in Section 5.6 include explicit 
cryptographic evidences to detect and prove trust violation by endorsement intermediaries.  
DEFINITION 4.1 ENDORSEMENT TRUST RELATIONSHIP 
Let   EI be the set of all Endorsement Intermediaries, TE be the set of all trading entities, 
C be the set of all Categories and TRMAX be a predefined scalar representing the maximum 
trust value 
Then the Endorsement Trust Relationship TR  is defined as follows: 
 When the sender is a trading entitiy and the recipient is an endorsement intermediary, TR  
represents the initial trust relationship as in : TR: TE  EI  C  [0 – TRMAX] 
 When both the sender and the recipient are both endorsement intermediaries, TR  represents 
the intermediary trust relationship as in : TR: EI  EI  C  [0 – TRMAX] 
 When the sender is an endorsement intermediary and the recipient is a trading entitiy, TR  
represents the final trust relationship as in :  TR: EI  TE  C  [0 – TRMAX] 
Note, no direct trust relationship exists betweeen trading entities (TE  TE  C). 
Figure 4.2  Types of Endorsement Relationships 
TR3 
TR2 
TR1 
TE EI
EI TE
EI EI
Initial Relationship 
Final Relationship 
Intermediate Relationship 
 Endorsement Intermediaries: EI1, EI2     
 Trading Entities: TE1 (Message Originator), TE2 (Message Recipient)  
 Trust relationships: TR1, TR2,TR3 
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Trust coupling (TC) is the average number of trust relationships (TR) that exist in a given domain, that 
is, the total number of trust relationships divided by the number of entities in that domain. Trust 
coupling is considered low if it is less than or equal to two.  
 
DEFINITION 4.2 TRUST COUPLING 
n
TRi
TC
n
i
)(#
1
 
where #(TRi) is the number of trust relationships in the i
th
 entity and n is the domain size.  
 
4.4.3 Hierarchical Category Specific Intermediary Network 
PTEI maintains a category specific intermediary network using a multigraph, which allows multiple 
edges between entities. Each entity in the network represents either a trading entity or an endorsement 
intermediary. This section outlines some of the design considerations of the PTEI model and some 
features of the underlying network before presenting a more formal model of the network. 
 
Design Considerations Trust Network features 
An endorser should be allowed to endorse one or more 
categories from the set C \ {C0}  where C0 is the 
category that requires no endorsement 
Multiple endorsement capability allowed. Separate 
edges used for representing trust relationships for 
different categories. 
Trust relationship along the data path should exceed 
the minimum trust relationship specified for that data 
category. 
Edges representing category specific trust relationships 
store the existing level of trust. 
All categories other than C0 must be exchanged 
through category specific endorsement intermediaries 
No direct links (edges) exist between trading entities 
for categories other than C0. Links for C0 are not 
maintained explicitly.  
Trading entities should be allowed to despatch data 
elements belonging to different categories grouped 
together, allowing intermediaries to verify they meet 
the necessary condition for endorsement.  
Data elements can be sent together between trading 
entities subject to intermediaries having combined 
endorsement capabilities and edges for combined 
categories.  
Hierarchical structure may or may not be imposed. If imposed, inherent constraints will prevent direct 
links being formed between entities at incompatible 
levels (say level 2 and 4) 
 
 
Endorsement capability of an intermediary (ECAP) is the nonempty set consisting of all categories 
other than C0 it is authorised to endorse. 
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DEFINITION 4.3 ENDORSEMENT CAPABILITY (ECAP) 
Endorsement capability of an intermediary ECAP is a non-empty subset of {C1,C2…CN} where 
C1,C2…CN  are the categories that require endorsements.   
 
Note ECAP cannot be empty and does not include C0, the category that requires no endorsement. 
 
DEFINITION 4.4 TRUST NETWORK (TN) 
Let  EN  be the set of all entities and 
ED be the set of all edges representing category specific trust relationships, 
then Trust Network  TN(EN,ED) is a directed weighted multigraph over EN and ED. 
- EN is either a trading entity TE, or an endorsement intermediary EI.  
-  TE is a tuple over <D,TEL> where D is the set of domains and TEL is the set of labels for 
trading entities.  
- EI is a tuple over <D,EIL, ECAP> where where D is the set of domains, EIL is the set of 
labels endorsement intermediaries and ECAP is the endorsement capability.  
- Each edge e in ED is labelled with category specific trust label of the <Ci,v> where Ci  
C\{C0} and v   [TRMIN,TRMAX], the extent of trust relationship. 
 
 
An Example using the Trust Network Multigraph 
Figure 4.3 shows a network made up of eight intermediaries, I1 to I8, and six trading entities, A to F 
from four different hierarchical domains. Each edge in the network represents the extent of a trust 
relationship for a specific category using two separate labels, one for category and one for the extent 
of trust relationship. All data exchanged between trading entities other than that of category C0 are 
assumed to require endorsements by intermediaries. Each intermediary node is labelled with its 
endorsement capability. In Figure 4.3 the intermediary I1 ({C1,C2,C3,C4}) has greater endorsement 
capability than I2 ({C1,C2,C3}). Data can be sent endorsed between two trading entities along a specific 
path only if intermediaries exist with endorsement capabilities exceeding (or equalling) the data 
category and data category specific edges between them with the required trust level. For example, 
data of category {C1} can be sent from B in domain D1 to D in domain D3 via B  I1  I2  I4  I8  
D  provided the trust requirement for data does not exceed 2, the lowest category specific (C1) trust 
relationship along that path. Note any other data element of type {C0} (which may provide the 
necessary context for data) can be sent together along the same path as they require no endorsements.   
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The entity A from domain D1 sending a message containing {C4} to E in domain D4 may either send it 
through I1 I3 I5 I6 or through intermediaries I3 I5 I6. The first route provides a better minimum 
trust relationship along the path (4) while the second route provides a better transitive depth (3). In 
general, the intermediary paths reflect the selection criteria used, such as transitive depth and 
maximum path trust, which is described in detail in the next section. 
4.4.4 Endorsement Processes 
Endorsement processes are services used by endorsement intermediaries. The process carried out by 
any specific intermediary can be uniquely determined based on the category and the type of 
endorsement (initial, final or intermediary).  
DEFINITION 4.5 ENDORSEMENT PROCESS (EP) 
An Endorsement Process EP = <EIL,C,ET,F> is a tuple over the set of all endorsement intermediary 
labels EIL, set of all categories C, endorsement types ET = {Initial,Final,Indirect}  and the set of 
endorsement function F which carries out the endorsements. The endorsement functions specify exact 
output based on domain and category based rules, data and previous endorsement if any.   
These functions are used as part of the security schemes presented in Chapter 5. Implementation 
details of intermediary endorsement functions are left open as they are category and domain 
dependent. For example, a notary in Myanmar may carry out different actions from an auditor in 
Canada. 
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Figure 4.3  Network Showing Endorsement Paths and Category Specific Trust Relationships 
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4.4.5 Entity and Domain Trust Policies 
PTEI policies are designed to promote trust based on both past direct experience [139,160] and 
indirect experience based on recommendations of trusted parties [40, 61, 128, 133]. Trust disposition 
and trusting beliefs are modelled using entity and domain policies respectively. Entity trust policies 
determine when new relationships can be formed reflecting the trust disposition of individual entity. 
Domain trust policies specify the rate at which trust relationships grow for positive conduct and 
decline for proven trust breaches. Domain policies also specify the maximum transitive depth allowed 
in terms of the number of entities. These rates aggregate trusting beliefs of entities in the domain. Both 
policies specify different rates for different categories reflecting their level of risks and rewards.  
 
Entity Trust Policy specifies trust disposition for each category an entity is allowed to endorse in terms 
of trust transfer threshold. Trust transfer threshold (TTT) is the minimum reputation necessary for 
forming new trust relationships.  
DEFINITION 4.6 ENTITY TRUST POLICY (ETP) 
Let   EN be the set of all entities,  
   C be the set of all categories and  
   TTT a natural number representing the trust transfer threshold. 
Then Entity Trust Policy ETP = <EN,C,TTT >  specifies category C specific trust disposition for each 
entity EN in terms of trusts transfer threshold TTT.  
 
Domain trust policy specifies the rate at which trust relationships grow or decline for positive or 
negative conduct, the maximum number of intermediaries allowed and the period for which any entity 
or intermediary trust relationships is severed for trust breach or endorsement failure. Distinct values 
are maintained for different categories as PTEI network maintains category specific trust relationships.   
DEFINITION 4.7 DOMAIN TRUST POLICY  (DTP) 
Let  DL be the set of all domain labels,   
 C be the set of categories,  
 TER  [0,1] representing trust evolution rate,  
 TDR  [0,1] representing trust degradation rate,  
 MTD a natural number representing the maximum number of intermediaries allowed, 
 TSP: N  trust severance period. 
The domain trust policy DTP = <DL,C, TER,TDR, MTD,TSP>  specifies category C specific trust 
values for domain DL including TER the rate at which trust relationships grow for valid behaviour, 
TDR the rate at which trust relationships degrade for poor conduct, MTD the maximum number of 
intermediaries in the domain and TSP the period for which trust relationships may be severed. 
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4.4.6 Path Trust (PT) and Path Endorsement Trust (PET) 
Trust relationships in transitive networks are commonly modelled using the product of all trust 
relationships (in the range [0,1]) along the message path [129, 139]. Such a model reflects the intuition 
that transitive trust diminishes significantly with each additional intermediary. Path endorsement trust 
proposed degrades at a much lower rate as any trust violation by authorised intermediaries leads to 
much greater penalties; loss of endorsement capability as well as trust capital.  
Path Trust (PT) for data d sent through a given path T is the lowest trust relationship along the path 
for any of the knowledge categories of its base elements.  
DEFINITION 4.8 PATH TRUST 
Let  d be the data with data elements {dj .. dm} and 
 T = <E0,E1,E2…En> be the trusted path from origin E0 to recipient En. 
Then the Path Trust for data d sent from origin E0 to En is: 
 PT(d,En,T) = 
mj
j
n
i
MinMin
1
1
0
 TR(KEC(dj),Ei,Ei+1) 
Example: 
Table 4.1 shows an example of existing trust relationships between entities A, B and intermediaries I1, 
I2 and I3 for knowledge category {C1}. Figure 4.4 shows two different trusted paths from A to B for 
data d with category {C1}. The path trusts for A I1 I2 B and A I3 B are 4 and 2 respectively 
based on the trust relationships along the paths shown. The first path chosen will reflect whether path 
trust or transitive depth is used as the criteria (Terminology in Section 4.3). 
 
 
       
 
Though path trust gives a measure of indirect trust between two entities, it does not model the trust 
attenuation likely to happen with each additional intermediary. Furthermore, it does not give an 
intuitive measure of indirect trust, as it can range from 0 to TRMAX (a variable). Therefore, Path 
Endorsement Trust (PET) is defined to give an estimate of indemnity provided by the trusted 
endorsement intermediaries that lies in the range 0 to 1.    
  
Entities Extent of Trust relationship 
A I1 C1:4 
I1 I2 C1:5 
I2 B C1:4 
A I3 C1:2 
I3 B C1:4 
C1:5 
C1:2 C1:4 
A 
I1 I3 
C1:4 
C1:4 
Figure 4.4 Trusted Paths using Different Criteria 
 
I2 
B 
Table 4.1 Extent of Trust Relationship (Category C1) 
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DEFINITION 4.9 PATH ENDORSEMENT TRUST 
Let  PT be the Path Trust for data d sent to En along the path T, 
 TD(T) be the transitive depth  of path T 
 MTD be the maximum transitive depth for the domain 
 TRMAX be the maximum trust relationship 
Then Path Endorsement Trust  PET (d,En,T) = )
)1(
1(
 )(
MTD
TD(T)
TR
,Td,EPT
MAX
n
 gives a measure of 
indemnity provided by the path T for data d sent to En, that lies in the range [0,1].  
4.4.7 Trusted Path Selection Criteria 
The trusted paths for various criteria are represented in the form of a spanning tree with originator as 
root and all the recipients as leaves. The selection criterion is designed to meet category specific trust 
requirements without incurring excessive costs. Trust requirements may be specified in terms of 
maximum path trust, minimum transitive depth, minimum intermediary costs or their combination. 
When attempting to optimise one variable (such as path trust), limits may be specified for other  
variables (such as transitive depth or path trust). Figure 4.5 shows two trusted paths created for C4 
category data from A using the network shown in Figure 4.3. The one on the left uses minimum 
transitive depth as the criterion with the minimum path trust (MPT)set to 2, while the one on the right 
uses the criterion maximum path trust with maximum transitive depth (MTD) restricted to 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
                         
 
    Figure 4.5 Trusted Path between Entity A and all others for the Network in Figure 4.3  
     Left: Path with Minimum Transitive Depth   Right: Path with maximum Path Trust 
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4.4.8 Objective Criteria for Selecting Trusted Path 
Security and trust based mechanisms are needed in various e-commerce domains, including wireless 
networks and web services. Overcoming constraints specific to a domain requires different trade-offs. 
PTEI objective criteria for path selection allows weights for maximum path trust, minimum 
intermediary-cost and minimum-transitive depth to be varied, as shown in Table 4.2. The first criterion 
aims for short paths with high trust relationships by combining high path trust value with low 
transitive-depth in equal weights results. Such a criterion is suitable when intermediary costs are 
negligible compared to the value of data transferred. The second criterion rates transitive depth as the 
prime factor, followed by cost and path trust, applicable when response time is critical and risks of 
trust breach are low. The last criterion rates all three factors equally, which is applicable when risks of 
trust breach and intermediary costs are high and response time is critical. These weights are combined 
to form the objective search function for trusted path generation. 
 
Quality of Service 
Factor                        
Path Trust (PT) 
weight 
Transitive Depth (TD)  
 Weight 
Intermediary  Cost (IC)  
Weight 
Criteria 1 1 1  
Criteria 2 1 3 2 
Criteria 3 1 1 1 
  
 
For example, in the network shown in Figure 4.3, assume that A must send a category 4 (C4) message 
to E. If PT or PT/TD is the criterion then intermediary path I1 I3 I5 I6 will be chosen, where PT is 
the path trust and TD is the transitive depth measuring the number of intermediaries. If the criteria is 
1/TD or PT/TD
2
 then the path I3 I5 I6 will be chosen instead.   
 
DEFINITION 4.10 OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR PATH SELECTION 
 Objective Critera  fCrit = 
kj
i
ICTD
PT
.
  speifies criteria for selecting the nodes along the  trusted path 
using weights i,j,k : N  for path trust PT, transitive depth TD and intermediary costs IC. 
 
Each node along a trusted path is linked to the previous node which provides the highest objective 
criteria for that node.  Note fCrit uses inverse values of TD and IC to minimise the number and overall 
costs of intermediaries. The actual objective criteria specified must also consider the underlying trust 
coupling (Terminology in Section 4.3), the type of intermediaries, security concerns and cost 
constraints.  
 
Table 4.2  Specifying Objective Criteria for Path Selection 
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4.4.9 Setting Maximum Transitive-Depth 
PTEI sets the maximum transitive depth (MTD) for a domain reflecting trust coupling (refer to 
Definition 4.2), and the number of entities in the domain. Intuitively, the higher the trust coupling in a 
domain the lower the number of intermediaries required. For example, if there are 100 entities, with 
each entity having a relationship with 10 others on average, each entity may only require 2 
intermediaries on average, as 10
2
 = 100. It is evident that the number of entities that can be reached 
transitively grows exponentially, suggesting MTD should be of O(logTC N). 
4.4.10 Trust Transfer and Trust Evolution 
The institutional framework alone cannot dispel the perception of risk in traditional commerce. For 
example, Alice, with low trust disposition for dental work, may need many recommendations before 
she visits the dentist who has recently moved to her neighbourhood, even though he is highly qualified 
(endorsed by certified authorities). However, once the initial trust is established, the extent of trust 
relationship is likely to grow with positive experiences (treatments). Thus, individual experiences and 
recommendations, too, have played a major role in shaping trust in traditional commerce. If such trust 
relationships are to be dynamic, the underlying mechanisms must allow trust networks to be self-
regulated. PTEI uses trust evolution and trust transfer mechanisms described below. 
 
4.4.10.1 Network Initialisation 
The initialisation of a trust network requires each entity to specify the extent to which it trusts another 
for a specific knowledge category. When two intermediaries or an intermediary and a trading entity 
express the desire for complementary roles between them for a specific category (one as a sender and 
the other as receiver) with trust values ranging from TRMIN to TRMAX, a directed edge from sender to 
receiver is added to the network. The trust relationship value for this edge is set to the lower of the two 
trust values specified by sender and receiver. 
 
4.4.10.2 Trust Transfer Policies 
Trust transfer policies in PTEI allow new trust relationships to be established based on the trust 
disposition of individual entities and intermediaries. Reputation is the sum of products of existing 
endorsement trust relationships with common neighbours. A’s reputation in B for being a trustworthy 
sender (refer to Figure 4.6) is computed the same way as B‘s reputation in A for being a trustworthy 
recipient. 
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DEFINITION 4.11 REPUTATION  
Let  E1, E2, …En are common intermediaries shared by entities EA and EB. 
TR(X,Y) be the endorsement trust relationship between X and Y.  
)()(),(
1 Bi
n
i iA
BA EETREETREEReputationthen
 
),( BA EEReputation represents EA’s reputation in EB for being a trustworthy sender and EB‘s 
reputation in EA for being a trustworthy recipient 
 
Note that reputation in this model is a directed relationship, that is, reputation for  A to a sender and B 
to be a receiver is different from B to be a sender and A to be a receiver.  By using the product of trust 
relationships for computing reputation, trust transfer policies weigh the extent of trust relationships 
higher than the number of trust relationships.  
 
Example: 
A directed edge is added to the network when the computed reputation between two entities exceeds 
the trust transfer thresholds for both entities. For the network shown in Figure 4.6, a new direct trust 
relationship for category Ci can be formed between sender A and receiver B if the required trust 
transfer thresholds (which reflect their trust disposition) for both A and B are less than 9  (3 1 + 1  2 
+ 2  2). This formula is similar to the global reputation scores used in P2P communities [54].  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
Though entities with high trust disposition (hence low trust transfer threshold) may form a greater 
number of links, they also run the risk of severe damage to existing trust relationships by being 
associated with unreliable intermediaries. Unreliable intermediaries are those with high likelihood of 
trust breaches and invalid endorsements. Therefore the optimal trust transfer threshold for any domain 
must be determined experimentally reflecting the trust degradation rate TDR, the trust severance 
period TSP and the average reliability of entities in the domain. 
 
4.4.10.3 Trust Evolution Policies 
Trust Evolution policies in PTEI determine how success or failure of transactions impacts trust 
relationships. Successful transactions cause growth in trust relationships based on the value for domain 
Ci:2 
Ci:2 
Ci:1 
Ci:2 
Ci:1 
Ci:3 
A B 
C 
D 
E 
Figure 4.6 Trust Network where Reputation between Sender A and Receiver B is 9. 
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TER. Some recent models have proposed context factors such as the transaction value should be 
included when modelling trust. Trust growth in PTEI can also be made a function of transaction value 
to prevent malicious entities building up trust using low valued transactions [160]. Trust relationships 
decline sharply when trust assumptions are breached based on domain TDP. The extent of decline 
reflects the distance (in hops) from the point of breach. Figure 4.7 shows the impact of trust breach by 
node E on trust relationships along the path, assuming the trust degradation rate (TDR) is 0.5. All trust 
relationships with entity breaching trust are severed for the period TSP (trust severance period) 
specified by domain policies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
4.5 Internal Representation and Algorithms  
If e-commerce trusted paths are to be computed at runtime, trusted path generation and retrieval 
algorithms must be scalable. The search criteria used must be made flexible if trade-offs between path 
trust and costs are to be achieved for different environments and values of messages. Section 4.5.1 
presents techniques devised to meet overall design goals. Section 4.5.2 presents the internal 
representation of various components, while Section 4.5.3 outlines the main algorithms devised. 
4.5.1 Design Techniques to Address PTEI Implementation Goals 
PTEI implementation goals relate to flexibility in specifying trust requirements, low response-time, 
acceptable performance for large networks and modelling trust. 
 Faster response-time for transactions relies on efficient trusted path creation/retrieval 
mechanisms. Domain trusted paths for various combinations of attributes are pre-created and 
updated regularly in PTEI as trust relationships are constantly evolving. The underlying PTEI 
algorithms are made efficient by using a form of spanning tree, which allows trusted paths to be 
maintained for all recipients.   
 Flexible objective criteria (fCrit) for path selection to allow the right trade-offs for different 
environments.  
A 
D 
C 
E 
G H 
F 
I 
J K 
E Entity breaching trust 
Severed trust relationships  
Trust relationship 0.5 x original 
Trust relationship 0.25 x original 
Figure 4.7 Trust Degradation along the Trusted Path from E’s Trust Breach 
Domain TDR = 0.5  
 
B 
 Unaffected parts (No change) 
 
140 
 The growth in the size of a network can adversely affect the update and search time for trusted 
paths. PTEI reduces search time by subdividing large networks into hierarchically organised 
domains. Each such domain contains a number of pre-created sub-trees to allow efficient trusted 
path retrieval. Sub-trees are created for various combinations of message origin, category and 
maximum transitive depth.  
 PTEI self-regulates the trust network through trust evolution and transfer policies. These policies 
aim to cause growth in the number and extent of trust relationships for reliable intermediaries, 
and reduction in trust relationships with unreliable intermediaries.  
4.5.2 Internal Representation using Domain Trees and Sub-trees 
Trading entities and intermediaries are divided into hierarchical domains allowing easy access to 
trusted paths. The domain tree is divided into sub-trees for each source node in that domain, which in 
turn are subdivided repeatedly for each data category, objective criterion and maximum transitive-
depth (MTD), as shown if Figure 4.8. The final (terminal) sub-tree is a spanning tree that optimises the 
trusted path from the specified source to all other domain destinations, using the criterion specified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.2.1 Worst Case Memory Requirement Analysis 
The worst case domain memory requirement (DMReq) for each domain can be computed on the basis 
of domain-size in bytes (DS), maximum number of data categories (DCmax), number of different 
objective criteria (OCmax) and size of tree node NS as MReq = DS × DS × DCmax × OCmax × NS 
×MaxMTD. Note domain-size (DS) is used twice as it determines the number of root nodes and the 
maximum number of nodes in the tree. Also each domain may allow trusted paths to be generated 
varying MTD from 1 to MaxMTD. The actual memory requirements are much smaller as only entities 
with the required endorsement capabilities can be part of a sub-tree making the number of nodes much 
less than the domain size. Thus for a domain size of 200 entities, 5 different objective criteria, 10 data 
categories, 5 different values for MTD and node size of 200 bytes the worst case memory requirement 
is only 2GB allowing the entire data structure to be stored in memory. Moreover, the availability of 
inexpensive large scale memory makes the cost of memory less critical than response time, in the 
design of trust servers.   
Root of domain trust tree for domain X 
Figure 4.8 Organisation of Domain Trust Tree 
Root of sub-tree for each data category 
Root of sub-tree for each entity (origin) 
Root of sub-tree for each objective criteria  
Root of sub-tree for each MTD  
domainX 
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4.5.2.2 Minimising Search and Retrieval Times 
This section presents the data structure devised to minimise the trusted path search and retrieval times, 
using an example. Figure 4.9 shows the sub-tree that maximizes path trust for a category {C4} message 
from A, for the trust network shown in Figure 4.3. The trusted path from A to entities B, E and F uses 
intermediaries I1, I3, I5, I6 and I7. The root of this sub-tree contains a label for all reachable entities 
together with corresponding path trust and transitive depth. All intermediate nodes (intermediaries) are 
also labelled with entities that can be reached, to reduce retrieval time. For example, the set {E,F} is 
set as dests for intermediary I3 as it lies along the path from A to E and F.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
4.5.3 PTEI Algorithms, Policies and Schemes 
This section presents the main algorithms used in PTEI. Section 4.5.3.1 describes the features of these 
algorithms. Section 4.5.3.2 presents the algorithms used for creating domain sub-trees. DSTGen used 
for generating the domain sub-tree is a variation of Prim’s spanning tree algorithm that can be 
executed in linear time [140].  Section 4.5.3.3 presents the algorithm for retrieving the trusted path for 
a message from a given source to a specific set of entities efficiently. Section 4.5.3.4 presents the 
schemes used for retrieving trusted paths in large networks efficiently using a hierarchical structure of 
domains. All these experiments were carried out using a 2.5 GHz laptop with 4GB RAM running 
Windows XP operating systems. 
4.5.3.1 Features of PTEI Algorithm 
PTEI features are designed to make the algorithms scalable and provide quick response times. These 
features are briefly described here. 
 No data is passed through an intermediary more than once, allowing an upper limit for the 
number of possible edges in a domain trust tree in terms of number of entities, data categories 
and objective criteria for path selection.    
                      A 
B:4:1  E:2:4    F:3:4 
Figure 4.9    Root of Sub-Tree Labelled with Trustworthiness and Transitive Depth for Each Entity 
        Origin: A   Data category: C4   MTD:4  Objective Criteria: Maximum Path Trust 
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 Limiting the maximum number of intermediaries makes the algorithm scalable.  Any search is 
abandoned if a trusted path cannot be found within MTD number of intermediaries. 
 Different sub-trees are created and stored for different trust/performance criteria. The root of 
each such sub-tree contains all the entities that can be reached, allowing efficient search for 
trusted paths based on trust/performance criteria and required destinations.     
 The algorithm retrieves trusted paths from existing domain trust trees in linear time, if one 
exists.  
4.5.3.2 Algorithm for Generating and Storing Domain Sub-Tree 
DSTGen computes the optimal spanning tree from a source to all other entities in the domain using the 
objective criteria specified for the data category. Only intermediaries with the required endorsement 
capability are added to the spanning tree. The number of intermediaries along the spanning tree is 
limited by the maximum transitive depth (MTD) specified. DSTStore stores the domain sub-trees 
generated by DSTGen.  These algorithms are implemented in Java using around 600 lines of code.  
 
DSTGen takes as arguments dc the data category, O the data origin, trels the 2-dimensional array 
storing all the trust relationships in the network, fCrit the objective function for trusted path selection 
and the maximum transitive depth allowed MTD. The class node used for storing entities lying along 
the trusted path, has attributes fCrit, current depth and a reference to its parent node. The algorithm 
creates the spanning tree pTree rooted in O using the trust relationships stored in trels. The set unused 
stores all nodes representing entities currently not lying along the trusted path. If trels contains a link 
between the current pTree node and an unused node with endorsement capability dc, the unused node 
is added to pTree. If trels has a link that improves fCrit for a given node, the sub-tree rooted in that 
node is rotated, provided the number of intermediaries does not exceed MTD. Note the algorithm 
allows at most one node per entity. 
DSTGen(dc, O, trels, fCrit, MTD) 
1. set root pTree  O 
2. set unused  entities \ {O} 
3. if trels has an element that links a pTree node e1 with less than MTD intermediaries to an 
unused node e2 with endorsement capability d, add e2 as a child node of e1 and remove e2 
from unused 
4. otherwise, if trels has an element that links a pTree node e1 to another pTree node e2 and the  
path through e1 entity improves  fCrit for e2 entity but without causing the number of pTree 
intermediaries to exceed MTD, move the sub-tree rooted in e2 as a child element of the node 
for e1. Update fCrit and depth for all elements in that sub-tree  
5. repeat steps 3 and 4 until no links can be found from an entity in pTree to any other unused 
entity or between entities in pTree that provides improved value for a specified criterion 
6. return  pTree  after updating all nodes for destinations reached through them 
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DSTStore stores the domain sub-trees for various combinations of data origin, category, MTD and 
fCrit in a hash using the DSTGen algorithm presented above. Data category can be any subset of the 
set of categories C and can originate from any of the entities in EN, the set of all domain entities. It is 
also assumed that MTD can be allowed to vary up to MaxMTD with fCrit selected from the set of all 
objective functions fCritSet. The current set of trust relationships in the network is stored in the array 
trels. 
 
DSTStore(trels,C,fCritSet,E,MaxMTD) 
   for each dc  C 
      for each  fCrit  fCritSet 
          for each O  E 
              for MTD = 1 to MaxMTD  
                 subtree(dc,O,fCrit,MTD)   DSTGen(dc, O, trels, fCrit, MTD) 
 
4.5.3.3 Algorithm for Trusted Path Retrieval 
The algorithm TrustPathRetriever retrieves a domain sub-tree using data origin, data category, 
objective function for trusted path selection and the lowest transitive trust depth possible. The function 
GetTrustPathTree creates the trusted path to all the recipient (destination) nodes in the form of a 
spanning tree.  These algorithms were implemented in Java using around 350 lines of code. 
 
The algorithm TrustPathRetriever takes as arguments the data category dc, the origin O, the objective 
function fCrit destinations dests and the maximum transitive depth (MAXMTD) allowed. It returns the 
sub-tree with the lowest MTD that meets the requirements by varying MTD from 1 to MAXMTD. If no 
such subtree can be found it returns null. Otherwise it returns the trusted path generated using the 
SetTrustPath function.  
 
TrustPathRetriever(dc,O,fCrit,dests,MAXMTD) 
for MTD from 1 to MAXMTD 
     st   subtree( dc, O, fCrit, MTD)        // domain trust tree with required parameters   
     if ( dests  st.dests )    // trusted path contains all required destinations 
          tp   getTrustPathTree(st.root, tp.root, dests); // forms the nodes 
         return tp;     // return trusted path 
     else  
         return null;        // no domain sub-tree with required destinations) 
 
GetTrustPathTree  is a recursive function that takes as argument domain sub-tree or one of its 
branches named dsTree and the required data destinations dests. Each node of dsTree contains a label 
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named dests specifying all destinations that can be reached through that node. GetTrustPathTree 
returns the spanning tree formed combining all branches leading to any of the required destinations.  
GetTrustPathTree(dsTree,  dests) 
        tp =              // initialize trusted path sub-tree  
        set tp.root   dests.root  
       for each branch  dests    
          if (branch.root.next  dests  )         // if this branch leads to one of the destinations 
              tp.add(GetTrustPathTree(branch,dests))  // add that sub-tree 
       return tp; 
       
4.5.3.4 Efficient Trusted Path Retrieval Using Hierarchical Domains 
The first part of this section presents the details of hierarchical domains used to retrieve trusted paths 
for large networks. The techniques for two-level hierarchies are presented first as shown in Figure 
4.10, before extending them to multiple hierarchies. The key design features and the rationale are 
outlined below.  
 When the number of entities in a trust network grows hierarchical domains can be formed to 
reduce the memory requirements and the path generation time. Memory requirements for 
maintaining trust relationships can grow at polynomial rate as n entities can have n
2
 number of 
trust relationships. Path generation time can be reduced significantly as the search path 
requires less traversing.  
 With hierarchical domains maximum transitive depth can be used to restrict the trading 
domain. When it is low only locally matching entities can be found while higher levels can be 
used to expand the trading domain.  
 Hierarchical domains many require subdividing a global problem into multiple domain based 
problems. However, the sum of locally optimal solutions may not produce the globally 
optimal solution. The domain size therefore must be set reflecting the need for globally 
optimal solutions and the memory capacity of servers. With decreasing cost of memory and 
fast processers the domain sizes can be increased far beyond the domain size used in this 
thesis.  
 Entity identifiers are made unique by combining domain and entity names. In Figure 4.9 the 
high-level domain is labelled HI. Each low-level domain consists of at least one shared entity 
(part of both low and high level domains) with the capacity to endorse all entities in the low 
level domain, thus forming a hierarchical endorsement structure. Such shared entities have 
multiple identifiers such as HI-M/1-W. The hierarchical structure can be extended to any 
number of levels. 
 The task of sending a message to n entities from different domains can be subdivided into 
multiple intra-domain sub-tasks. For example, in Figure 4.10 entity 3-D sending a message to 
destinations {3-C, 1-Y, 2-E, 2-F} can be subdivided into the following intra-domain sub-tasks: 
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{3-D} sending a message to {3-C, HI-N/3-A}, {HI-N/3-A } sending a message to {HI-M/1-W} 
and {HI-O/2-H}, {HI-M/1-W} sending a message to {1-Y} and {HI-O/2-H} sending a 
message to {2-E, 2-F}. 
 
{3-D} sending a message to {3-B, 3-A} , {HI-N} sending a message to {HI-M} and {HI-O} , 
{HI-M} sending a message to {1-Y},  {HI-O} sending a message to {2-E, 2-F} 
aa 
a 
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity Analysis of Path Retrieval  
This section briefly analyses the complexity of the multi-domain search algorithm. Assume the 
number of entities in the network is n, and the predefined domain size is s, and the average transitive 
depth for the domain is td. Assuming the whole trust network of entities is organised into a balanced 
tree of domains, the number of hierarchical levels (l) is logsn.   For any message sent to d destinations: 
the maximum number of steps occurs when every recipient is found in a different domain at the lowest 
level (which involves searching all the way to the top and then back). Hence, the maximum number of 
steps is 2dl, which grow linearly with d. Hence using such a clustering mechanism the algorithm can 
be made scalable. Furthermore, the clustering mechanism allows the global search problem to be 
subdivided into tasks that can be handled concurrently by different trust servers.  
Domain HI 
Domain 3 Domain 1 
Domain 2 
2-E 
2-G 
2-F 
HI-O/2-H 
HI-N/3-A 
1-X 
HI-J 
1-Y 
HI-K 
Figure 4.10 Hierarchical Clustering of Domains 
3-B 
3-D 
3-C 
HI-M/1-W 
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4.6 Experimental Results & Comparison with Other Work 
This section is designed to verify a number of hypotheses relevant to the design of PTEI framework. 
By considering the factors that cause trust growth or decline, the centralized trust network in PTEI 
allows trusted paths to be generated much faster than distributed networks where each node maintains 
its own trust relationships. This section attempts to verify the effectiveness of PTEI trust policies in 
modelling factors that are known to influence trust, such as experiential trust and trust disposition 
[39,41]. All trusted paths in PTEI are depth limited, though the underlying selection criteria can be 
made to vary combining the extent of trust relationships, transitive depth and endorsement costs. The 
impact of these criteria in networks with different trust couplings are compared in this section. This 
section also verifies the effectiveness of the underlying architecture and path finding techniques for 
large networks. The table below gives the rationale and the hypotheses to be tested. All of these 
hypotheses are tested using a simulation approach using randomly generated trust network. 
 
Rationale Hypotheses to be Tested 
Trust disposition is known to be a major factor 
that causes growth in trust relationships.  In 
Traditional commerce, traders with high trust 
disposition and are willing to take greater risks 
may benefit up to a point. Business confidence 
may decline if traders take too high a risk.  
If trust transfer threshold modelling trust disposition 
is valid, a similar relationship (in the shape of an 
inverted parabola) must exist between trust transfer 
threshold and trust spread (which models trust 
capital). Note low trust transfer threshold 
corresponds to high trust disposition, and vice-versa. 
In traditional commerce positive customer 
experiences and the resulting trust capital 
plays a major role in business growth. 
If experiential trust is modelled correctly a linear 
relationship must exist between node reliability or 
trustworthiness and trust spread. 
A number of factors can affect the elapsed 
time for path generation. PTEI domain sizes 
should be set to allow path generation at 
runtime.   
Elapsed time should vary significantly with the level 
of coupling and grow at a polynomial rate for the 
highest coupling where every entity has a 
relationship with another. 
When depth limited trusted paths are selected 
on the sole criteria of highest trust 
relationship, trusted paths may not exist for 
many entities.   
When transitive depth is limited, significantly more 
trusted paths can be established when the objective 
function combines transitive depth with extent of 
trust relationships (compared to using trust 
relationships alone). 
Trusted paths must be created in real time if e-
commerce entities are to interact. 
Algorithms can be devised to retrieve trusted paths 
from domain trust trees that are linear in complexity 
for varying domain sizes and number of recipients. 
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Section 4.6.1 verifies the first hypothesis by measuring the impact on trust growth for varying trust 
transfer thresholds.  This section also attempts to verify the second hypothesis by measuring the 
impact of trust evolution policy on entities with varying degrees of reliability. Sections 4.6.2 is 
designed to test the third hypothesis by comparing the elapsed time for trusted path generation with 
varying levels of trust coupling. Objective functions for generating trusted paths are specified in terms 
of low transitive depth, low intermediary cost and high path trust. Section 4.6.3 tests the fourth 
hypothesis by varying the weights attached to these factors and comparing their impact on the 
percentage of valid trusted paths formed.  Section 4.6.4 tests the fifth hypothesis by measuring the 
path retrieval times. Section 4.6.5 compares the rate of trust attenuation in the existing trust models 
with the endorsement trust model proposed. All these experiments were carried out using a 2.5 GHz 
laptop with 4GB RAM running Windows XP operating systems. All the algorithms and simulations 
were implemented using Java with the lines of code varying from 200 to 400 lines of code.  
 
4.6.1 Trust Evolution and Trust Transfer Parameters 
The experiments in this section are designed to measure the impact of reliability on overall trust 
relationships through trust evolution policies. It also measures how the trust transfer threshold 
(Definition 4.6) impacts overall trust relationships through trust transfer policies. The experiments 
were carried by simulating a trust network with 200 entities. The overall trust relationship of an entity 
is measured using Trust Spread which is the sum of trust placed on an entity, as defined below. 
DEFINITION 4.12 TRUST SPREAD 
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where TR(Ej Ei) is the trust relationship between entities Ej and Ei, and n is the number of network 
entities. 
 
Figure 4.11 shows the effect of PTEI trust transfer and evolution policies on trust disposition by 
measuring trust spread against trust transfer threshold, where all entity reliabilities (Terminology in 
Section 4.3) are set at 40,000. The penalties and rewards for entity conduct are also kept the same for 
all entities. It is evident that PTEI policies are effective is dissuading entities from setting the trust 
disposition either too low or too high.  
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Figure 4.11 Trust Spread with Varying Trust Transfer Threshold 
Results and Analysis 
In Figure 4.11, the trust spread increases when trust threshold increases from 1 to 1.8, because the 
likelihood of trust breaches through unreliable associations is reduced.  However, beyond the optimal 
point of 1.8, trust spread decreases as the chances of forming new trust relationships (both good and 
bad are reduced). The experimental results also show the optimal point for trust threshold varies 
significantly when trust parameters reflecting risks and rewards are varied. Hence, the optimal 
parameters should be set considering the underlying domains and categories.  
 
Figure 4.12 shows the impact of trust evolution policies (Section 4.4.10.3), which specify rewards and 
penalties for positive and negative conduct respectively. Initially all entities in the network are 
connected to at least one other entity, with trust relationship value of 1. The experiment regenerated 
the domain trust trees 100 times using the updated values of trust relationships to measure the impact 
of these policies over time. Messages are sent up to 1000 times or until trust is breached (simulated 
based on the reliability) along the trusted paths in domain trusted-trees, updating the trust value each 
time. Penalty for trust breach (stated in terms of period of distrust following a trust breach) is kept 
constant across the domain.  
 
Figure 4.12 Trust Spread through Trust Evolution Policies for Varying Reliability 
 
Results and Analysis 
The results of measuring trust spread with varying trust transfer thresholds as depicted in Figure 
4.11suggests the trust transfer policy is effective in modelling trust disposition. Figure 4.12 shows the 
relationship between reliability and trust-spread in nearly linear with a correlation coefficient of 0.92.  
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The increase in trust spread is caused by both trust evolution and trust transfer policies. The more 
reliable entities are less likely cause a trust breach or endorsement failure leading to trust devaluation. 
The effect of trust degradation is not evident in the graph as these results are obtained averaging the 
results for different trees and data paths. These results show policies for maintaining PTEI centralized 
trust network are effective in modelling “business growth in traditional commerce through trust 
disposition and positive customer experiences”. 
 
4.6.2 Impact of Trust Coupling on Performance 
Trust coupling (Terminology in Section 4.3) reflects the average number of trust relationships an 
entity has with others. Assuming each entity has a (directed) trust relationship with at least one entity, 
the number of one-way trust relationships in a domain of 200 entities can vary between 200 and 
40,000. In this section the effect of trust coupling on performance is measured using high, average and 
low coupling. High coupling assumes that every entity trusts all others in the domain, meaning the 
average number of trust relationships is the same as the number of entities. Highly coupled networks 
are unlikely to be encountered in real life except in small domains. In lowly coupled networks, each 
entity trusts only one other entity for sending or receiving a message. Lowly coupled networks are also 
uncommon, except in mobile ad-hoc networks where each entity may be allowed to send or receive a 
message from only one other entity [141]. Based on empirical studies in social networks, the average  
number of intermediaries for medium coupling is set at 2 [142].  In order to reach all entities in a 
network of n nodes using only 2 intermediaries, the average trust coupling therefore must be n
½
  [142]. 
For example, if medium coupling is used an entity which has 10 trust relationships in a community of 
100, will end up with 20 trust relationships when the community size increases to 400. 
 
Networks with high, medium and low coupling were simulated using normal distribution of trust 
relationships varying from 1 to TRMAX. The maximum transitive depth was restricted, as cost and 
bandwidth increases with each additional intermediary, and opens more venues for attacks; it was set 
at 5 based on empirical studies for social networks of a similar size [143]. It was shown that 90% of 
recipients in networks of mixed coupling can be reached with 5 or less intermediaries [143]. Figure 
4.13 shows the algorithm performance where the number of entities in the network varies between 20 
and 240. Elapsed time shows acceptable performance (less than 70 milliseconds), though it grows 
linearly for low and medium coupling and at polynomial rate for the highest coupling. These 
differences directly reflect the number of trust links. Trusted paths for larger networks are generated 
within acceptable bounds by subdividing them into hierarchical domains (Section 4.5.3.4) and by 
computing trusted paths offline (Section 4.5.3.3).  
150 
 
 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
High 0 1.5 3 6 7.5 11 16 22 28 32.5 45 60 
Figure 4.13 Elapsed Time for Low, Medium and High Coupling (LNHMTD5Res) 
 
Results and Analysis 
Table 4.3 shows percentage of recipients for which valid trusted paths can be found (for a fixed 
maximum transitive depth) varies significantly with coupling levels. Though low and medium coupled 
networks scale well with the number of entities, the performance of highly coupled network degrades 
significantly. This can be attributed to the underlying data, which models the worst-case scenario for 
high coupling where every entity in the domain has a trust relationship with each other.  Even with this 
worst case scenario, trusted paths can be found within acceptable time bounds as the network is 
subdivided into hierarchical domains where the size of domain is restricted.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of 
Entities 
High 
Coupling 
Medium 
Coupling 
Low Coupling 
20 100% 90% 56.5% 
40 100% 90% 39% 
60 100% 88.5% 30% 
80 100% 86% 21% 
100 100%  86% 18.5% 
120 100% 83.5% 17% 
140 100% 81% 13% 
160 100% 80.5% 13% 
180 100% 81% 11% 
200 100% 79.5% 11% 
220 100% 79.5 8.5% 
240 100% 79.5 8.5% 
 
Table 4.3 Recipients with Valid Trusted Paths 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 100 200 300
E
la
p
s
e
d
 T
im
e
 
Number of Entities 
Low
Coupling
Medium
Coupling
High
Coupling
Though the low and medium coupled networks 
have better performance, Table 4.3 shows that 
the percentage of valid trusted paths is 
significantly lower than for highly coupled 
networks. The problem is exacerbated for large 
networks. This is because limited transitive 
depth impacts larger networks more than 
smaller networks. 
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4.6.3 Path Selection 
Criteria for path selection are made to reflect the number of intermediaries and the extent of trust 
relationships between trading entities. This section measures the impact of varying the relative weights 
attached to path trust (PT) transitive depth (TD) for a network of medium coupling. Figure 4.14 shows 
how PT, PT/TD and PT/TD
2
 affect the percentage of trust graphs that can be formed. The maximum 
transitive depth is set to 5 based on work done with social networks [143].   
 
 
Results and Analysis 
Using path trust (PT) alone as the selection criterion seems adequate for finding trusted paths when the 
number of entities is small (less than 10). However, when the number of entities exceeds 150 the 
percentage of entities with trusted paths drops significantly. This is because the transitive depth 
specified does not allow the highest path trust to be attained by all data recipients. With objective 
criteria PT/TD
2
 up to 20% increase is obtained for number of entities exceeding 200. This can be 
explained as this objective-criteria selects entities based on closer proximity as well as trust as 
opposed to using trust alone. Thus, a side effect of minimising the number of intermediaries through 
objective functions such as PT/TD
2  
 is that more entities can be reached within the transitive depth 
limit.  On the negative side, the aggregate path trust for recipients will be lower than when using trust 
as the sole criteria.  Hence, the weight attached to transitive depth (TD) objective criteria must reflect 
the limit on transitive depth, the cost of intermediaries and need for high path trust.  PTEI also allows 
the cost of intermediaries to be included explicitly in the selection criteria. Though transitive depth 
indirectly models endorsement costs, it does not model any variation in endorsement cost of 
intermediaries. Furthermore, congestion in busy nodes can be averted by assigning them high costs.   
4.6.4 Trusted Path Retrieval Time 
PTEI facilitates trusted path selection at runtime by generating domain trust trees offline and allowing 
retrieval at runtime. This section measures the time to retrieve trusted paths from pre-existing domain 
trust trees for networks of various sizes. The average retrieval times are obtained by repeating the 
simulation 1000 times for 10 randomly generated highly-coupled networks using a varying number of 
recipients (between 5 and 10).  The results presented in Figure 4.15 shows the algorithm scales 
linearly, with a coefficient of correlation 0.933.       
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E-commerce applications often require messages to be sent to multiple recipients. Such messages can 
significantly reduce intermediary costs and bandwidth by using common intermediaries along the 
path. The next experiment measures the trusted path retrieval time for up to 20 recipients. The results 
in figure 4.16 show that the algorithm scales linearly with the number of recipients with correlation 
coefficient 0.95. 
 
Figure 4.16 Retrieval Time for Varying Number of Recipients 
 
Results and Analysis 
The linear growth in retrieval time for highly-coupled networks is obtained in Figure 4.16, because the 
trust trees are formed offline. Although the linear growth suggests the domain size can be indefinitely 
increased, the main constraint is the memory required for maintaining separate large trees for every 
combination of message originator and selection-criteria. Analysis of memory requirements in Section 
4.5.2.1 shows that the memory requirement degrades at quadratic rate with the number of domain 
entities.   
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Retrieval time also scales linearly with the number of recipients, in Figure 4.16, because each node in 
trust tree formed offline contains all recipients that can be reached through them (to make retrieval 
efficient). The low response-time for domain trust trees makes it possible to vary the selection criteria 
dynamically, to find the right balance between trust and underlying costs.    
4.6.5 Comparison with Existing Transitive Trust Models  
Social networks model transitive trust relationships as a product of existing trust relationships between 
successive nodes along the path [133, 136]. Others have set transitive trust value to the minimum trust 
relationship along the trusted path [129]. The proposed model allows endorsement trust (Definition 
4.1) to reflect the minimum trust relationship along the path and the number of intermediaries using 
the formula :   PET (M,En,T) = 
MAXTR
M,En,TPT )(
 . )
)1(
1(
MTD
TD(T)
 
 
Figure 4.11 compares these transitive trust models with the endorsement model proposed as the 
number of hops varies from 1 to 6. It is assumed that the trust relationship between each adjacent node 
along the path is set to 0.7.  
Results and Analysis 
Figure 4.17 shows no degradation in transitive trust using minimum trust relationship as it does not 
consider the number of intermediaries. Using the minimum trust relationship does not model the way 
trust degrades in real-life where each additional intermediary decreases the trustworthiness of 
information passed. Modelling trust relationship using the product of existing trust relationships 
reflects both the trust relationships and the number of intermediaries along the trusted path. However, 
the transitive trust declines sharply reaching less than 0.2 with five intermediaries. The figure also 
shows that the rate of decline for the proposed model varies with the maximum transitive depth. When 
MTD is set to 20 trust degrades at a much lower rate than when it is set to 7. Hence, the proposed 
model allows the flexibility to vary the rate of decline for different categories and domains by 
changing the maximum transitive depth (MTD). Varying MTD reflects the intuition that in more 
trustworthy and less critical environments more endorsement intermediaries may be permitted.  
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4.6.6 Comparison with Other Trust Models  
This section compares PTEI with trust models in other domains. All trust models surveyed allowed 
transitive depth to be limited when selecting trusted paths as optimal path algorithms are in general 
considered to be NP-Complete  [133]. PTEI allows trust relationships to be classified into categories 
and organised into hierarchies. Trust in social networks too involves multiple communities organized 
into hierarchical nodes [134]. However, use of a link structures instead of nodes are necessary to avoid 
the complexity introduced by overlapping hierarchies [134]. PTEI uses a global trust network to allow 
faster generation of trusted paths. However, such an approach may introduce traffic congestions in 
certain nodes. Another distributed approach, which allows trusted paths to be extended iteratively until 
a path is found [128], allows greater flexibility in selection criteria for individual nodes. Unlike 
referral networks [125] which only allow trust evolution, PTEI policies allows trust evolution to be 
combined with trust propagation, thus allowing establishment of new trust relationships and reduction 
in transitive depths required. Trust models used in ad-hoc networks allows multiple objectives (trust 
values and the number of hops) to reduce the hazards from malicious nodes [164]. PTEI too allows 
multiple criteria such as transitive depth, endorsement costs and path trusts in different weights. The 
Table 4.4 compares the features of common trust models surveyed. 
 
Trust Model Category 
Specific 
Trust 
Hierarchical 
Trust 
Relationships 
Global/Local 
Trust Model  
Formation of New 
Trust relationships 
Multiple 
Criteria 
Allowed 
PTEI 
 
yes Yes Global  yes Yes 
Social 
Networks 
yes Yes Local yes No 
Referral 
Networks 
No no Local no Yes 
Distributed 
Model 
No no Local no Yes 
Ad-hoc 
networks 
No no Local no Yes 
 
Table 4.4 Comparing PTEI with other Trust Models 
155 
4.7 Discussion  
Reducing the perception of risk involved in trading with unknown e-commerce entities requires a new 
trust promoting framework. While cryptographic schemes can assure the integrity of the data received 
and the identity of a peer entity, they cannot by themselves guarantee the trustworthiness of entities for 
specific types of transactions. In the past e-commerce intermediaries such as payment gateways have 
played a major role in promoting trust in financial transactions. The right type of intermediaries can be 
selected automatically if they are classified on the basis of transaction categories they are authorised to 
endorse. Category specific endorsements were also used as a means of promoting trust in traditional 
commerce, together with experiential trust and trust based on recommendations. Creating an e-
commerce trust framework combining such mechanisms poses many challenges. The trust network 
must be centralised if endorsement intermediaries are to be selected at runtime.  Furthermore, it must 
be self-regulating if trust relationships are to reflect past direct experience and recommendations based 
on the experience of trusted neighbours.  Meeting these challenges requires devising a category 
specific trust network, policies that make the network self-regulating, and efficient trusted paths 
generation techniques.    
 
4.7.1 Institutional Trust 
Reputation mechanisms through product ratings are used as a means of promoting trust in web sites 
such as ebay and Amazon. These ratings, which combine previous user experiences in the form of 
numerical value or written comments, allow other product users to make an informed decision. Social 
networking sites such as LinkedIn allow one to endorse others for a specific category of skills. 
However, the validity of such ratings relies on the rating and authority of raters themselves. The 
endorsement trust model presented in PTEI provides a stronger form of indemnity against trading risks 
by combining existing trust relationships with endorsements done by authorised intermediaries [167]. 
The level of indemnity is modelled by path endorsement trust (PET), which aggregates the existing 
trust relationships between endorsement intermediaries along the message path. The trust relationships 
themselves are a cumulative measure of past experiences. Trust relationships may be lowered or 
severed if trust breaches are detected along the message path. Endorsement capabilities, too, may be 
revoked if invalid endorsements are detected. Avoiding invalid endorsements and poor alliances is 
therefore in the self-interest of intermediaries that aim to maximise their endorsement incomes. 
Simulation results show that economic incentive/disincentive schemes are effective in making the trust 
relationships of more trustworthy intermediaries improve at a faster rate. Detecting trust breaches and 
invalid endorsements, however, is predicated on finding end-to-end security mechanisms that make 
each endorsement intermediary along the trusted path accountable. Such mechanisms are presented in 
chapter 5. 
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4.7.2 Self-Regulating Trust Networks 
Past attempts at trusted path generation used recommendations and referrals from intermediaries to 
find the right services [40, 128, 133, 157]. The PTEI approach however, requires finding trusted 
endorsement intermediaries that can inspect and endorse key data based on experiential trust. New 
entities would initially require long endorsement chains as they may have very few established trust 
relationships. Costs and bandwidth for these long endorsements would severely limit their trading 
opportunities. To circumvent this problem, PTEI allows formations of new trust relationships in 
addition to evolution of existing ones. New trust relationships formed are initially assigned a low value 
reflecting their unfamiliarity. Trust evolution policies allow trust relationships to grow over time. 
Trust relationships are devalued for security breaches, failure of trading entities or endorsement 
failures. 
 
McKnight and others [113] have proposed multidimensional trust models that includes institutional 
trust, trust disposition and trusting beliefs.  In PTEI, endorsements which provide a form of 
institutional trust are combined with trusting beliefs about various domains and categories to update 
trust relationships. New trust relationships are established when indirect trust relationships exceed the 
trust transfer threshold value specified (which reflects individual trust disposition). Simulation results 
also suggest that trust transfer threshold should be allowed to vary over time if entities are to build and 
preserve their trust capital. Thus, PTEI policies allow criteria for establishing new relationships to be 
made more stringent as the number and extent of trust relationships grow. This models the common 
perception that “new traders often take higher risks when they have little to lose by trading with less 
well known entities”. Thus, the growth of trust relationships in traditional commerce can be modelled 
more closely by combining trust evolution with trust transfer policies.      
 
4.7.3 Response Time for Trusted Path Generation 
Evaluating trust values for social networks and web services are highly time consuming making it 
difficult to find trustworthy participants or services at runtime [17, 133]. One novelty of PTEI is 
synthesis of trusted paths at runtime based on a centralized trust network that treats trust itself as a 
derived value. The extent of trust relationships are computed based on past experiences (both positive 
and negative) and trust dispositions of entities and intermediaries in different domains and categories. 
Furthermore, in an optimistic scenario, every transaction through the trusted path can be considered a 
success unless the centralized server is alerted of any trust breaches or endorsement failures. Any 
failure along a trusted path causes trust relationships to be adjusted. Unlike PTEI, many of the past 
trust prediction models use a distributed architecture  [38, 40, 128], where trustworthiness  is the 
aggregate of values obtained from a number of sources. Such techniques are inherently slow because 
of the communication delay involved. Moreover, trustworthiness may not be reliable as the node 
information from intermediaries themselves may not be reliable or up to date. 
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Two techniques devised in PTEI helped to reduce the response time even further. The first technique 
clustered intermediaries into hierarchical domains with domain names as part of entity identity. This 
allowed the solution search space to be restricted to only those clusters where either the sender, 
recipients or their intermediaries are located. Furthermore, searches can be carried out concurrently as 
domain networks are maintained separately. Using such a technique, trusted paths were generated 
within 5 milliseconds for groups of 200 entities with medium coupling (defined in Section 4.6.2). 
Based on complexity analysis presented in 4.5.3.4 for hierarchical networks, the elapsed time for 
generating a trusted path to 2 destinations in a network of 800,000 (200x200x200) entities will be 60 
ms (2x3x2x5).  The second technique created trusted paths offline, where the retrieval times are in the 
order of 0.25 ms for up to 25 recipients.  
 
4.7.4 Security and Cost for Multiple Endorsements  
Multiple endorsements are necessary when trading entities do not share common trusted 
intermediaries. With hierarchical intermediaries, endorsement at one level may be deferred until 
endorsement is obtained at another level. When multiple endorsements are needed, actions must be 
carried out in a predefined order with access to confidential data elements restricted to specific 
intermediaries. End-to-end schemes such as those presented in chapter 5 may be used to enforce such 
secrecy requirements.  To reduce the cost of multiple endorsements, PTEI share common 
endorsements when data are sent to multiple recipients. Moreover, PTEI only requires endorsements 
when key messages are sent between trading entities. 
 
4.7.5 Future Work 
In this framework trust is treated as a derived value based on past experience, trusting beliefs and trust 
disposition; the model could be extended to include other factors that may influence trust such as the 
integrity and benevolence of a trustee. Experiential trust modelled in PTEI does not consider the value 
of transactions; rewards and penalties based on conduct can be made a function of transaction value. 
Distrust between entities can be considered when selecting trusted paths as distrust plays a major role 
in traditional commerce. The current model does not include implementation details of endorsement 
functions. More work must be carried out to define endorsement interfaces, quality of service, 
maintenance and access control. Trust transfer in the proposed model considers trust relationships of 
immediate neighbours only; it can be extended to allow greater trust transitivity. Finally the simulation 
results must be corroborated using real data in areas where multilevel endorsements are vital such as 
those used in news feeds, outsourcing, international contracts and online gaming services.     
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4.8 Conclusion  
In this Chapter, an institutional trust framework was proposed to promote trust between unknown e-
commerce entities. In particular, the following contributions were made. 
 
 A new institutional trust framework was devised to help overcome the perception of risk 
involved in trading with unknown e-commerce entities. Inspired by trust establishment 
methods in traditional commerce, this framework allows key messages to be passed through 
trusted, category specific endorsement intermediaries. The endorsement intermediary network 
consists of nodes representing trading entities and authorised intermediaries, while edges 
represent the extent of trust relationships that exist between them. Path endorsement trust 
gives a measure of indemnity, based on the number of endorsement intermediaries and the 
trust relationships that exist between them.  
 
 The endorsement trust network was made self-regulating combining direct and indirect 
endorsement trust. Trust evolution policies allow trust relationships with reliable 
intermediaries to grow over time. Trust transfer policies allow new trust relationships to be 
established, thus reducing the transitive depth between trading entities. Simulation results 
show these policies cause trust relationships with reliable entities to grow over time and that 
trust transfer policies are effective in modelling trust disposition. Hence, trust transfer and 
trust evolution policies can be combined to model trust in traditional commerce more closely.  
 
 Trust was treated as a derived value based on past experiences and trust dispositions of entities 
and intermediaries. Large networks were decomposed into hierarchical domains using a 
clustering technique devised. Simulation results show that for each domain with medium trust 
coupling, the average search time for a trusted path grows linearly. Hierarchical organisation 
allows trusted paths to be retrieved within one second even for trust networks of up to 800,000 
nodes. This performance can be further improved by generating domain trust trees offline. 
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Chapter 5: Security Schemes for Endorsement Services 
(SSES) 
5.1 Introduction    
Chapter 4 presented a trust model that can help alleviate distrust between unknown e-commerce 
entities by selecting intermediaries based on endorsement capabilities and trust relationships that 
reflect past experience. Maintaining relationships however, requires accountability schemes that can 
detect trust breaches. An accountability scheme allows every action to be associated with a specific 
entity [30]. By incorporating explicit cryptographic evidence it allows any misconduct to be proved to 
a third party adjudicator, similar to audit trails used in traditional commerce. Currently there are no 
standard accountability schemes for data sent to multiple recipients through common intermediaries. 
Such end-to-end schemes must be dynamically generated as the number and type of intermediaries 
vary with the transaction type and trust requirements of interacting entities. The proposed framework 
allows such end-to-end schemes to be derived by combining proven two-party schemes.  
 
End-to-end security schemes can detect and prove trust breaches, but not prevent them. Preventing 
trust breaches requires combining end-to-end schemes with techniques for selecting reliable 
intermediaries. Reliable intermediaries with built–up trust capital are less inclined to misbehave when 
it is known that trust breaches will lead to a loss of trust relationships. This interdependency between 
trust relationships and end-to-end security is captured in this framework in two ways. Firstly, 
minimum trust relationships can be specified when selecting message paths, thus lowering the 
likelihood of trust breaches. Secondly, when an entity trust breach is detected using end-to-end 
accountability schemes, trust relationships with that entity are lowered or severed depending on the 
type of trust breach. This allows existing trust relationships to reflect past conduct. 
     
Although end-to-end protocols were created for specific applications in the past [89, 144], little or no 
work has been done for endorsement intermediaries. When endorsement intermediaries are used, the 
data originator and recipients may want an end-to-end assurance about data and successive 
endorsements along the path. Furthermore, a higher level endorsement or an indirect endorsement may 
not be obtained unless all previous endorsements have been carried out in the right order. The 
proposed framework provides such an assurance in the form of a certified trusted path through 
intermediaries with required endorsement capabilities.  
 
The security challenges in endorsement security are similar to that faced in content-transforming 
intermediaries, which include data corruption, eavesdropping, false responses by adversaries and 
repudiation of message despatch or receipt [144, 145].  However, the excessive cost of cryptographic 
operations required in each intermediary has caused data security to be neglected [144-146].  In the 
past others have attempted to reduce performance overheads by exploiting any inherent parallelism in 
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data relationships [146]. In this framework messages sent to multiple recipients are made to share 
common endorsements, thus reducing intermediary overheads. The use of fine-grained security 
properties and schemes enforcing them help improve security performance trade-offs by providing the 
right level of security. The right level of security along each edge of the trusted path is determined as a 
function of security requirements by data originator and all recipients using that edge. 
 
5.1.1 Main Contribution 
Before e-commerce messages can be sent to multiple recipients through endorsement intermediaries a 
number of research challenges have to be overcome. Firstly, security must be provided for both data 
and endorsements. Secondly, security schemes must incorporate the necessary evidence to make all 
intermediaries accountable for their actions. Finally, end-to-end security schemes must be created 
dynamically, as the number of intermediaries and the type of security properties may vary. This 
section describes the main contributions made in meeting these challenges. 
 
 The notion of proof obligations introduced facilitates reasoning about accountability for 
various security properties. End-to-end accountability schemes for security properties 
providing assurances to recipients (A,DI,TB) are derived by transferring proof obligations 
through intermediaries until they can be discharged using direct evidence from the data 
originator. Similarly, end-to-end accountability schemes for security properties providing 
assurances to data source (RNR) are derived by delegating proof obligations through 
intermediaries until direct evidence is obtained from all recipients. End-to-end assurances 
follow naturally when all proof obligations are discharged either directly or indirectly. 
Conversely, any trust breach or invalid transaction can be narrowed to a specific intermediary 
or trading entity failing to discharge its proof obligations. Past research with accountability 
was mainly restricted to verifying whether existing protocols can make participants 
accountable for their actions. E-commerce protocols must be designed with accountability as a 
core requirement if legal recourse is to be provided when intermediaries fail to discharge their 
obligations. 
 
 An SSES scheme devised allows server signed metadata consisting of data hash, data 
category, trusted path and required security levels along the path to provide a form of protocol 
description. Each intermediary and recipient along the trusted path enforces the security levels 
specified using the proven two party schemes in their possession. Such a scheme allows end-
to-end security and trust to be enforced. 
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5.2 Statement of the Problem 
Generating provably secure end-to-end security protocols through endorsement intermediaries pose a 
number of challenges that must be overcome. The main ones are highlighted below.    
 End-to-end schemes for messages sent through intermediaries must provide security 
assurances for both the data and all intermediary endorsements. The validity of final 
endorsement is dependent on each endorsement along the path being valid for a given data 
category and data.  
 Accountability requires entities and intermediaries to discharge their proof obligations by 
producing the necessary cryptographic evidence from the message source or message 
recipients. However, direct evidence from the source or destination may not be possible as 
messages may be sent through multiple intermediaries. Hence, mechanisms must be devised to 
allow entities and intermediaries to discharge their proof obligations indirectly through others.   
 Accountability requires explicit cryptographic evidence that can be presented to a third-party 
arbitrator.  For example, the nonces used for verifying recency in Chapter 3 cannot be 
presented as explicit evidence of recency to a third-party arbitrator as these nonces were 
locally generated.    
 The security level along the common trusted path must meet the security requirements of all 
recipients reached through them. Furthermore, the cryptographic schemes for these security 
levels must be sequentially composable (defined in 2.2.2.2). For example, if security 
properties {A,RNR} are used when sending message M  from P to I, and {A} when sending M 
from I to R, and {RNR} when sending M from I to S, then the schemes used by {A,RNR} and 
{A} for authentication and {A,RNR} and {RNR} for non-repudiation must be sequentially 
composable. 
5.2.1 Research Questions  
 Validity of a message sent through multiple endorsement intermediaries depends on integrity 
of data and endorsements along the path. This leads to the research question: How can end-to-
end schemes be devised that provide both data and endorsement security?    
 When messages are sent through multiple endorsement intermediaries, misconduct by any 
entity or intermediary may cause a transaction failure. This leads to the research question: 
How can end-to-end schemes be devised that make all endorsement intermediaries and trading 
entities accountable for their actions? 
 Protocols must be synthesised at run time if protocol paths through intermediaries are to 
reflect existing trust relationships. This raises the research question: How can newly 
synthesised protocols be distributed and enforced by all entities and intermediaries along the 
protocol path?  
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5.3 Outline of the Solution 
The end-to-end schemes devised make all entities and intermediaries accountable for their actions. The 
notion of proof obligation and the means for discharging, delegating or transferring them provides an 
elegant mechanism to derive end-to-end security properties, as outlined in Section 5.3.1. Data sent 
through intermediaries include data from the source and endorsements by intermediaries. 
Endorsements provide the necessary evidence to each subsequent intermediary along the trusted path, 
as outlined in Section 5.3.2. All messages are accompanied by metadata signed by the trust server, 
which includes both the trusted path and the minimum security levels along the path, as outlined in 
Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4. The metadata signed by the trust server serves as the certified protocol 
description, allowing protocols to be synthesised and executed dynamically. The cryptographic 
schemes are revised to incorporate explicit cryptographic evidences to make all intermediaries and 
entities accountable, as outlined in Section 5.3.5.  
 
5.3.1 Deriving End-to-End Security Schemes 
End-to-end schemes for data sent through intermediaries are derived by combining proof obligations 
(liabilities) described using accountability logic (presented in Section 2.5) with attestable evidences 
for security properties derived in Chapter 3. These attestable evidences can be used for transferring, 
delegating or discharging such obligations.  Proof obligations can be discharged directly when direct 
evidence is obtained from source or recipients. When direct evidence cannot be obtained from all 
recipients proof obligation can be delegated. Similarly when direct evidence cannot be obtained from 
source it can be transferred. Protocol entities lacking the necessary evidences to discharge, delegate or 
transfer their proof obligations are considered to have breached trust assumptions. The notion of proof 
obligation is first presented using two examples in this section, before being formalized in Section 
5.5.5.  
 
Example: Informal Notion of Destination Proof Obligation 
An employer may use the recommendation of an authorised agency A as the basis for hiring a 
candidate, which may be based on direct knowledge of the candidate or an earlier recommendation by 
another authorised agency B. In the second scenario, the employer may hold the agency A liable for 
the hire while A may hold the other agency B liable. This process may be repeated transitively where 
each agency is obliged to prove it has direct knowledge of the candidate or has received an earlier 
recommendation. In SSES, destination proof obligation models a similar notion for end-to-end 
security properties {A, DI, TB} where the recipient and intermediary may transfer liability to its 
predecessor until it can be discharged directly.  
 
163 
Example: Informal Notion of Source Proof Obligation 
Assume a CEO of a company is legally bound to inform each employee about a stock option and to 
gather evidence of its receipt. The CEO may choose to carry it out by informing all subordinates and 
getting an undertaking that they will delegate it recursively until all employees are informed. In 
addition the CEO may attach an endorsed organizational structure to make the reporting structure 
explicit. Also, assume the company rules require anyone failing to get evidence of delegation to 
inform the secretary (allowing other arrangements to be made). In such a case, the CEO has 
discharged his or her liability as long as he or she can show evidence of informing and delegating to 
all subordinates. In SSES a source proof obligation models a similar notion which can be used by the 
data originator and subsequent intermediaries along the tree to discharge their liabilities for properties 
such as {RNR}. Unlike destination proof obligations, source proof obligations require evidence from 
all successors as SSES allows data to be despatched to multiple recipients through common 
intermediaries. 
 
5.3.2 Schemes Devised for Endorsement Security 
Messages through endorsement intermediaries may consist of earlier endorsement, in addition to data 
from source and server signed digest. The variable part contains the endorsement from the predecessor 
in the trusted path and forms the basis for subsequent endorsement. The first endorser along any 
trusted path must possess direct knowledge of the originator. Similarly the last endorser must possess 
direct knowledge of the recipient.  
 
5.3.3 Technique for Enforcing Path Security 
Each cryptographic scheme in the proposed framework named Security Schemes for Endorsement 
Services (SSES) includes a server signed digest made up of the valid trusted path, a data category and 
a hash of the original data. The elements in the server signed digest allow data and the node through 
which they are received to be validated before discharging, delegating or transferring proof 
obligations.  
5.3.4 Enforcing Minimum Security Levels along a Message Path 
The minimum security level between any two adjacent entities in a message path is expressed as a 
function of the security requirements of all recipients using that path. The trust server specifies the 
minimum security level required along every edge in the trusted path by annotating security levels in 
the trusted path as in [A[B:8[C][D:2]][E:11[F][G:2]]], where the letters represent entities and 
intermediaries along the path and the numbers represent the security levels along the path. Fine-
grained schemes are created by combining basic schemes, similar to the approach used in Chapter 3. 
These pre-created schemes allow an entity or intermediary to select the scheme matching the security 
level specified along the path.   
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5.3.5 Revised Schemes with Explicit Cryptographic Evidence 
The time-bound property combines predecessor signed despatch-time with expiry time in the server 
signed digest to enforce the time-bound property. Any intermediary can show that data was 
despatched with time-bound property if the difference between its own despatch time and that of its 
predecessor is less than the expiry time. The expiry time specifies the m9aximum delay between 
nodes, which includes both the communication delay and the processing time. A time-bound can be 
placed as the number of intermediaries in the trusted path is limited by the maximum transitive depth 
(MTD) allowed. It is assumed all trusted intermediaries have synchronised clocks.  
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5.4 Literature Review 
This section outlines the research relevant to end-to-end security and content transforming 
intermediaries. The initial section outlines research problems in e-commerce end-to-end security. 
Research issues in accountability and delegation relevant to end-to-end protocols are presented next.  
5.4.1 Security Threats of Content Transformation Intermediaries 
Intermediaries are software entities that intervene in the flow of information from message originators 
to recipients.  Their main aim is to support seamless access to services for different types of clients by 
providing functions like customisation, annotation, filtering and transcoding [147].  The 
transformation may include format translation or other forms of filtering such as virus removal or 
watermarking [146]. Annotations may include some form of endorsement or additional information 
that may be used by subsequent intermediaries or recipients. Content transformation through 
intermediaries introduces many security hazards, including unauthorised access and alterations [145]. 
Valid content-transforming intermediaries themselves may pose threats when multiple intermediaries 
are involved [148]. Past schemes to enforce content integrity include use of metadata expressing 
modification policies. However, the increased overheads resulting from these schemes limit their 
applicability, especially for large data volumes [146].  
 
Some content transforming systems allow alteration of signed data by trusted intermediaries by 
sharing the necessary keys [144]. These schemes, however allow intermediaries to make random 
changes to the original data which may result in invalid information being passed to recipients.  
Furthermore, sharing keys with multiple intermediaries makes it impossible to attribute changes to any 
one entity. Although content transformation techniques have been an active area of research, relatively 
little attention has been paid to data security until recently. The size of data involved and the number 
of intermediaries pose many challenges related to security and performance overheads. Reducing 
intermediary overheads requires minimising the number of intermediaries, especially when multiple 
recipients are involved.  
5.4.2 Protocols for Intermediary Communication 
Trusted intermediaries play a vital role in e-commerce by providing services such as anonymity 
preservation and quality of service guarantees [28]. Such services require additional transformation 
and annotations of data flowing from originator to recipients. Intermediary responses may consist of 
either additional information for interpreting data from message origin, guarantees, endorsements or 
caveats [29]. Currently, intermediaries communicate between themselves and with servers by using 
standard protocols such as HTTP, SMTP and RMI. Moving towards an open distributed setting poses 
many research challenges, including the need for flexible mechanisms to allow richer interaction 
between other intermediary components, message originators and diverse clients. Also, flexible 
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mechanisms are needed for authenticating third parties requesting services, and for enforcing trust 
policies at the granularity of data elements [29].  When standard point-to-point security protocols such 
as SSL, are used with intermediaries, multiple connections are needed to enforce end-to-end security. 
Furthermore, SSL does not allow secrecy requirements to be specified at the granularity of message 
element, which is required to restrict access to specific intermediaries. These limitations make it 
necessary to devise end-to-end schemes that enforce the right level of security, including secrecy 
requirements at data element level.  
5.4.3 Need for Fine-grained End-to-End Schemes 
In the past, security properties were often combined to create stronger properties to meet specific 
needs. The recency property, guaranteeing freshness of messages, is often combined with the 
authentication property to create a stronger form of authentication [33].  However, the use of the 
recency property based on nonces (as presented in Chapter 3) has limited applicability as it does not 
allow claims about freshness to be proved to third parties [30]. Many security relevant attributes such 
as keys expire after a specific time. The period of validity for a message using those keys can be made 
explicit by including a time-bound [149]. Using a time-bound can also avoid stale messages being 
despatched through intermediaries. A time-bound property can be combined with other properties to 
create stronger versions of authentication and non-repudiation [48]. An arbitrator can verify whether 
the message sent is valid at a particular point in time, if it has an explicit reference to time of message 
despatch.   
 
An organisation responding to a tender expiring soon may want to combine the time-bound property 
with non-repudiation. Intermediaries that are slow to respond can be easily identified if the time-bound 
property also includes time of message despatch. Unlike other security properties, the onus of proof 
for the non-repudiation property is placed on the message originator. The receiver non-repudiation 
protocol is considered fair if neither sender nor receiver gets an advantage by terminating prematurely. 
Therefore, fair non-repudiation schemes must ensure that the receiver gets the data and the sender gets 
evidence of receipt, or neither party can get any useful information [105]. Most fair exchange non-
repudiation protocols place a time interval within which non-repudiation evidence must be presented 
[150]. The period of validity can be made explicit by combining the non-repudiation and time-bound 
properties. The lack of end-to-end schemes also poses a major challenge in web services where all 
intermediaries may not be trusted to the same extent. Existing specifications such as WS-Security 
provide only pair-wise assurances [2].  
5.4.4 Accountability in E-commerce 
Accountability is defined as the property whereby association of a unique originator with an action or 
object can be proved to a third party [30]. Commercial transactions must have the built-in mechanism 
to hold peer entities accountable for their actions. Proving an assertion about an action differs from 
believing that assertion to be true. When believing an assertion, an entity becomes convinced that it is 
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true, though it may lack the explicit evidence to prove it to an arbitrator. Proofs have been classified as 
strong proofs if the evidence can convince any entity about the validity of an assertion, and weak 
proofs if they can only convince specific entities [30]. Protocols can be analysed for accountability, 
based on assumptions such as “private keys are not divulged by honest entities”, and “signatures can 
be associated with unique entities”. The accountability proofs for protocols have been derived from 
generic properties and properties applicable only to systems using digital signatures [30]. The initial 
assumptions assert the origin of messages signed by private keys and associate specific meanings to 
messages. This approach provides a means to analyse the accountability of existing protocols, and 
resolve disputes by third parties. It also provides a systematic way of identifying the required set of 
protocol messages to match the transaction goals, thereby identifying redundant messages in existing 
protocols. However, these techniques are useful only for analysing existing protocols.  
5.4.4.1 Accountability Delegation 
Security protocols created on the fly should configure trusted paths dynamically, based on the type of 
transaction, the threat posed by the environment and the relationship between entities [115, 151, 152]. 
If disputes are to be resolved by third parties, interacting entities with no prior relationships must 
delegate accountability to trusted intermediaries [153]. Most of the delegation protocols designed in 
the past allowed only delegation of rights. Delegation of accountability allows one entity to rely on 
another to enforce the necessary security properties. However, a delegated entity cannot be held 
accountable unless its explicit consent to enforce the required property is proven.  
5.4.5 Summary and Evaluation 
Content transformation intermediaries have been an active area of research reflecting the need for 
various forms of services including filtering, transcoding and watermarking. Such systems require 
messages intended for one or more recipients to be passed through intermediaries with varying access 
rights. Path security is also vital, when guarantees are needed about the order in which services are 
carried out. For time-critical applications it may also be necessary to enforce time bounds.  However, 
problems related to data security have not been addressed adequately in such systems [144-146]. 
Accountability is also vital for intermediaries which influence e-commerce decisions, such as whether 
to collaborate with an unknown entity. However, a search of the literature review failed to reveal any 
past technique that makes such intermediaries accountable.  
 
The proposed solution makes intermediaries selected at runtime accountable by deriving end-to-end 
schemes dynamically.  Secrecy schemes allow data access to be restricted to specific entities. Path 
security is enforced by sending data together with server signed metadata. Use of common 
endorsements for data sent to multiple recipients helps to reduce security and service overheads.  
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5.5 SSES Model Elements 
This section describes how the main SSES elements combine to provide end-to-end security for 
messages sent through endorsement intermediaries. Section 5.5.1 highlights some limitations of the 
interleaved schemes as devised in Chapter 3. Section 5.5.2 presents an endorsement chain made up of 
a series of endorsements along a trusted path. Section 5.5.3 defines end-to-end properties. Section 
5.5.4 describes the structure of server signed trusted paths included in digests.  Section 5.5.5 outlines 
how proof obligations are used for creating end-to-end schemes. Section 5.5.6 presents security 
schemes devised for data and endorsement chains. Section 5.5.7 describes the complementary roles 
played by dynamic trust relationships and end-to-end schemes. 
5.5.1 Comparison with Interleaved Schemes Devised in Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, two-party cryptographic schemes for security properties were interleaved to create 
schemes for any number of recipients forming a sequence. By piggybacking messages and forming a 
cycle these interleaved schemes helped to reduce both the traffic at the source node and the number of 
message hops in the protocol. However, the interleaving technique assumes intermediaries are passive, 
with no message-related endorsements or responses, while piggybacking increases bandwidth through 
additional payloads. Any delay in one of the entities impacts the all other entities relying on 
piggybacked messages, thus adversely affecting end-to-end response time. Also, piggybacking is 
applicable only when entities lie in a linear path. Interleaved schemes also assume that all message 
originators know the public keys of all recipients, and all recipients know the public keys of message 
originators, thus limiting their applicability. The revised scheme presented in this chapter allows more 
flexible path configurations for intermediaries where security levels along a message path are allowed 
to vary, reflecting the security requirements of the originator and recipients. Entities and 
intermediaries are required to maintain the public keys of only those entities/intermediaries they trust. 
 
In SSES, the endorsement function (f) returns a precise value based on data, data category previous 
endorsement (if any) and the endorser, based on existing rules or laws.  The endorsement value can be 
compared to the endorsement made by a certified notary for a specific type of document based on 
existing laws in that region.  
DEFINITION 5.1 INTERMEDIARY ENDORSEMENT FUNCTION (F)  
Let  EI be the set of all endorsement intermediaries, 
DC be the set of all data categories, 
 D be the set of all data, 
 EV be the set of all endorsement values, 
then  F : EI × DC × D × EV  EV  is the endorsement function that returns  an endorsement value 
based on endorsement intermediary, data category, data and previous endorsement. Note when the 
previous endorsement is set to null a direct endorsement is performed.  
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An endorser may perform different functions based on the data category (DC). An endorsement 
intermediary indirectly determines the domain in which endorsement is performed and whether it is 
direct endorser, indirect endorser or either. Any invalid endorsement value may lead to loss of loss of 
endorsement capability if proven.  
TERMINOLOGY 5.1 TRUST SERVER 
In SSES the trust server in addition to maintaining trust networks and  forming trusted paths also 
signs digests containing hash of data, data category and the trusted path thus acting as a protocol 
server. 
5.5.2 Endorsement Chain along Trusted Path 
The trusted paths presented in Chapter 4 take into consideration the hierarchical organisation of 
endorsement intermediaries (common in the physical world), where endorsement at one level may 
depend on endorsements at all previous levels. Therefore, SSES schemes are designed to provide 
security for both the source data and the endorsement chain. Each endorsement value is expected to 
comply with the output from the intermediary endorsement function (f) taking as input fixed data d 
(from origin), previous endorsement dvi, data category DC and the endorser. For example, in Figure 
5.1 the data d originating in O is passed through endorsement intermediaries E1, E2 and E3.  E2 
forwards the fixed part d received without any alteration whereas the variable part dv2 is given by dv2  
= f(E2,DC, d, dv1). The values dv0, dv1, dv2 … dvn form the endorsement chain and sp refers to the 
security property. The term dv0, set to a null value, is used only for the purpose of consistency of 
notation.  
 
 
 
 
 
d+dv2 {sp} 
m 
E3 
 
d+dv1 {sp} 
m 
d+dv0{sp} 
m 
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E2 
 
O 
 Figure  5.1 Intermediary Messages with Fixed and Variable Parts 
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5.5.3 End-to-End Security Properties 
Past attempts to secure data sent through content transforming intermediaries included schemes for 
standard security properties including data authentication, data integrity and data non-repudiation [2, 
145]. SSES must provide these such assurances for both data elements from the source and 
endorsements made by intermediaries. Path security is also essential when data paths are restricted 
[144]. SSES enforces path security by ensuring that the order of intermediary endorsements for data 
matches the trusted path for data included in the trust server signed digest.  In addition, accountability 
is enforced in SSES by incorporating evidences that can be archived and presented to third parties 
when necessary. The list of end-to-end properties that incorporate path-security and accountability are 
listed in Table 5.1. 
 
E-commerce transactions can be secured if accountability is used as a fundamental property [153]. 
Recency, one of the basic properties in Chapter 3 and its underlying scheme presented does not allow 
for accountability. For example, an entity B can convince itself that the data received from A is recent, 
if A also sends a signed digest made up of a hash of the data together with a nonce A sent recently. 
However, B cannot present this digest as proof of recency to a third party, as the uniqueness of the 
nonce cannot be proved. Hence, SSES uses the time-bound property (TB) instead which can be 
enforced with explicit evidence. Note all the security properties enforced at message level 
({A,TB,RNR,NI}) are required to guarantee that each endorsement along the path is valid for given 
data, data category and previous endorsement. A valid endorsement is one that adheres to the rules 
associated with the intermediary endorsement function assigned (Definition 5.1).      
Symbol Property Meaning 
A Path 
Authentication 
 
Each recipient can prove that the chain of data and endorsements are directed to the correct 
intermediary/entity along the trusted path and each endorsement along the path is valid for 
given data, data category and previous endorsement (if any).   
TB Path  
Time-Bound 
 
Each recipient can prove it has received data and endorsement chain within the time-bound 
allowed by the trust server and each endorsement along the path is valid for given data, data 
category and previous endorsement (if any). 
RNR Path  
Non-Repudiation 
A message-originator can prove that each entity or intermediary along the trusted path 
cannot deny receiving a chain of data and endorsement where each endorsement is valid for 
given data, data category and previous endorsement (if any).  
DI Path  
Data Integrity 
 
Each recipient can prove that the chain of data and endorsement received through a trusted 
path has not been tampered with along the way and each endorsement along the path is valid 
for given data, data category and previous endorsement (if any).   
FS Secrecy  Fine-grained secrecy at message element level. 
 
 
Distinct schemes are needed for the various combinations of security properties, as listed in Table 5.2 
to enable fine-grained end-to-end security. For example, by combining the properties TB and RNR the 
message originator can prove that all recipients were in possession of the messages before the message 
Table 5.1 End-to-End Security Properties 
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expiry time. SSES assigns an index (SPI) to each of the 15 different combinations of security 
properties as shown in the second row of Table 5.2. These indices (SPI) are used to specify the 
security level along the trusted path. The secrecy property — being a non-correspondence property is 
not shown in Table 5.2; it uses schemes that are independent of others, allowing it to be combined 
with any of the other schemes. 
A DI RNR TB A,DI A,RNR A,TB DI,RNR DI,TB RNR,TB A,DI,RNR A,DI,TB A,RNR,
TB 
DI,RNR, 
TB 
A,DI, 
RNR,TB 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
  
5.5.4 Example of Server Signed Trusted Path  
In PTEI framework presented in Chapter 4, trusted paths between data originator and recipients were 
represented in the form of spanning trees. Trusted paths were generated on the basis of minimum trust 
relationship and maximum transitive depth (refer to Terminology 4.1) specified. SSES allows all 
recipients and intermediaries to verify data are passed along valid trusted paths signed by the trust 
server. For example, assume that trading entity A wants to send a finance-related data d of category 
Fin (finance) to entities C and D with minimum trust relationship n and maximum transitive depth 1 
(maximum number of intermediaries set to 1) with authentication assurance. Further, assume that B 
can be an intermediary from A to C and D for finance-related transactions, with all trust relationships 
exceeding n, as shown in Figure 5.2. In such a scenario, data d can be sent to C and D via B and the 
trusted path signed by trust server TS will take the tree structure shown below, represented textually as 
in [A[B[C][D]]]. In SSES all  end-to-end schemes incorporate a certified trusted path made up of a 
server signed digest consisting of a security property index (SPI), data category (DC), valid trusted 
path from data origin [A[B[C][D]]] and a hash of data h(d) as in {SPI,DC,h(d),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.5 Enforcing Accountability through Proof Obligations 
Much of the past work done on accountability has been limited to analysing existing protocols for 
accountability properties [30, 153]. Enforcing accountability for fine-grained end-to-end protocols 
requires a derivation-based approach, as the number of intermediaries and recipients in a trusted path 
may vary. The basic end-to-end security properties in SSES can be broadly classified into those giving 
Table 5.2 Security Properties and their Indices 
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Figure 5.2 Trusted Path from Message Originator A to Recipients C and D 
 
172 
assurances to recipients and those giving assurances to message originators.  Authentication, data 
integrity and time-bound properties assure recipients, while the non-repudiation property assures data-
originators. In both cases end-to-end evidences cannot be sent or received directly making 
intermediary involvement inevitable. Thus, end-to-end assurances in SSES require data originators 
and recipients to combine authority granted by central trust server with evidences from that 
intermediary. These indirect evidences together allow any entity to indirectly discharge any liability 
either by transferring or discharging proof obligations.  
 
TERMINOLOGY 5.2 PROOF OBLIGATION 
Proof obligations (PO) are liabilities placed on entities and intermediaries that must be discharged 
using explicit cryptographic evidence. Proof obligations are further classified into destination proof 
obligations (DPO) and source proof obligations (SPO) reflecting where initial proof obligations are 
placed. Discharging destination proof obligations (DPO) require evidence from the data originator 
while discharging source proof obligations (SPO) require evidence from all recipients. 
 
Note the SSES schemes allow data to be sent to multiple recipients to share common endorsements, 
thus reducing intermediary costs.  A tree structure is used to represent all intermediaries and 
recipients. Discharging source proof obligations requires evidence from all subsequent branches or 
leaves in the tree, which represent intermediaries and recipient entities respectively. Proof obligations 
can be discharged only after evidence presented by other intermediaries or entities are validated by the 
trust server signed digest. The explicit cryptographic elements in the schemes can be presented as 
evidence to a third party, when necessary. An entity or intermediary unable to discharge a proof 
obligation based on direct evidence from the data originator or recipients may transfer or delegate it to 
other intermediaries using explicit cryptographic evidences from either predecessor or successors in 
the trusted path. Transferring destination proof obligation requires evidence from its predecessor, 
while delegating source proof obligations requires evidences from all successors. In Figure 5.3, the 
source proof obligation for {RNR} is placed on E1, while destination proof obligations for {A} and 
{TB} are placed on E2 and E3 respectively for data d is sent from E1 to E2 and E3 via the trusted path 
through intermediary I.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d 
d 
d 
DPO {TB} 
DPO {A} 
E3 
I SPO {RNR} 
E1 
Figure  5.3  Destination and Source Proof Obligations 
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The Figure 5.4 shows how these proof obligations are either transferred or delegated through the 
intermediary I subject to receiving the necessary evidence, until all obligations are discharged. Note 
when multiple proof obligations are involved evidence along all edges are combined subject to non-
interference.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
If an intermediary presents insufficient evidence or incorrect evidence which cannot be validated, or 
fails to respond within the stipulated time, the entity terminates the end-to-end protocol midway and 
sends an exception message to the trust server. In response, the trust server downgrades the trust 
relationship along that path and attempts to find an alternative trusted path, thus avoiding the 
intermediary that caused the exception. 
 
5.5.6 End-to-End Schemes for Data and Endorsement-Chain  
One main challenge for end-to-end security is to provide the required security assurances for messages 
sent through intermediaries without restricting their actions [154]. Although content transforming 
intermediaries has been an active area of research in the recent past, issues related to content security 
were not addressed to the same extent [154]. SSES security schemes are designed to provide fine-
grained end-to-end security for data elements from the entity data origin and for the chain of 
endorsements by intermediaries. Security for the chain of endorsements is necessary as it allows an 
intermediary to justify its own endorsement based on its predecessor, thus creating an audit trail.  
 
As an example, consider the flow of data df  of category DC along the trusted path from intermediary 
X to Y as shown in Figure 5.5. The data from X to Y, dXY combines both the fixed part df and the 
variable part dvXY. In other words, dXY = df dvXY where  denotes the concatenation operator. The data 
is sent together with signed hash elements of fixed and variable parts. The hash of the fixed part h(df) 
is signed by a trust server, while intermediary X signs the combined hashes of variable and fixed parts, 
denoted by h(dXY) = h(dvXY) + h(df). The trust server signed digest allows data to be verified. The 
common hash h(df) in the digest signed by X allows it to be linked with the trust server signed digest, 
while the hash of the variable part allows response (endorsement) from its predecessor in the trusted 
path to be verified. The intermediary Y then forms its own response dvYZ  based on df and dvXY received 
securely from its predecessor along the path. The same scheme is then used to forward its own 
response and the fixed message part. Note that both server and predecessor signed elements may 
{TB} and {A} Evidence for d 
{TB} Evidence for d 
{A} Evidence for d 
{RNR}Evidence for d  
{RNR} Evidence  for d 
E3 
E2 
I 
E1 
{RNR} Evidence for d  
Figure  5.4  Evidences Required to Delegate/Transfer/Discharge Proof Obligations 
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contain other elements on top of the fixed data and the variable endorsement. Additional elements 
(such as trusted path) that are used for enforcing specific end-to-end security properties are presented 
in the next section.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
All the SSES schemes described in the next section use this technique for enforcing end-to-end 
security for the fixed part.  
 
5.5.7 Trust-Relationship and End-to-End Security  
The PTEI techniques presented in Chapter 4 allow the trust server (TS) to determine a trusted path 
based on the trust requirements specified. The SSES accountability schemes presented in this chapter 
allow intermediaries breaching trust assumptions to be detected. Trust relationships with entities 
breaching trust are either lowered or severed, depending on domain trust policies. Hence, SSES and 
PTEI techniques have a circular relationship as they depend on each other. One major benefit of the 
proposed framework is that it allows interdependence between trust and security to be modelled 
explicitly.     
x 
y 
dXY,{h(dXY)}priX, { h(df), …}priTS 
dYZ,{h(dYZ)}priY, { h(df), …}priTS 
dOX {…}priO, { h(df), …}priTS 
z 
dvXY = f(X,DC,df, dvOX) 
dvYZ = f(Y,DC, df, dvXY) 
dvZRn = f(Z,DC, df, dvYZ) 
 
dZRn,{h(dZRn)}priZ, { h(df), …}priTS 
Rn 
R1 
R2 
Figure 5.5  Verifiable Basis Path for Intermediary Generated Responses 
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5.6 SSES Model Details 
This section presents the model details of SSES. Section 5.6.1 describes end-to-end security properties 
and when they may be prescribed. Section 5.6.2 identifies destination and source proof obligations 
associated with end-to-end security properties, which must be discharged, delegated or transferred. 
Section 5.6.3 summarises the role played by proof obligations. Section 5.6.4 presents examples of end-
to-end schemes based on evidences needed for discharging proof obligations. Section 5.6.5 presents 
examples of composed end-to-end schemes derived by combining evidences needed for discharging 
multiple proof obligations. 
5.6.1 End-to-End Security Properties and Proof Obligations 
This section presents end-to-end security properties (defined in Table 5.1) in greater depth, including 
property-related proof obligations placed on message originators and recipients.  
5.6.1.1 End-to-End Authentication Property 
The end-to-end authentication property provides each recipient with the assurance that data and 
endorsements were sent authenticated from the message origin. It is enforced by requiring each 
recipient to discharge the destination proof obligation that data and a valid endorsement were 
despatched authenticated, along each edge of the trusted path from the data origin. The proof 
obligation can be discharged (indirectly) by transferring it to its predecessor in the trusted path (tree).  
5.6.1.2 End-to-End Time-bound Property 
The end-to-end time-bound property provides each recipient with the assurance that data and 
endorsements are timely. It is enforced by requiring each intermediary to discharge the destination 
proof obligation that the time duration between each subsequent despatch along the trusted path 
(starting from the source) is lower than the time interval permitted by the trust server. The proof 
obligation can be discharged (indirectly) by transferring it to its predecessor in the trusted path (tree).  
5.6.1.3 End-to-End Receiver Non-Repudiation Property and Scheme 
The end-to-end receiver non-repudiation property provides the message originator with non-repudiable 
evidence that receipt of data and endorsements cannot be disputed by any of the recipients. It is 
enforced by requiring the originator to discharge the source proof obligation that data and 
endorsements were sent along a trusted path and received by all recipients. Source proof obligations 
can be discharged indirectly by delegating it to all successors along the trusted path.  
5.6.1.4 End-to-End Data Integrity Property 
The end-to-end data integrity property provides recipients with non-repudiable evidence that data and 
endorsements were not tampered with. It is enforced by requiring each recipient along the trusted path 
to discharge the associated destination proof obligation. This proof obligation can be discharged 
indirectly by transferring it to its predecessor in the trusted path.  
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5.6.1.5 End-to-End Secrecy Property 
End-to-end secrecy allows sharing of confidential information without disclosing it to intermediaries. 
A particular data item m is a secret at the end of the protocol run if an intruder or an entity that is not 
part of the secrecy group cannot obtain m during the run of the protocol [69]. Secret elements in SSES 
can only be accessed by entities that are part of a pre-established group. It is assumed that no member 
of a secrecy group will reveal its secret elements and all secret message elements in SSES are 
encrypted at the source using relevant group keys. Thus, any message containing secret elements can 
be passed safely through entities that are not part of the secrecy group. To ensure no secrets are leaked 
indirectly, secrecy groups of derived elements are made a subset of secrecy group of base elements (as 
in Chapter 3).       
 
5.6.2 Discharging Proof Obligations 
Proof obligations for basic security properties specify the cryptographic evidence needed to discharge 
them directly, or indirectly by transferring or delegating them. SSES techniques allow end-to-end 
schemes to be created by combining such cryptographic evidences. In addition each intermediary is 
required to prove its endorsement for specified data, data category and previous endorsement matches 
the value returned by the intermediary endorsement function (Definition 5.1). For all end-to-end 
security properties, discharging, transferring or delegating associated proof obligations can be done 
only after validating evidence presented by entities with the evidence from the trust server. If an 
anomaly is detected while the protocol is still in progress, an exception message is sent to the trust 
server, allowing corrective action. If an anomaly is detected afterwards, the archived cryptographic 
information from various entities can be combined to detect the entity or intermediary causing the 
problem. In either case, the trust server may lower or sever the trust relationship when an entity or 
intermediary is noncompliant.  
The Logical Framework  
The logical framework for proving end-to-end schemes through endorsement intermediaries combines 
SPCL used in Chapter 3 with accountability logic presented in Section 2. While SPCL allows 
reasoning about security schemes and provides the basis for combining them securely, the implicit 
evidence used in such schemes cannot be presented to a third party to make an intermediary 
accountable. The inference rules in accountability logic allows cryptographic  evidences needed for 
transferring, delegating and discharging proof obligations to be specified explicitly. All the proofs in 
this Section make the perfect encryption assumption stated in Section 2.1.2.  
TERMINOLOGY 5.3 PRIMITIVE FORMULAS AND SEMANTICS 
 dig refers to a digest and dig.x, dig.y refer to elements x and y contained in that digest.  
 Ei,Ei-1 refer to intermediaries or entities 
 Eipri refers to private key of Ei 
 h(d) refers to hash of data d 
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 TD, TA and TE refer to time of despatch time of arrival and expiry time. 
 Tree refers to the tree representing the trusted path from message origin O  
 Sub-tree(N) refers to the sub-tree of Tree representing rooted in node N 
 Next(Tree,X) returns the successors of X in Tree 
 sp represents a security property variable representing one of {A,DI,TB,RNR} 
 The symbol ● is used to indicate concatenation of terms. 
DEFINITION 5.2 DESTINATION PROOF OBLIGATIONS  
Let  d be the data,  
En be entity or intermediary along the trusted path 
dvn be endorsement received by entity En 
 DC be the category of data 
 O be the entity of data origin 
 sp  {A,DI,TB}  
Then the destination proof obligation DPO[d+dvn,O,DC,En,sp] states that En is obliged to prove that 
both the data d originating in O, and endorsement dvn from its immediate predecessor are received 
with security assurance sp.   
DEFINITION 5.3 SOURCE PROOF OBLIGATIONS  
Let  d be the data,  
En be entity or intermediary along the trusted path 
dvn be endorsement received by entity En 
 DC be the category of data 
 O be the entity of data origin 
 sp  {EA, RNR}  
Then the source proof obligation SPO[d+dvn,O,DC,En,sp] states En is obliged to prove all its 
successors along the trusted path have received both the data d originating in O and En’s endorsement 
based on previous endorsement dvn, with security property sp. En is also obliged to prove all 
successive nodes have accepted delegation for non-repudiation. SPO uses a tree view as SSES allow 
data to be despatched to multiple intermediaries and recipients. 
 
Sections 5.6.2.1 and 5.6.2.2 present assumptions and postulates used in destination and source proof 
obligations. Section 5.6.2.3 presents evidences needed to discharge destination proof obligations. 
Similarly Section 5.6.2.4 presents evidences needed to discharge source proof obligations. Section 
5.6.2.5 presents attestable evidence for enforcing all two party security properties by extending proven 
two-party schemes presented in Section 3.6.3. Section 5.6.2.6 describes how evidences can be 
combined to discharge multiple proof obligations. 
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5.6.2.1 Assumptions  
The assumptions presented in this section relate to trust server and compliant entities. These 
assumptions together with postulates presented in the next section form the basis for end-to-end 
schemes.  
Trust Tree Assumptions (TTAs) 
Trusted paths generated by the trust server in Chapter 4 reflect the category specific trust-related 
criteria specified. The following assumptions are made about trust trees. 
TTA1:  The trusted path forms part of the spanning tree from source to recipients. 
TTA2:  The trusted path consists of compliant entities and intermediaries only that meet the specified 
trust requirements. 
TTA3: The centralized trust server (TS) has jurisdiction over trust relationships. 
Valid Endorsement Assumption (EV) 
Endorsement value dvi in a compliant intermediary Ei must be set as )DC,d, f(E i-ii dvdv 1,  
where d is 
data, dvi-1 is the previous-endorsement, DC is the data category and f is the predefined intermediary 
endorsement function reflecting legal requirements for endorsements in different domains and 
categories. 
Proof Obligation Assumption (POA)  
All compliant entities must discharge their proof obligations for the security properties required 
(specified by the trust server) or raise an exception. Proof obligations can be discharged directly or by 
transferring or delegating them. An exception may be raised when another entity fails to respond 
within stipulated time or because the data is stale or invalid.   
Source Proof Obligation Assumption (SPOA) 
Compliant intermediaries respond to a receipt of SPO from a valid predecessor and accept delegation 
to all nodes in the trusted path reached through them. Furthermore, an SPO can be delegated by a node 
only if it has received a valid delegation or if it is the source itself.  
Destination Proof Obligation Assumption (DPOA) 
A compliant entity in a trusted path (Tree) forwards data with a security property in {A,DI, TB} to its 
successor only if it has valid evidence to transfer or discharge its associated proof obligation.  
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5.6.2.2  Postulates 
The postulates in this section extend the notation introduced for accountability logic in Section 2.5 of 
the background chapter. Postulates are presented in the form of a conclusion that can be deduced from 
a set of premises.  
 
Conclusion
nmise .... ;pre2; premise1premise  
These postulates are used by interacting entities to reason and discharge any proof obligations.  
 
Common Postulates 
This section presents common postulates that form the basis for reasoning, similar to those presented 
in Section 2.5 for verifying accountability of existing protocols. 
 
Statement: “A says x” 
This construct makes A accountable for the statement x and anything implied by x.  
 
Attestable Evidence from Digital Signature 
Digitally signing a message provides attestable evidence of message origin.  For example, when entity  
X receives a message m containing element d, signed with YPri, X can prove that Y says d. Here d may 
refer to specific data, or specific semantics that have common predefined meaning. In the postulate 
below X canAttest(p) says that entity X can prove that the proposition p is true, based on the evidence 
presented.   
 d)t (Y says X canAttes
mdYpriSignedWithmX ;in    );   ( Receives 
 
Attestable Evidence for Trust 
If Ei receives a trust server signed digest containing a hash of data d, its data category DC and trusted 
path Tree rooted in O and having Ei as successor of Ei-1, Ei can deduce that the trust server says it can 
trust data d of data category DC originating in O and any endorsement (dv) related to it, from its 
predecessor Ei-1.  It can be stated as in: 
 
    
,Ei ) )idv,O, MC,Es  trust(dst (TS sayEi canAtte
O)Root(Tree,,Ei)-EiNext(Tree,mDCTreedTSpriSignedWithmEi
1
;1; in  },,{ ;)  ( Receives 
 
 
Trust: 
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5.6.2.3 Discharging Destination Proof Obligations 
Destination proof obligations, which are initially placed on all data recipients in SSES, are discharged 
indirectly as all trusted paths consist of one or more intermediaries. Thus, proof obligations are 
transferred to the preceding intermediary, until it can be directly discharged with evidence from the 
data originator. Transferring proof obligations requires validating security property related evidence 
from the predecessor with evidence from the trust server. For example, in the Figure 5.6 below, the 
proof obligation for security property sp placed on R requires transferring it recursively to the 
predecessor specified by the trust server, until it can be discharged directly. This amounts to showing 
the scheme for security property sp is valid for both data d and endorsement dvi as i varies from n 
down to 1, and showing that the chain of endorsements dvn, dvn-1, … dv1 are generated on a valid 
basis.. Each endorsement dvi by intermediary Ei must be of the form dvi = f(Ei,DC,d,dvi-1) where d is 
the data and dvi-1 is the endorsement from the previous intermediary and f is the endorsement function.  
The first intermediary along the trusted path requires no endorsement; the term dv0, a null 
endorsement, is introduced only for consistency of notation. 
 
 
 
 
Attestable Evidence for Transferring or Discharging Destination Proof Obligations 
In Figure 5.6, the destination proof obligation for R, DPO[d+dvn,O,DC,R,sp] can be transferred to the 
previous intermediary En in the server signed trusted path, subject to receipt of valid evidence from En 
for security property sp. Note the destination proof obligation for the previous intermediary is 
specified in terms of dvn-1 where dvn = f(Ei,DC,d,dvn-1). 
 
]),,]) ,
 with sp) dv sent d   
spO,DC,Endv(DPO [d spO,DC,R,dv(DPO [d 
t (EnR CanAttes)),RO, DC,En (trust(d,t (TS saysR CanAttes
-nn
n )
1
;,
 
 
In general, for each intermediary (other than the first one along the trusted path) destination proof 
obligation DPO[d+dvi,O,DC,Ei,sp] can be transferred to its predecessor along the trusted path, subject 
to evidence from the predecessor specified by the trust server.   
 
If ( i > 1)   
 
For the intermediary immediately following the data originator, the proof obligation can be discharged 
based on direct evidence from the originator. 
 
d●dvn-1 {sp} 
m 
d●dvn{sp} 
m 
d●dv1 {sp} 
m 
d dv0{sp} 
m 
R 
 
En 
 
E1 
 
E2 
 
O 
 Figure 5.6 End-to-End Non-Repudiation through delegation 
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If ( i = 1) 
DischargeDPO:  
sp]), ,O,Edv  (DPO [dDischarge 
dv sent d ( O CanAttestE) ,EO, DC,O(trust(d (TS says  CanAttestE
11
111   ) 0;,  
 
The next section presents evidences needed for individual security properties.  
 
5.6.2.4 Discharging Source Proof Obligations 
Source Proof Obligations relate to security properties that provide assurances to the data source. End-
to-end schemes for these properties can be derived by combining evidence needed to delegate them 
until they can be discharged directly. A specific security property, receiver non-repudiation (RNR) is 
used to illustrate SPO in this section as it is the only source security property considered in this 
chapter. In the example shown in Figure 5.7, non-repudiating d sent from O to recipients R1 to R5 
requires involvement of intermediaries I1 to I4. Each node can discharge its obligation only after 
receiving evidence of data receipt and acceptance of delegation from all successors along the trusted 
path. Entity O requires I1 to non-repudiate the receipt of data d  dvO and acceptance of delegated 
obligation to non-repudiate d●dvI1 to all subsequent entities along that sub-tree (which in this case is 
only R1) where new response dvI1 is formed by I1 based on d and dv0, i.e., dvI1 = f(I1,DC,d,dvO). 
Likewise, O requires I2 to non-repudiate receipt of d●dvO and accept delegation obligation to non-
repudiate d●dvI2 to I3 and I4. This process of delegation is repeated until all recipients requiring non-
repudiation are reached. These obligations are denoted by SPO[d●dvEi,O,DC,Ei,sp] (source proof 
obligation) where Ei is an entity that lies along the trusted path for data d of category DC originating 
in O, and dvEi is the endorsement from Ei.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The postulates for source proof obligation in this section relate to an entity X sending data d●dvX to 
one or more successors along the trusted path, as shown in Figure 5.8. The sender X can either be the 
originator (in which case dvX  is empty) or an intermediary while the successors can either be 
recipients or intermediaries. In the Figure 5.8  Next(Tree,X) returns N1, N2, … Ni …. Nn.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 End-to-End Non-Repudiation through Delegation 
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Attestable Evidence for Delegating or Discharging Source Proof Obligations 
Any intermediary or entity can delegate a non-repudiation proof obligation only if evidences for both 
data receipt and delegation acceptance are produced from all its successors in Tree. This results in 
non-repudiation proof obligation being delegated to all its successors. The transfer clause can be 
formally stated as shown below. 
 
SPODelegate: 
 
, X) } Next(Tree  N,{NR}]  : ,O,DC,Ndv{SPO [dR}] ,O,DC,X,{Ndv  SPO [d
))N, SubTree(dv degation(O, AcceptDelN)dvvidence(d sent NR_EAttest (N X) :X CanNext(Tree, N
iiNiX
iNiiXii
 
 
The non-repudiation obligation can be discharged directly when a leaf node of Tree is reached, as 
there are no further obligations. 
SPODischarge:   
C,X,{NR}])SPO [d,O,MDischarge(
 Ø  X) Next(Tree,
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Figure 5.8 Successor Entities/Intermediaries along Trusted Path 
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5.6.2.5 Attestable Evidence for Enforcing Security Properties 
This section presents attestable evidence for security properties that can be used to discharge proof 
obligations. These evidences are based on schemes presented as part of PGPS in Chapter 3. The 
recency property however, is replaced with the time-bound property which provides explicit evidence 
for timeliness. The non-repudiation property presented in Chapter 3 is extended to include delegation. 
All of these schemes allow protocols to be terminated halfway if data or sender cannot be validated or 
if property related assumptions cannot be met. The security properties enforced by all subsequent 
schemes are indicated indirectly using the index property index in Table 5.2. 
 
Attestable Evidence for Authentication 
Scheme 
The scheme is identical to that presented in Section 3.6.3 with data consisting of data from the source 
and endorsement from the intermediary (sender). The proof is presented in Section 3.6.3.1. 
Aborting Authentication 
If the data or labels from the sender cannot be validated with the digest from the trust server dig, an 
exception message must be sent to the trust server to take corrective action, thus discharging any proof 
obligation. 
 
Attestable Evidence for Data Integrity 
Scheme 
The scheme is identical to that presented in Section 3.6.3 with data consisting of data from the source 
and endorsement from the intermediary (sender). The proof is presented in Section 3.6.3.1. 
Aborting Data Integrity 
If the data or label from the sender cannot be validated with the digest from the trust server an 
exception message is sent to the trust server to take corrective action thus discharging any proof 
obligation. 
 
Attestable Evidence for Time-Bound 
Additional Assumption:  Synchronization (SYN) 
Time stamps between trusted intermediaries are generated using synchronized clocks. 
 
Scheme 
 
 
In the figure above, intermediary B can attest that data dAB (formed combining data from the source 
with endorsement from A) was sent with the time-bound property from another entity A if the data 
hash h(dAB) and the time of despatch TDA was signed by its predecessor A, and the difference between 
despatch times (TDB - TDA) is lower than the expiry time (TE) singed by the trust server.  
dAB,{4, h(df),[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS,{ h(dAB),TDA}priA 
B A 
184 
Time-Bound (TB) Scheme (B’s actions when receiving data from A with time-bound property) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof: Time-bound Scheme allows B to verify Timeliness of A’s Data 
By precondition Honest(A,B,TS) and honest entity assumption HEA (Table 3.12), invariant Inv1 is 
initially true. By axiom PA7 (Table 3.11), MDA in L3 derived decrypting message EMDA by public key of 
A, was despatched by an entity in possession of private key of A. Based on the precondition, A is honest 
and by assumption HEA Inv1 holds (private keys are kept confidential), it follows MDA originated in A. 
L4 and L5 together with the precondition Honest(A) allows time of data (d) despatch from A to be 
extracted. By axiom PA7, MDA in L6 derived decrypting message EMDTS by public key of TS, was 
despatched by an entity in possession of the private key of TS. Based on the precondition TS is honest 
and by assumption HEA (Table 3.12) Inv1 holds (private keys are kept confidential), it follows MDTS 
originated in TS. L7 and L8 together with the precondition Honest(TS) allows expiry time TE from 
the trust server  to be extracted. L9 and L10 together with the additional assumption clocks are 
synchronized allows timeliness of data from A to be asserted. □ 
 
Aborting Time-Bound 
If the data from the sender cannot be validated with the digest from the trust server, or if the sum of 
node and communication delay exceeds TE an exception message is sent to the trust server to take 
corrective action, thus discharging any proof obligation. 
 
Attestable Evidence for Non-repudiation and Delegation 
Additional Assumption: Delegation Assumption (DA) 
The recipient sending an acknowledgement of server signed digest containing a hash of the data with 
the hash of the tree representing trusted path amounts to accepting delegation for all subsequent nodes 
along the tree.  
 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B, TS) Invariants:  Inv1 
L1. Receive(B,A,[dAB,EMDTS,EMDA]) // receiving the data d and signed message digest EMD3 from A 
L2. d  dAB.fixed   // extract the data from source 
L3. MDA Dec(B, EMDA,pubA)  // B decrypts EMDA with pubA and stores it in MDA 
L4. MDA.hash=h(d)    // verifying data hash  
L5.TDA  MDA.TS   // extract timestamp 
L6. MDTS Dec(B, EMDTS,pubTS) // B decrypts EMDTS with pubTS and stores it in MDTS 
L7. MDTS.hash=h(d)    // verify data hash 
L8. TE MDTS.TE   // extract maximum time allowed 
L9. TDB  Timestamp()  // B time-stamps current time 
L10. TDB – TDA  ≤ TE    // verify the difference between despatch times is lower than TE 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B, TS)  B Assert timeliness of data from A 
Invariants:  Inv1 
185 
Extended Scheme for Non-Repudiation (including Delegation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The data d sent from A combines data from source df with the endorsement by A, dvA.  The scheme 
differs from the non-repudiation scheme used in Chapter 3 in terms of sending the server signed digest 
({3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS) in step 1 and receiving it as part of the signed term in step 2.  This additional step 
is used for getting acceptance of delegation for all subsequent nodes. 
 
Proof: Extended Scheme allows Delegation Acceptance in addition to Data Non-Repudiation. 
This is an extension of the RNR Proof Presented in Section 3.6.3.1. Only differences are in L4 and L7.  
 
E 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof: Non-repudiation of Delegation (in addition to Data Receipt proved in 3.6.3.1) 
Presence of trust server signed digest containing the trusted path in the recipient signed term in L7 
amounts to accepting delegation to all subsequent nodes along the tree based on the assumption DA.  
 
Aborting Non-repudiation 
If one of the child nodes does not respond within a predefined timeout period, an exception message is 
raised to the trust server, passing on the sender, non-responding entity, security property and cause. 
The timeout period is predefined though time-bound property can be combined with non-repudiation 
to specify appropriate value for a particular application context.  
  
{kOTAB}priB 
{{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS, h(dOTAB), nAB, B,A 
{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,dOTAB, nAB 
B 
A 
kOTAB 
Pre-condition:  Honest(A,B)     Invariants: Inv1,Inv2,Inv3,Inv4 
… 
L4. Send(A,B,[dOTA,AnB,SD) // A sends encrypted data, nonce and the server signed digest SD 
L5. Receive(A,B, EMD4) // receive encrypted digest containing data hash, nonce and labels 
L6. MD4 Dec(A,EMD4,pubB)  // A decrypts encrypted message digest storing it in MD4  
L7. MD4.hash=h(dOTA) MD4.nonce=AnB  MD4.sender=B MD4.receiver=A MD4.SD = SD 
                                                        // contains the additional term – SD sent in L4 
Post-condition:  Honest(A,B); A Assert(Message Non-Repudiation and Acceptance of 
Delegation by B) 
Invariants: Inv1,Inv2,Inv3,Inv4 
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Enforcing Secrecy 
The accountability logic does not allow reasoning about techniques used for enforcing secrecy [30].  
Therefore a scheme independent of others using symmetric group keys is devised to enforce end-to-
end secrecy in SSES. These schemes are enforced at a fine-grained knowledge-element level to allow 
access to different parts of data to be restricted to specific entities. Two other mechanisms for 
enforcing secrecy include multiple key ciphers [101] and the public key systems [85]. The multiple 
key ciphers system is appropriate when the number of entities sharing secret s is large, as the number 
of keys required is the same as the number of entities. Public key systems are computationally more 
expensive than symmetric keys. Protocol bandwidth, too, may increase substantially if each secret 
knowledge element is encrypted by all the public keys of intended recipients. For example, if A is 
sending data to B, C and D through trusted intermediaries E and F, three distinct messages must be 
sent through E and F, each encrypted with public keys of B, C or D. Bandwidth can be reduced if a 
common public key scheme is used. A symmetric group key scheme  however, requires sending only 
one copy of secret data encrypted by the common group key, though it requires a symmetric group key 
server such as ELK to be present for distributing symmetric group keys [103]. An entity requesting a 
group key sends a message containing the list of entities in the group signed by its private key. The 
key server creates a new one if one does not already exist for the specified group or if it has expired. 
 
5.6.2.6 Discharging Multiple Proof Obligations 
Proof obligations for multiple security properties can be discharged by combining attestable evidences 
that are non-interfering.  For example, in Figure 5.4 evidences needed for discharging security 
properties {A}, {TB} and {RNR} along the data path were combined. The protocol composition rule 
states that two schemes can be combined in parallel if the invariants for one does not interfere with the 
invariants for the other [25]. For example, the validity of a scheme relying on the invariant “a private 
key cannot be divulged” cannot be combined safely with another scheme sending the same key in the 
open.  More formally, two schemes Q and Q   with invariants  and  , can be combined in parallel if 
they do not violate the invariants      (refer to Section 2.3.2.2). In Chapter 3, non-interfering 
cryptographic schemes for properties were combined directly to provide multiple security assurances. 
In a similar way, SSES combines non-interfering schemes that provide explicit evidence.  
 
When invariants for basic schemes interfere, non-interfering schemes must be devised before they can 
be combined, as in Chapter 3. For example, when combining with non-repudiation scheme, extended 
schemes for authentication, time-bound and data-integrity are used instead, as the standard schemes 
violate the invariant Inv3 assumed to hold by the non-repudiation scheme. For authentication and data 
integrity, the basic and extended schemes are identical to those used in Chapter 2 as they also provide 
explicit evidence. For the time-bound property which replaces recency, a revised version is created by 
first releasing data encrypted by a one-time-key followed by the one-time-key on receipt of an 
acknowledgement.   
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5.6.3 Role of Proof Obligations 
The trust server determines the trusted paths and the path security levels aggregating the trust and the 
security requirements specified.  Each node along the trusted path is required to discharge its proof 
obligations for the security properties assigned by obtaining evidence from its neighbouring nodes. If 
all interacting entities and intermediaries can discharge their proof obligations end-to-end trust and 
security can be guaranteed. If however, such obligations cannot be discharged the protocol run may be 
aborted midway after alerting the trust server to from a different trusted path. Even if all proof 
obligations are discharged an entity or intermediary can be held liable if the underlying assumptions 
are found to have been violated. A process similar to audit can be carried out with proof obligations to 
identify the noncompliant node.  Any entity or intermediary failing to produce the required (archived) 
evidence for the underlying assumptions can be held liable. It is assumed archived data is stored for a 
predefined period of time.  These three possible scenarios are outlined briefly in this section.  
 
Detecting Violations during Protocol Execution 
Validity of data can be verified directly by comparing it with the hash of data in the digest sent from 
the trust server. If data cannot be validated the protocol may be aborted. When enforcing specific 
properties such as time-bound or receiver non-repudiation, long communication delays may cause 
protocol execution to be terminated.  
 
End-to-End Security and Trust 
Using trust tree assumptions TTA1, TTA2 and TTA3 the trusted path consists of compliant entities that 
meet the trust requirements. If no exceptions are raised, then based on assumptions POA, SPOA and 
DPOA, all compliant entities or intermediaries have discharged their source and destination proof 
obligations, meaning data and its successive endorsements have reached their intended recipients 
along the trusted path. Thus, when all proof obligations are discharged without any exceptions, end-to-
end trust and security requirements are met for all data and endorsements. 
 
Detecting Non-Compliant Entities 
Every entity and intermediary involved in discharging a proof obligation directly or indirectly is 
required to adhere to the underlying assumptions for compliant entities and intermediaries. Any entity 
or intermediary failing to produce the necessary (archived) evidence is considered to have breached 
trust assumptions, which may lead to severance of all trust relationships. For example, an invalid 
endorsement that does not comply with dvn = f(Ei,DC,d,dvn-1) is considered to have violated the 
assumption EV. Similarly an intermediary enforcing time-bound property is considered to have 
violated a trust assumption if the difference between its despatch time and its predecessor despatch 
time exceeds the server specified time limit. 
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5.6.4 Example: End-to-End Schemes Derived from Proof Obligations 
This section presents examples of end-to-end schemes derived by combining two-party evidence used 
for discharging, delegating or transferring proof obligations along a trusted path involving two 
recipients and one intermediary. Both DPO and SPO also specify preconditions for all intermediaries 
forwarding messages. These schemes implicitly show the preconditions which are based on the 
assumptions. For example, an intermediary cannot send authenticated data until and unless it has 
received the data authenticated (Assumption DPOA). Similarly an intermediary cannot delegate the 
non-repudiation property until that property has been delegated to it (Assumption SPOA). Schemes for 
basic properties can be combined to provide multiple security properties, as long as the individual 
schemes for basic properties do not violate each other’s  invariants [61]. Example schemes for 
multiple properties are presented in the next section.  
Symbols used in the Schemes 
The schemes presented in this section and the next use the trusted path presented in Section 5.5.4 
where: 
 trusted path from A to data recipients C and D through intermediary B is  [A[B[C][D]]]. The 
term Tree is the abbreviation for [A[B[C][D]]] in Figures 5.9 to 5.16,  indicating that data from 
A must be sent to entities C and D via B. 
 the symbol df represents data from its origin A 
 dBC represents the combination of data df and endorsement dvBC    
 SPI (1..15) represents the security properties index (refer to Table 5.2) 
 DC is the data category 
 TS is the trust server 
 {SPI,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS   is the trust server signed digest 
 
5.6.4.1 End-To-End Authentication Scheme  
The end-to-end authentication scheme derived from discharging the destination proof obligation along 
trusted path [A[B[C][D]]] is shown in Figure 5.9. Each of the two-party schemes making up the end-
to-end scheme consists of two digests. The first digest consists of the IDs for sender and destination as 
well as the combined hash for fixed and variable parts, while the trust server signed digest consists of 
SPI, DC, a hash of fixed data and the trusted path. Note that the protocol path AB, BC and BD in 
Figure 5.9 lie along the trusted path [A[B[C][D]]] specified by the trust server. In addition, the data 
combining fixed and variable parts in plaintext is shown as one term (dBC = df + dvBC).  Intuitively, 
recipient C can verify the validity of the sender based on the server signed trusted path, and verify the 
association between two digests based on the common hash of fixed data contained therein.  
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Assumptions: TTA1, TTA2, TTA3, EV, POA, SPOA 
Invariants: Inv1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.4.2 End-to-End Data Integrity Scheme 
The derived scheme for data integrity shown in Figure 5.10 is identical to that of authentication, 
except for the omission of a label specifying data destination.  
Assumptions: TTA1, TTA2, TTA3, EV, POA, SPOA 
Invariants: Inv1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.4.3 End-to-End Time-Bound Scheme 
The scheme derived for time-bound property, shown in Figure 5.11, contains two signed digests for 
each step: one for data and one for endorsement. Note that each digest signed by the preceding 
intermediary or entity consists of the data despatch time (such as TDA,TDB1,TDB2), while the one 
signed by the trust server consists of the data expiry time (TE).  An intermediary must not forward 
data that has already expired, to avoid despatch of stale data. However, the intermediary is expected to 
raise an exception to the trust server allowing corrective action. The time-bound property prevents 
replay attacks by limiting the time window in which the messages are considered valid.  
 
Assumptions: TTA1, TTA2, TTA3, EV, POA, SPOA, SYN 
Invariants: Inv1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dBD,{B,D,h(dBD)}priB,{1,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS  
dBC,{B,C,{h(dBC)}priB,{1,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS dAB,{A,B,h(dAB)}priA,{1,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS 
B 
A C D 
Figure 5.9 End-to-End Scheme for Authentication 
 
dBD,{B,h(dBD)}priB,{2,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS  
 
dBC,{B,{h(dBC)}priB,{2,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS 
 
dAB,{A,h(dAB)}priA,{2,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]]}priTS 
B 
A 
C D 
Figure 5.10  End-to-End Scheme for Data Integrity 
 
dBD,{4, h(df),[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS, { h(dBD),TDB2}priB 
dBC,{4, h(df),[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS,{ h(dBC),TDB1}priB dAB,{4, h(df),[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS,{ h(dAB),TDA}priA 
B A 
D 
C 
Figure 5.11  End-to-End Scheme for Time-Bound Property 
 
190 
5.6.4.4 End-to-End Receiver Non-Repudiation Scheme 
The scheme derived for the non-repudiation property allows partial release of data as shown in Figure 
5.12. In the initial pass, a server signed message consisting of the trusted path, a hash of the fixed part, 
the data encrypted with a one-time key (such as dOTAB) and the nonce nd  (sent from message-origin to 
distinguish one run from another) are sent. The term dOTAB is formed by encrypting d with a one-time 
key kOTAB, where d is the string formed appending the variable and fixed segments (dOTAB  =  (df  
dvAB)KOTAB).  The key kOTA is despatched only after signed acknowledgement from the recipient, made 
up of the signed trust tree, a hash of the encrypted message and a nonce. If successor 
acknowledgement is not received within a pre-set time limit, an exception is sent to the trust server, 
which acknowledges receipt, thus discharging any liability. This scheme ensures that recipients cannot 
deny data receipt, as the sender can show the acknowledgement to an arbitrator as evidence of receipt. 
Furthermore, recipients are required to forward data to all subsequent nodes along the trusted path.  
 
Assumptions and Invariants: A1, A2, A3, Inv1, Inv2, Inv3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
{kOTBD}priD 
{kOTBC}priC 
{{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,h(dOTB2), nd, D,B }priD 
{kOTAB}priB 
kOTBD 
{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,dOTBD, nd 
kOTBC 
{{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,h(dOTBC), nd, C,B }priC 
{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,dOTBC, nd 
{{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS, h(dOTAB), nd, B,A }priB 
{3,DC,Tree,h(df)}priTS,dOTAB, n(d) 
B 
A C D 
kOTAB 
Figure 5.12 End-to-End Scheme for Non-Repudiation 
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5.6.5 Example: Composed End-to-End Schemes 
This section presents the composed schemes using the methodology outlined in Section 5.6.2.5 which 
requires extended schemes to be combined when basic schemes interfere. 
 
5.6.5.1 End-to-End Scheme Combining Authentication and Time-Bound  
Figure 5.13 shows the scheme meeting authentication and time-bound properties. This scheme, though 
costlier than the authentication scheme alone, can be used when replay attacks needs to be prevented. 
In this scheme each entity or intermediary receives the time of despatch from the previous 
intermediary along the trusted path, signed by its private key, and the data expiry time signed by the 
trust server, in addition to all the other elements included in the authentication scheme. These 
elements, together with non-conflicting invariants for authentication and the time-bound property 
ensure that the combined scheme meets both authentication and time-bound goals (using the 
composition rule). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.5.2 End-to-End Scheme Combining Authentication and Non-Repudiation  
The combined scheme shown in Figure 5.14 was arrived at by combining the non-repudiation scheme 
with an extended (non-conflicting) authentication scheme. End-to-end protocols combining 
authentication and non-repudiation allow data recipients to verify that data was sent through 
authenticated channels before providing non-repudiation evidence. This results in an additional signed 
term in the first step of the non-repudiation scheme associate data with message origin and intended 
destination. Note that the last term in the first step from A to B, B to C and B to D in Figure 5.14, is a 
sender signed term made up of a hash of encrypted data, source and destination information, as well as 
the nonce used in non-repudiation.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
kOTAB 
{kOTAB} priB 
dBD,{7,DC,h(df),B,D,[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS,{h(dBD),TDB2}priB 
 
D 
dBC,{7,DC,h(df),B,C, [A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS},{h(dBC),TDB1}priB dAB,{7,DC,h(df),[A[B[C][D]]],TE}priTS,{h(dAB),A,B,TDA}priA  
B 
A C 
kOTBD 
{{ 6,DC,h(df),Tree}priTS,h(dOTBD), nd, D,B,TRB}priD 
{6,DC,h(df),Tree}priTS,dOTBD,{ h(dOTBD),B,D, nd}priB 
kOTBC 
{{ 6,DC,h(df),Tree}priTS,h(dOTBC), nd, C,B,TRB}priC 
{6,DC,h(df),Tree }priTS,dOTBC,{h(dOTBC),B,C, nd}priB 
{{6, DC,h(df),Tree}priTS, h(dOTAB), nd, B,A}priB 
dOTAB,{6, DC,h(df),Tree }priTS,{h(dOTAB),A,B,nd}priA 
 
D 
B 
A C 
Figure 5.13  End-to-End Scheme for Authentication and  Time-Bound Properties 
 
Figure 5.14 End-to-End Scheme for Authentication and Non-Repudiation 
 
{kOTBC} priC 
{kOTBD} priD 
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5.6.5.3 End-to-End Scheme Combining Non-Repudiation and Time-Bound  
The scheme combining the non-repudiation and extended time-bound schemes is shown in Figure 
5.15. This combined scheme allows recipients to verify that the message is timely before 
acknowledging it. The message originator gets non-repudiable evidence of timely message receipt. 
Such a composite property, for example, may be used when bidding for a business tender that has a 
specific expiry date/time.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.5.4 End-To-End Scheme Combining Authentication and Time-Bound  
The extended time-bound and authentication schemes can be combined with the non-repudiation 
scheme to provide a stronger property, as shown in Figure 5.16. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.6.5.5 Summary of Fine-grained End-to-End Security Schemes 
All the security properties, including the combined ones, are summarised in Table 5.3 based on data d, 
origin O, sender S, receiver R, security-level sl and data trust tree Tree. Note there can be up to four 
hops for a given security-level. The abbreviation TreeN is used for {N,DC,h(df),Tree, …}priTS where N 
is the index for the security property. For example, when N=1, TreeN is {1,DC,h(d),Tree }priTS  and 
when N=13, TreeN is {13,DC, h(d),Tree, TE}priTS  where TE is the time of data expiry. Note that only 
those properties that include the time-bound property (N=4,7,9,10,12,13,14,15) have the additional 
element TE. 
dOTAB,{13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE}priTS, { h(dOTAB),A,B,nd,TDA}priA 
 
{{10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTBD),nd,B,A,TDB2 }priD 
{{10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTBC),nd,B,A,TDB1 }priC 
dOTBD, {10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,nd,{h(d),h(dOTBD),TDB2}priB 
dOTBC, {10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS, nd,{h(dOTBC),TDB1}priB 
Figure 5.16 End-to-End Scheme for Authentication, Non-Repudiation and Time-Bound properties 
kOTBD 
kOTBC 
{{10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTAB),nd,B,A,TDA}priB 
dOTAB,{10,DC,h(df),Tree,TE}priTS,nd,{ h(dOTAB),TDA}priA 
 
kOTAB 
D B 
A C 
{{13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTBD),nd,B,A,TDB2 }priD 
{{13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTBC),nd,B,A,TDB1 }priC 
dOTBD, {13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,{ h(dOTBD),B,D, nd,TDB2}priB 
dOTBC,{ 13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,{ h(dOTBC),B,C,nd,TDB1}priB 
kOTBD 
kOTBC 
{{13,DC,h(df),Tree,TE }priTS,h(dOTAB),nd,B,A,TDA }priB 
kOTAB 
D B 
A C 
Figure 5.15 End-to-End Scheme for Non-Repudiation and Time-Bound Properties 
 
{kOTAB} priB {kOTBC} priC 
{kOTBD} priD 
{kOTAB} priB 
{kOTBC} priC 
{kOTBD} priD 
193 
 
N Security  
Properties 
Security Scheme 
1 {A} S[dSR,TreeN,{S,R,h(dSR)}priS]R 
2 {DI} S[dSR, TreeN, {S,h(dSR)}priS]R 
3 {RNR} S[TreeN,dOTSR, {h(d),h(dOTSR),nd}priS]R●R[TreeN, {h(dOTSR), nd, R,S }priR]S●S[ kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
4 {TB} S[dSR,TreeN,{h(dSR),TDS}]R 
5 {A,DI} S[dSR, TreeN, {S,R,h(dSR)}priS]R 
6 {A,RNR} S[TreeN,dOTSR,{ h(dOTSR),S,R, nd}priS]R●R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR),nd, R,S}priR]S●S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
7 {A,TB} S[dSR,TreeN, {h(dSR),S,R,TDS}priS]R   
8 {DI,RNR} S[d,TreeN, dOTSR, {S,h(dOTSR)}priS,nd]R●R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR), nd, R,S }priB]S●R[ kOTSR]S●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
9 {DI,TB} S[dSR,TreeN,{ {h(dSR),TDS } priTS ]R 
10 {RNR,TB} S[dOTSR, nd,TDA,TreeN { h(dOTSR),TDS}priS ]R ● S[{TreeN, h(dOTSR) nd, R,S,TDS }priR ]R ● S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
11 {A,DI,RNR} S[dOTSR, TreeN,{ h(dOTSR),S,R,nd}priS]R ● R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR), nd, R,S}priR]S ● S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
12 {A,DI,TB} S[dSR,TreeN,{h(dSR),S,R,TDS}priTS]R 
13 {A,RNR,TB} S[dOTSR,TreeN,{ h(dTSR),S,R,TDA,nd}priS]R ●  R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR), nd, R,S,TDS }priR]S ● S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
14 {DI,RNR,TB} S[dOTSR,TreeN,{ h(dTSR),TDA,nd}priS]R ●  R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR), nd, R,S,TDS }priR]S ● S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
15 {A,DI,RNR,T
B} 
S[dOTSR,TreeN,{ h(dOTSR),S,R, TDA,nd}priS]R ●  R[{TreeN, h(dOTSR), nd, R,S,TDS }priR]S ● S[kOTSR]R●R[{kOTSR}priR]S 
 
 
Table 5.3  End-to-End Schemes for Authentication, Non-Repudiation and Time-Bound Properties 
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5.6.6 Reducing the Cost of End-To-End Security Schemes 
This section describes two techniques employed by SSES to reduce the overall computational and 
bandwidth costs of messages sent to multiple recipients. First, it shares common intermediaries and 
endorsements, as shown in Figures 5.9 to 5.16. Second, the security level along any path from data 
originator to recipient cannot be raised. The actual security level is computed as a function of security 
requirements at data originator and recipients, as described in Section 5.6.6.1. This technique, 
however, requires each entity and intermediary to store the necessary schemes for enforcing every 
combination of security properties. Section 5.6.6.2 present the technique devised for reducing the size 
of string (metadata), which contains the trusted path and the required security levels.  
 
5.6.6.1 Variable Security Level for Reduced Overheads 
The security level along any edge is computed by aggregating the security requirements of recipients 
reached through that edge and the security requirement specified by the data originator. In SSES the 
security level cannot be raised along any path as additional evidences may be required from the data 
originator. For example, assume data originating in A must be sent to C and D through intermediary B, 
and that the security requirements at A, B and C are as follows: A:{RNR}, C:{R}, D:{A}. Then the 
minimum security levels along AB, BC and BD are respectively {A,RNR,R}, {RNR,R} and {RNR,A}. 
Assigning the minimum security level along data path helps to lower the cryptographic overheads. 
Then next algorithm automatically assigns the minimum security level without affecting end-to-end 
security. 
 
Overview and Description of Security Level Assignment 
SLA(tpath, oSP, resSPs,) computes the security level for each edge along the trusted path tpath, where 
oSP specifies the security level for the message-originator, and resSPS the security levels for 
recipients. For example, an argument to SLA could consist of the string “[A[B[C][D]][E[F][G]]]” for 
the trusted path tpath, {DI} for oSP, and [(C,{RNR}), (F,{A,RNR})] for resSPs. The algorithm first 
constructs the spanning tree from the trusted path (string) specified before assigning the security 
property oSP to all edges. It then adds to each edge along the tree the security properties of all 
recipients in resSPs reached through that edge. Finally, it forms stpath (string) the trusted path with 
security levels encoded.  
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Input: tpath, oSP, resSPs  
Output: stpath 
 
1. form the spanning tree based on input (string) tpath. 
2. add the security property oSP along all edges of the tree PTree.  
3. for each recipient in resSPs 
for each edge in PTree from origin to the specified recipient 
   add the associated security properties.  
4. form the security encoded trusted path from the spanning tree.  
 
 
The result of applying this algorithm for the specified input is shown in Figure 5.17.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Providing End-to-End Assurances 
SSES allows compatible two-party schemes along the path to be combined to meet end-to-end security 
assurances. In Figure 5.17 the {A,RNR,DI} scheme from  A to E can be combined with the {DI} 
scheme from E to G to provide end-to-end security assurance {DI} between A and G. In general if for 
each data path from originator to recipient the security level enforced exceeds pl, the end-to-end 
assurance pl can be provided for that data. This is because each intermediary along the path uses a 
scheme that contains the necessary evidence to discharge its proof obligation. Composite schemes 
used for providing multiple properties do not interfere with schemes for basic properties. Thus, 
composite schemes for multiple properties can be combined to provide end-to-end security assurance 
for common properties.      
tPath (String) 
“[A[B[C][D]][E[F][G]]]” 
 
oSP (Security Property for Originator) 
Originator Security Properties 
A {DI} 
 
resSPs (Security Properties for Recipients 
Recipient Security Properties 
C {RNR} 
D {} 
F {A,RNR} 
G {} 
 
Figure 5.17 Minimum Security-Level Based on Fine-Grained Security Requirements 
 
Input Output 
{A,RNR,DI} (SPI 11) 
{A,RNR,DI}(SPI 11) 
{DI} (SPI 2) 
{DI} (SPI 2) 
{RNR,DI} (SPI 8) 
{RNR,DI}(SPI 8) 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Table 5.4 Security-Level Assignment Algorithm  
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5.6.6.2 Space Efficient Encoding of Variable Security Levels in Trusted Path 
In SSES, variable security levels are encoded along edges of the trusted path (string) by the trust 
server. The size of such strings is reduced by setting the security level to an edge only if it is different 
from its previous edge. For example, the tree structure in Figure 5.17 is encoded into security encoded 
trusted path stpath as in “[A[B:8[C][D:2]][E:11[F][G:2]]]”. If the security level is not explicitly 
specified when decoding the trusted path (to determine the required security level), it is set to the 
closest edge up the tree with an explicit security level. In “[A[B:8[C][D:2]][E:11[F][G:2]]]”, security 
level along EG is {DI} based on 2 (explicitly specified), and EF is {A,RNR,DI} (implicitly specified) 
based on the SPI 11 assigned to the next closest edge (AE) up the tree.  
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5.7 Discussion 
The framework presented in Chapter 4 helped to alleviate the perception of risk in e-commerce by 
endorsing key messages. However, such endorsements introduce additional security and performance 
challenges. Some of these problems such as the need for accountability, security for data originating in 
a source and intermediaries and reducing the high security overheads are common to many other 
domains. The following sections discuss the techniques devised to address some of these challenges. 
 
5.7.1 Security Schemes Incorporating Intermediary Endorsements 
End-to-end schemes in SSES provide fine-grained security guarantees for data originating in source 
and endorsements made by intermediaries along the trusted path. Valid endorsements are computed on 
the basis of data from the source, data category and previous endorsements if any. Path security is 
enforced by validating data from intermediaries and entities with server signed digest containing the 
trusted path and the hash of data. The proposed solution has a number of benefits. In the past high 
overheads had made it difficult to secure data sent through content transformation intermediaries 
[146]. SSES reduces security overheads by using fine-grained schemes that provide the right level of 
security. Furthermore, SSES allows minimum security levels to be used along each edge of the trusted 
path based on security requirements of data recipients using that edge. SSES also reduces endorsement 
costs by allowing data for multiple recipients to be sent through common endorsers. Schemes for 
content transformation intermediaries must also prevent unauthorised access and alterations [145]. 
SSES server signed digest ensures data from source cannot be tampered by intermediaries while SSES 
secrecy schemes allow additional data elements to be sent with restricted access. The main drawback 
of this technique, however, is the reliance on a common trust server for all data needing endorsement. 
Furthermore assumptions about synchronized clocks between trusted nodes may be difficult to enforce 
in practice unless logical clocks and timestamps are used.  
  
5.7.2 Synthesising End-to-End Schemes from Proof Obligations 
Maintaining centralized trust networks (used in Chapter 4) require end-to-end accountability schemes 
that can detect any misconduct. Accountability schemes provide the explicit evidence necessary to 
discharge any liability in e-commerce [155]. The end-to-end accountability schemes in this chapter 
were derived based on the notion of proof obligations for security properties. Proof obligations allow 
entities and intermediaries to reason about explicit evidences needed to enforce accountability. Any 
intermediary failing to produce the necessary evidence to transfer, delegate or discharge its proof 
obligation is considered to have breached trust assumptions. Destination proof obligations are placed 
on all recipients while source proof obligations are placed on data originators. The work done in this 
thesis deriving accountability schemes differs from past work done, which was primarily used to 
verify whether existing protocols enforce accountability [30, 155].  The applicability of this new 
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approach is not limited to endorsement intermediaries alone; accountability schemes are essential for 
web services, cloud based solutions and content transformation intermediaries. 
   
5.7.3 Mechanism for Enforcing End-to-End Schemes 
If e-commerce entities are to interact dynamically, the end-to-end schemes derived must be made 
available to all interacting entities and intermediaries. The solution presented in SSES uses trust server 
signed metadata containing trusted path and path security levels as a form of protocol description. The 
trust server determines the trusted path on the basis of existing trust relationships and the trust 
requirements specified by the data originator and recipients. The data originator despatches the trust 
server signed metadata containing the protocol description together with the data. Each entity or 
intermediary along the trusted path enforces the specified security level using predefined two-party 
schemes which are combined to meet the end-to-end security requirements at runtime. 
 
5.7.4 Future Work 
This chapter does address problems related to storage, retrieval and revocation of evidences. Also the 
current model reliance on a single trust server can lead to performance bottlenecks and potential loss 
of all data in cases of any security compromise. Hence, a distributed model for trust services must be 
explored. Endorsement functions too are likely to change with time making it necessary to maintain 
different versions to perform the necessary audit.  
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5.8 Conclusion  
End-to-end security is a major research challenge facing content transformation systems, web services 
and e-commerce. Many past solutions for end-to-end security appear to be inadequate partly because 
they do not explicitly capture the interdependencies between trust and security. The proposed 
framework combining trust and security aspects has two main benefits. First, endorsement 
intermediaries can be chosen on the basis of dynamically evolving trust relationships. Second, trust 
and endorsement breaches can be detected using end-to-end accountability schemes. Although a 
number of standard protocols incorporate accountability, no past technique allows end-to-end 
accountability schemes to be derived for a given configuration. In particular, the following 
contributions were made. 
 
 End-to-end schemes devised provide security for both data from source and endorsements by 
intermediaries. The server signed metadata consisting of the trusted path and data hash allows 
intermediaries to validate the data and endorsement path before performing their own 
endorsements. 
   
 End-to-end schemes were derived directly from proof obligations. End-to-end assurances 
follow directly when all proof obligations are discharged. Intermediaries are made accountable 
as the cause of transaction failure can be traced to a trust breach or invalid endorsement of a 
specific intermediary. Any invalid endorsement or trust breach can be proved to a third party 
using explicit cryptographic evidences included in the end-to-end schemes.  
 
 A novel mechanism allowed end-to-end security schemes to be enforced dynamically by 
combining the metadata consisting of trusted path and security levels with sequentially 
composable two-party schemes. Security overheads were reduced by using minimum security 
levels along the path, which are derived by aggregating the security requirements of data 
originator and recipients.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
This thesis has considered the security problems facing e-commerce. Security protocols must be 
synthesised on-the-fly if e-commerce entities with specific security requirements are to collaborate 
dynamically. Before security protocols can be synthesised, however, security properties themselves 
must be defined unambiguously. If security protocols are to be synthesised dynamically for e-
commerce the basic properties must be made to incorporate features such as fair exchange. 
Furthermore, cryptographic protocols for e-commerce must be designed to work within resource 
constraints and bandwidth limitations.  
 
Trust has always played a major role in security protocols. Kerberos and other protocols using public 
key systems rely on trust placed on servers and certification authorities respectively. Such a binary 
trust model, however, is inadequate for modelling trust relationships that exist in the real world. E-
commerce currently lacks an institutional framework where trust between unknown entities can be 
established through category specific endorsement intermediaries. Use of such intermediaries is 
predicated on devising end-to-end security mechanisms that make all intermediaries accountable for 
their actions. Such end-to-end security schemes are also vital for web services and content 
transforming intermediaries where messages are passed through one or more intermediaries. The 
solutions presented allowed: 
 aggregation of end-to-end security requirements using operations defined over fine-grained 
security properties 
 creation of security protocols at runtime combining provably correct security schemes devised 
for fine-grained security properties  
 schemes for delivering data to any number of recipients by interleaving two-party schemes  
 techniques to make security performance trade-offs by estimating computational cost and 
bandwidth based on underlying cryptographic strength 
 reducing the risk of trading with unknown e-commerce entities using category specific 
endorsement intermediaries  
 end-to-end schemes that make intermediaries along the trusted path accountable for their 
actions 
 end-to-end schemes that provide guarantees for both data and endorsements along the path 
 self-regulating trust relationships for endorsement intermediaries based on accountability 
schemes and trust evolution/transfer policies   
 a mechanism to enforce end-to-end schemes dynamically 
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6.1 Research Contributions 
The solutions presented include fine-grained security properties and schemes, a cost model that allows 
trade-offs between security and cost, an institutional trust framework for building trust between 
unknown e-commerce entities, end-to-end schemes that make all intermediaries accountable and a 
mechanism for enforcing end-to-end schemes dynamically. The specific contributions are presented 
below.   
 
A New Mechanism for Quantifying and Reasoning About Security Requirements  
The fine-grained security properties proposed organize security requirements into hierarchical security 
levels using a lattice model. These security levels were formed by combining basic security properties 
providing assurances to data originators and recipients. The meanings of composite properties were 
made precise by standardising the order in which individual properties are enforced. The operators 
defined over them allowed overall security requirements along the path to be expressed as a function 
of security requirements of interacting parties. By defining all security properties in an unambiguous 
way many of the past security flaws caused by multiple interpretations of common security properties 
can be avoided.  The hierarchical structure made it possible to specify exact security requirements, 
thus avoiding overheads caused by over-prescription of security requirements. Standardizing the 
meaning of fine-grained security properties allow security requirements of interacting entities to be 
specified explicitly. Past matchmaking techniques expressed possible transitions using commitments 
or permitted workflow as the basis but did not include security requirements for permitted interactions. 
The security levels in this model with precise meanings attached to them allow such transitions to be 
annotated with the necessary security levels.  
 
Provably Secure Schemes Providing Fine-grained Security Properties 
A new approach allowed e-commerce protocols meeting end-to-end security requirements similar to 
SET protocols to be synthesised at runtime by combining provably correct fine-grained security 
schemes. Though a number of previous attempts have been made to synthesise protocols using 
standard challenge-response mechanisms or composition of protocols, no past attempt was made to 
combine these techniques to form fine-grained security schemes. Furthermore, the long elapsed times 
required for previous synthesis approaches made them unsuitable for service composition. Axioms 
involving protocol actions were used to prove the basic challenge-response schemes devised, while 
invariants enforced by the composition logic guarantee the validity of composite schemes. It was also 
shown that these schemes can be further strengthened to resist common attacks such as type flaw and 
replay attacks. 
  
Cost Model for Synthesised Protocols 
One novel aspect of the proposed synthesis approach was that it combined formal methods used for 
security with performance measures. The bandwidth and computational costs of synthesised protocols 
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were expressed in terms of underlying security strength allowing  selection of protocols with better 
security performance trade-offs. Pervasive use of security protocols across various resource 
constrained devices and bandwidth constrained networks make such trade-offs inevitable. 
Furthermore, by expressing the cost of security in terms of security strength allowed security strength 
to be lowered to meet performance constraints.    
 
Interleaving Technique for Extending Two-Party Schemes 
A novel interleaving technique devised allowed any two-party scheme to be extended to any number 
of recipients at runtime. Such schemes allow data to be delivered in a specific order by piggybacking 
the necessary cryptographic elements. The validity of extended schemes was proved using Strand 
Spaces. The interleaved schemes provide a number of benefits. First, direct evidence from originator 
and recipients are included even though data is sent through third parties. Second, the number of 
protocol steps required at data source is significantly reduced when data must be despatched to 
multiple recipients with various security properties.   
 
Framework for Institutional Trust 
A new institutional trust framework devised for e-commerce can help overcome the perception of risk 
involved in trading with unknown e-commerce entities. This framework allowed key messages to be 
passed through trusted, category specific endorsement intermediaries. The endorsement intermediary 
network consisted of nodes representing trading entities and authorised intermediaries, while edges 
represented the extent of trust relationships between nodes. All intermediaries were made accountable 
for their endorsements. The path endorsement trust proposed gave a measure of indemnity based on 
the number of endorsement intermediaries and the extent of the trust relationships along the path. By 
combining category specific trust and endorsements with security mechanisms for detecting trust 
breaches, the proposed framework provided a much stronger basis for trust propagation than the 
transitive trust models proposed in the past. Large networks were decomposed into hierarchical 
domains using clustering techniques. Simulation results showed average search time for trusted path 
through domains with medium trust coupling grows linearly. Based on these results and the 
hierarchical clustering techniques devised it was estimated that trusted paths can be retrieved within 
one second, even for networks of up to 800,000 nodes. Offline generation of trusted paths can improve 
performance even further. 
 
Self-regulating Centralised Trust Networks  
The trust network was centralized by modelling trust as a derived value based on past conduct, trust 
disposition and trusting beliefs. The network was also made self-regulating using trust transfer and 
trust evolution policies. Trust evolution policies either raised or lowered trust relationships based on 
transaction outcomes. The extent of these changes was made to reflect trusting beliefs in underlying 
domains for the data category. Trust transfer policies allowed new trust relationships to be established 
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reflecting their own trust disposition. Simulation results showed that the trust transfer threshold should 
be varied over time if entities are to build and preserve their trust capital. These simulation results 
demonstrate how optimal trust disposition can be made a function of trusting beliefs in the domain by 
combining trust transfer and trust evolution policies. 
 
Deriving End-to-End Accountability Schemes  
End-to-end accountability schemes were derived using the notion of proof obligations. End-to-end 
accountability schemes for security properties providing assurances to recipients (A,DI,TB)  were 
derived by transferring proof obligations through intermediaries until they were directly discharged 
using evidence from the data originator. Similarly end-to-end accountability schemes for security 
properties providing assurances to data source (RNR) were derived by delegating proof obligations 
through intermediaries until direct evidence were obtained from all final recipients. End-to-end 
assurances follow naturally when all proof obligations are discharged either directly or indirectly. Any 
trust breach or invalid endorsement can be narrowed to a specific intermediary or trading entity that 
fails to discharge its proof obligations. Past research with accountability was mainly restricted to 
verifying whether existing protocols can make participants accountable for their actions. 
 
Enforcing End-to-End Security 
An SSES scheme devised allows the server signed metadata, consisting of data hash, data category, 
trusted path and required security levels along the path, to act as a form of protocol description. Each 
intermediary and recipient along the trusted path enforces these security levels using the proven two 
party schemes in their possession. Such a scheme allowed end-to-end security and trust requirements 
to be met.  
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6.2 Future Work 
Future work could extend the research undertaken in this thesis in a number of different directions. 
Some of the possible areas for research are suggested below. 
 
Endorsement Functions 
The current model does not include implementation details of endorsement functions. More work must 
be carried out about implementation issues dealing with interfaces, quality of service, maintenance and 
access control. 
 
Trust Growth 
Currently, trust growth for successful transactions does not take into account the value of transactions. 
The model can be extended to set rewards and penalties as a function of transaction value. Currently 
trust transfer occurs only when trust relationships exist with trusted neighbours. Trust transfer can be 
extended to consider transitive trust relationships modelling indirect referral in traditional commerce. 
 
Fine-Grained Properties and Schemes 
The security properties can be extended to include other recent properties in e-commerce such as 
anonymity and privacy. Current two-party schemes can incorporate techniques to resist attacks such as 
replay and type-flaw. These can be further strengthened to resist other forms of attacks including 
reflection, oracle and algebraic attacks. Specialized model checkers can be devised to verify whether 
the composed schemes continue to meet the original requirements. Currently composed schemes use 
distinct encryption techniques combining signing with encryption. The overheads for separate signing 
and encryption can be reduced by devising schemes based on signcryption which combines signing 
and encryption into a single operation. 
 
Synthesising Security Protocols for E-Commerce Workflow 
The security schemes devised in this thesis can be extended to e-commerce workflow patterns. This 
requires identifying common patterns including non-deterministic ones and identifying how security 
levels can be aggregated over them. If a knowledge based approach is used, it requires modelling the 
initial world and all possible final worlds. 
 
Varying Security Strength 
The current synthesis framework requires the same security strength to be used throughout the 
protocol. Better security/cost trade-offs are possible if a flexible synthesis framework allows security 
strength to be varied within the same protocol, reflecting the value of data, the type of entities 
exchanging the data and the level of threats posed. Synthesising such protocols require the type of 
entities and their performance/security requirements to be explicitly represented.   
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Glossary 
Correspondence Properties 
Properties that specify temporal relationships between the various events in the protocols such as a 
send event in one entity and a receive event in another. 
 
Combinatorial Explosion  
Exponential growth in the number of possible combinations. 
 
Time Stamp 
A time stamp is the recorded time of an event. The time stamp mechanism is used for a wide variety of 
synchronisation purposes. Time stamps are common in security protocols including Kerebos. 
 
Logical Time Stamp 
Logical time stamp increments a scalar value each time a send/receive event occurs using a logical 
clock. Logical clocks allow data recipients to detect replayed attacks through repeated logical clock 
values and are less costly than maintaining synchronised clocks. 
 
Fair Exchange Protocol 
A fair exchange protocol ensures that no party gains any advantage by prematurely terminating a 
protocol.   
 
One-Time Key  
With one-time key, a private key is used only once to encrypt data which is then decrypted using a 
matching key. One-time keys cannot be identified by analysing successive messages as they are used 
only once.   
 
Spanning Tree 
A spanning tree of a graph is a sub-graph which is a tree (no cycles) that connects all the vertices in 
the graph. 
 
Symmetric Group Key 
Symmetric group keys are identical keys shared by a group to enforce confidentiality.  
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